THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES.

BRITISH MUSEUM

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES.

By THOMAS POWNALL,
Late Governor and Commander in Chief of his Majesty's Provinces, Messachusets-Bay and South-Carolina, and Lieutenant-Governor of New-Jersey.

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Pulchrum est benefacere reipublicæ, etiam bene dicere haud absurdum est. SALLUSTIUS.

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MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM

TO THE

RIGHT HONOURABLE

GEORGE GRENVILLE,

First Lord Commiſſioner of His Majeſty's Treaſury, Chancellor of the Exchequer, &c. &c. &c.

SIR,

WHoever conſiders the importance of the North-American colonies, and the neceſſary connection of their affairs with thoſe of Great Britain, muſt congratulate the public upon having a miniſter, who will take pains to underſtand the commerce and intereſts of the colonies,

who will ſeriouſly enter into the adminiſtration of them, and who is equal in firmneſs to purſue thoſe intereſts in that line only, which connects them with the welfare of the mother country; who, convinced that the mother country has a juſt and natural right to govern the colonies, will yet ſo adminiſter the power of that government in the genuine ſpirit of the Britiſh Conſtitution, as ſhall lead the people of the colonies, by the ſpirit of laws and equity to that true and conſtitutional obedience, which is their real liberty.

The experience I have had in the affairs of the colonies muſt at leaſt have given me a practical knowledge of them: And the relation I have borne to the people has given me an affection for them. Not being employed in any department, wherein that knowledge can be reduced to

to practice, I thought it a duty, if indeed it may be of any uſe, to publiſh my ſentiments on this ſubject; and I have taken the freedom, Sir, of addreſſing them to you.

I have profeſſed an affection for the colonies, becauſe having lived amongſt their people in a private, as well as public character, I know them; I know that in their private ſocial relations, there is not a more friendly, and in their political one, a more zealouſly loyal people, in all his majeſty's dominions.

Whatever appearances or interpretation of appearances, may have raiſed ſome prejudices againſt their conduct on a late occaſion, I will venture to affirm, that fairly, firmly, and openly dealt with, there is not, with all their errors, a people who has a truer ſenſe of the neceſſary

powers of government; and I will reſt the truth of this aſſertion on the good effect, which you will have the pleaſure to ſee derived to this country, and to the colonies, from the firmneſs and candour with which your part of the American buſineſs has been conducted.

When the ſubjects, eſpecially thoſe of a popular ſtate, become alarmed, they are ſoon inflamed; and then their demagogues, perhaps the worſt, as well as the loweſt part of the people, govern. The truly great and wiſe man will not judge of the people from their paſſions — He will view the whole tenor of their principles and of their conduct. While he ſees them uniformly loyal to their King, obedient to his government, active in every point of public ſpirit, in every object of the public welfare — He will not regard what they are led either

to

to ſay or do under theſe fits of alarm and inflammation; he will, finally, have the pleaſure to ſee them return to their genuine good temper, good ſenſe and principles. The true movements of government will again have their effect; and he will acquire an aſcendency over them from the ſteady ſuperiority of his conduct.

While ſuch is the temper of the great miniſter, there cannot be too much caution and prudence exerciſed in preventing the inferior members or officers of government from acting under any ſenſe of reſentment or prejudice, againſt a people improperly ſuppoſed to be under diſfavour: For by the mutual aggravation and provocations of ſuch miſunderſtanding towards each other, even a wiſe people may be driven to madneſs. Let not the Coloniſts imagine that the people of England have any ill idea

of them, or any deſigns of oppreſſing them. The people of England love them. Let not the people of England imagine that the Coloniſts have a wiſh but for their welfare, and to partake of it as fellow-ſubjects — For the people of the colonies would ſacrifice their deareſt intereſts for the honour and proſperity of their mother country; and the laſt wiſh of their hearts will be for ever to belong to it. I have a right to ſay this, becauſe experience has given me this impreſſion of them. I do not ſay it to flatter them; I never did flatter them, when I was connected with them in buſineſs, but I ſpeak it as a truth which I think ſhould be known, leſt the intemperance and imprudence of their falſe or miſtaken patriots ſhould give any undue impreſſions to their diſadvantage, and cauſe any alienation of that natural affection which at preſent ſubſiſts,

and

and will, I hope, for ever ſubſiſt between the people of Great Britain and thoſe of the colonies.

May that miniſter who ſhall interweave the adminiſtration of the colonies into the Britiſh adminiſtration, as a part eſſentially united with it, may he live to ſee the power, proſperity, and honour, that ſo great and important an event muſt give to his country.

With the higheſt eſteem and regard, I have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your moſt obedient,

and moſt humble ſervant,

T. POWNALL.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

A General opinion prevails, that the changes in territory and power in America, muſt create new political intereſts in Europe — — Page 1

As in the early ages of Europe, the power of the ſword firſt ruled the world, and the ſpirit of religion next---ſo now the operations of commerce give that aſcendancy — — 2—4

The nature of the commercial powers which are ariſing in the Atlantic and in America de-

described as the preciſe idea of the preſent criſis of politicks —— 5—7

That theſe are already become the baſis of a commercial intereſt, and will riſe faſt into dominion — — 8

That that European power which ſhall have the wiſdom and vigour to unite theſe powers to its dominion, muſt become the ruling commercial power of Europe 9

That the fortune of the late war hath put theſe into our hands, and that therefore it is the duty of our government, at this criſis, to carry forward this ſtate of things to the weaving of theſe powers into our ſyſtem.

As the riſing of this criſis above deſcribed, forms preciſely *the object* on which government ſhould be employed, ſo the taking leading meaſures, towards the forming all thoſe Atlantic and American poſſeſſions into one empire, A ONE COMMERCIAL EMPIRE, is the preciſe duty of government at this criſis — p. 10

The firſt ſtep muſt commence by forming a practicable and effective adminiſtration at home.

An

CONTENTS.

An American and commercial department, which ſhould be the centre of all official information, and the ſpring of all execution in adminiſtration — p. 11—18

This deſcribed as it doth exiſt in the commiſſion of the board of trade and *plantation*—Where all the great officers of ſtate are officially united in one commiſſion for this preciſe ſervice.—This (not the inefficient committee, commonly called the Board of Trade) ſhewn to be, from the defect of all other ſchemes of buſineſs, the only official centre and ſeat of this American and commercial adminiſtration p. 19—20

The neceſſity of this Board's becoming an acting and efficient part of adminiſtration, if the government of Great Britain is, as it ought to be, in earneſt about its commercial powers, and its American dominions — — p. 20—24

Under a perſuaſion and hope that this Board will, from the nature, and even neceſſity of buſineſs, become active—and act.—The ſubject of colony adminiſtration propoſed — — p. 25

Idea of colonies — p. 25—27

The

CONTENTS.

The vulgar opinion of the Britiſh colonies becoming independent of the mother country obviated — p. 28—29

The different ideas of the rights and privileges of the colonies—as ſuppoſed to be granted by the crown, or derived from the conſtitution, ſtated, and explained on both ideas; and a deciſion of the diſputed points recommended as neceſſary to the liberty of the ſubject, and to the imperium of government — p. 30—38

A more particular reviſion of the conſtitution of the governments of the colonies recommended as a ſettlement of the charter of rights to the people, and as a fixing the rights and juſt powers of government p. 39

Firſt of the rights of legiſlature in the colonies, and extent of the power of royal inſtructions reſtricting theſe rights p. 40—46

That it is abſolutely eſſential to government, on one hand, and to the liberties of the people on the other, and to good policy as reſpecting the whole, that theſe points in diſpute ſhould be ſettled — p. 47

Some

Some particular wrong exertions of this legiſlative power in the colonies—and firſt, of their aſſuming an executive and even judicial power, by orders of the legiſlature not formed into *acts* ſent to England for confirmation — p. 48

Their manner of providing for the ſupport of government and the civil liſt, ſo as to render all the officers of the crown dependant on the aſſemblies p. 49—51

Their taking occaſion from this meaſure thus eſtabliſhed, to aſſume, by commiſſioners of the aſſemblies—the actual adminiſtration and executive power of government in all caſes, civil and military, where money is wanted — p. 52

The neceſſity of aſcertaining the powers of the governor, and of defining thoſe of the aſſemblies. The queſtion ſtated and propoſed for deciſion — p. 53

The neceſſity of maintaining the conſtitutional power of the governor and of the governments, as the beſt ſecurity of the conſtitutional dependence of the colonies on the mother countries, and as the beſt ſecurity of the rights and liberties of the coloniſts— 52

CONTENTS.

These conſtitutions as founded on charters and commiſſion-patents explained 54—56

The danger of ſuperceding theſe powers and conſtitutions by the office of a military commander in chief—

The only danger, occaſion or ſource of revolt in the colonies will be derived from the powers of this commiſſion—and its becoming a principle of union under ſuch power to the colonies who are otherwiſe incapable of ſuch union—The effect of this meaſure pointed out from reaſon and experience — — 56—68

What may be the probable intentions of government on this head—and ſome ideas of a mode of eſtabliſhment for the military power in America ſuggeſted 69—71

The review of the colony conſtitutions continued—in the eſtabliſhment and practice of their courts of law. Some diſputed points on this head ſtated——and the idea of a circuiting court of appeals and equity, as much wanted in America, propoſed—as alſo the defect of ſuch court of appeals here in England for American affairs pointed out —— 72—85

The making the governor's council and the legiſlative council diſtinct in their conſtitution as well as offices propoſed 85—86

The neceſſity of a reviſion and concerted delegation of the ſeveral powers granted to the reſpective officers of the crown in America, by the ſeveral Offices and Boards in England —— —— 87

The true and real Board of Trade and Plantations can alone extend to theſe caſes, which muſt conſtantly ariſe in the adminiſtration of the colonies; this Board ought therefore to become efficient, and to act 88

Of American revenues and money. The queſtion as to Great Britain taxing the coloniſts ſtated —— —— 89

Theſe taxes diſtinguiſhed by funds which relate to the general ſervice, and funds which ſpecially lye within each reſpective colony. That the firſt ſeem the proper objects of government in general, while the others ſeem proper to be left to the colonies unincumbered by parliament. 90

Of the firſt, cuſtoms, ſtamps, exciſe 91—93

Of

Of the ſecond—viz. Polls and eſtates real and perſonal—That theſe being the more eſpecial property of each colony, are the natural internal funds of ſuch—and for that reaſon the moſt proper to be left for the reſpective colony taxes—That the nature and extent of theſe are known to government—and that they are adequate to the internal ſervices and ſupport of government in thoſe colonies 94—99

The leaving to the colonies theſe internal funds unincumbered by parliament, ſhould remove every oppoſition to thoſe taxes laid on the general funds, of the firſt ſort for the general ſervice —— 100

Other objects of colony revenue. The quit-rents, fines, waifs, ſtrays, &c.—the neceſſity of ſome reviſion and reform in theſe, as alſo at the ſame time of rendering the office of auditor of the plantations an efficient office —— p. 101

The ſtate of the money and currency in the colonies conſidered—and the neceſſity of ſome meaſure of ſecuring or providing ſuch to the colonies —— p. 102

Of

CONTENTS.

Of ſilver—as a meaſure, a depoſite in trade, and as an inſtrument of forenſic uſe p. 103—105

A corollary of the foregoing propoſitions p. 106

Of ſuffering the colonies to ſupply themſelves with ſilver by an undeſcribed trade, and of leaving that ſilver to its own operation in the colonies — p. 106

Of ſupplying the colonies by a mint p. 107—108

————by a paper currency p. 109

Provincial bank mentioned p. 109

Penſylvania emiſſion of paper-money by loan——and the meaſure of the loan-office recommended — p. 110

The publication of ſome very principal matters intended for this place, ſuſpended for the preſent —— —— p. 111

Deſcription and conſideration of the ordinary mode of paper-money p. 112

On what the regulations of this currency

muſt turn——viz. The fund—the uſes—
the quantity —— p. 112

Mr. Francis's conſiderations on a paper-currency here publiſhed as the beſt written treatiſe on this ſubject — p. 114

Of the nature of value in things p. 115

Value——as the uſes directly,
as the quantity inverſely p. 116

Regulating the uſes is one of the powers over value——limiting the quantity is another p. 117

This applied to money, and its effects on lands, labour, and commodities,

The value of paper-money depends upon the regulations of the fund, the uſes, and the quantity —— p. 122

Of the fund —— p. 123—124

Of the uſes —— —— p. 125

How this paper-money derives its value from the uſes —— —— 126

That it ought to have all the uſes of ſilver money

money within that colony which creates it —— —— p. 127---128

Paper-money, after the enacting of the law which creates it, ſhould be received in lieu of ſilver, for debts contracted in ſilver before the law, as well as after; but as its real, not its nominal, value, ſo as that an equitable compenſation is paid, p. 129—134

Objections to this, 1ſt, By this the legiſlature will confeſs the inferior worth of the paper; 2dly, That leſſening the current value will be a loſs to the community in general. The firſt anſwered, p. 135—140

The ſecond anſwered — p. 141—146

Finally, that the public authority cannot in fact give this paper-money any other currency than its real value——without incurring the guilt of breach of public faith, and giving occaſion to all the evil conſequences of debauching the morals of the people —— p. 147

That this value muſt find its own level p. 148

Of the fund (end of this treatiſe) p. 149--150

That a certain quantity of paper-money is neceſſary in the colonies p. 151

How to know when it is neceſſary to increaſe or diminiſh this currency p. 151

That the colony legiſlatures ſhould not be able to make this paper-money a legal tender —— —— p. 153

This the true remedy againſt a fallacious depreciating currency——and the true occaſion to a currency of real value, p. 154

Of Indian affairs

Of Indian politicks as derived from the nature and circumſtances of the Indians p. 155—161

Of the different ideas under which the Indians granted, and the Europeans obtained grants of ſettlements from the Indians—— and of the reſpective conduct of each people in conſequence of theſe ideas p. 161—162

Of the European encroachments—Of their unfair trading——Of thei groundleſs and unjuſt claim of dominion over the Indians p. 102

Indian hoſtilities if not open actual war, the effect of theſe meaſures, the diſtreſs that muſt be the conſequence to our ſettlers, ſo unequal to an Indian enemy, p. 163—164

The great expence of engaging in ſuch an uſeleſs faithleſs meaſure as war with the Indians —— —— p. 165

Every good end better obtained by a faithful obſervance of our alliance with them, ibid.

The Indian rights ſtated; and firſt of thoſe of the Five Nations——their dwelling lands and hunting grounds deſcribed p. 166—168

Of their conveyance of theſe to the Engliſh in truſt —— —— p. 169

The deed inſerted —— p. 170—174

Of the manner in which we have executed this ſolemn truſt —— p. 175—176

Some particular encroachments pointed out p. 177

How theſe ſhould be remedied p. 178

Errors and injuſtice of the like nature referred

red to in the caſe of the Delawares, Shawaneſe and ſouthern tribes p. 179

That conduct which is ſuppoſed to be our beſt and right politicks pointed out, 1ſt, To form our conduct by the real ſpirit of our alliance. 2dly, To redreſs the grievances complained of by the Indians in their lands. 3dly, Giving up our claim to dominion over them p. 179

4thly, The eſtabliſhing an adminiſtration for Indian affairs in America p. 180

5thly, Making proper regulations for the Indian trade —— p. 181

The laws for regulating the colony trade, and the principles of the act of Navigation explained p. 181—183

Of the right application of this principle, which by eſtabliſhing Britiſh markets in foreign countries by means of the colony-trade, would be the true method of extending the Britiſh trade p. 184—185

Of the manner in which this principle, thus underſtood, may be carried into practice, p. 186—190

A pro-

CONTENTS.

A propoſal of eſtabliſhing a mart in the Weſt-Indies for Eaſt-India goods, p. 191

Reviſion of the ſugar act recommended—— p. 192—195

The attention and caution neceſſary at the markets which may be formed at the iſland St. Peter's, and at New Orleans, p. 195

A reviſion of the laws relative to naval ſtores, neceſſary, particularly as to the maſt Pines. The allowing a free maſting on all lands not yet granted, and the making all Pines growing on lands already granted, private property, together with a bounty on all maſts brought to the water-ſide, recommended — p. 196—198

When the laws for regulating the plantation-trade ſhall be formed agreeably to the true ſpirit of that trade, as a ſubordinate branch of the general commerce of Great Britain——Government cannot be too careful and exact in ſeeing them carried into execution—On the other hand, until theſe laws ſhall be ſome way accommodated, as far as can be, to that ſtate of commerce which is neceſſary to the colonies, the danger and inconvenience of too rigid an execution of them pointed out — p. 198—200

The

CONTENTS.

The concluſion——Proper regulations, on a reviſion, made as to their governments, their laws, and courts of juſtice, their money, their revenues, Indian affairs, and their trade, ſo as to eſtabliſh the adminiſtration of the colonies, on the true baſis of the political and commercial intereſt of Great Britain, and meaſures taken to interweave that into the Britiſh adminiſtration as an eſſential part of it, muſt lead to the forming the poſſeſſions of Great Britain, in the Atlantic and in America, into one united dominion, p. 201

Courts of Judicature pa. 78.
Laws of Trades &c. — 79
appeals — 82 - 83 &c.
Rivalship bet: Officers 87
Right of Taxation &c. 90
Mode & amount &c. — 100
coin & Money 102
Spanish Trade & Silver 104
that is said pa: 106 — may be also applied
to the attempt lately made ab.t weights
Act of Navigation to be Enforced p. tot 107
currency — paper or Bank — 108
considerations on P.ce — 114
Indians & their Affairs — 155.

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

THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COLONIES.

THE ſeveral changes in intereſts and territories, which have taken place in the colonies of the European world on the event of Peace, have occaſioned a general idea of ſome new ſtate of things ariſing, of ſome new channel of buſineſs opening which may be applied to new powers;——which ought to be guarded againſt, on one hand, or that is to be carried to advantage on the other. There is an univerſal apprehenſion of ſome new criſis forming: yet one does not find any one preciſe comprehenſive idea of this criſis: and conſequently, all that is propoſed, is by parts, without connection to any whole; in tem-

porary expedients without general reference to that eventual ſtate of things which may be the effect of ſuch meaſures or expedients. Our politicks have regard only to particular branches, without any ſyſtematical police, directed to the intereſt of all as of a One Whole.

This ſtate of the buſineſs has tempted me to hazard my ſentiments on this ſubject. My particular ſituation in time paſt gave me early opportunity of ſeeing and obſerving the ſtate of things, which have been long leading to this criſis. I have ſeen and mark'd, where it was my duty, this naſcent criſis at the beginning of this war, and may affirm, have foreſeen and foretold the events that now form it. My preſent ſituation by which I ſtand unconnected with the politics of miniſtry, or of the colonies, opens the faireſt occaſion to me of giving to the public, whom it concerns, ſuch an impartial uninfluenced opinion of what I think to be the right of things, as I am convinced the following ſheets contain. I know what effect this conduct will have, what it has had, on this work and on myſelf. I may be thought neither by the miniſtry nor the Coloniſts to underſtand this ſubject, the one may call this work the viſion of a theoriſt, the other will repreſent the doctrine which it contains, as

the

the prejudices of power and ambition. The one may think me an advocate for the politicks of the colonies, the other will imagine me to be an evil counſellor againſt the colonies to the miniſtry: But as I know that my aim is, without any prudential view of pleaſing others or of my own intereſt, to point out and to endeavour to eſtabliſh an idea of the true intereſt of the colonies, and of the mother country as related to the colonies, I ſhall equally diſregard what varies from this on the one hand, and equally reject what deviates from it on the other.

In the firſt uncultur'd ages of Europe, when men ſought nothing but to poſſeſs, and to ſecure poſſeſſion, the power of the *ſword* was the predominant ſpirit of the world; it was that, which formed the Roman empire; and it was the ſame, which, in the declenſion of that empire, divided again the nations into the ſeveral governments formed upon the ruins of it.

When men afterward, from leiſure, began to exerciſe the powers of their minds in (what is called) learning; religion, the only learning at that time, led them to a concern for their ſpiritual intereſts, and conſequently led them under their ſpiritual guides. The power of *religion* would hence as naturally

predominate and rule, and did actually become the ruling ſpirit of the policy of Europe. It was this ſpirit, which, for many ages formed, and gave away kingdoms; this which created the anointed Lords over them, or again excommunicated and execrated theſe ſovereigns; this that united and allied the various nations, or plung'd them into war and bloodſhed; this, that formed the ballance of the power of the whole, and actuated the ſecond grand ſcene of Europe's hiſtory.

But ſince the people of Europe have formed their communication with the commerce of Aſia; have been, for ſome ages paſt, ſettling on all ſides of the Atlantic Ocean, and in America, have been poſſeſſing every ſeat and channel of commerce, and have planted and raiſed that to an intereſt which has taken root;—ſince they now feel the powers which derive from this, and are extending it to, and combining it with others; the ſpirit of *commerce* will become that predominant power, which will form the general policy, and rule the powers of Europe: and hence a grand commercial intereſt, the baſis of a great commercial dominion, under the preſent ſcite and circumſtances of the world, will be formed and ariſe. The riſe and forming of this commercial intereſt is what preciſely conſtitutes the preſent criſis.

The

The European poſſeſſions and intereſts in the Atlantic and in America lye under various forms, in plantations of ſugar, tobacco, rice, and indigo, in farms of tillage and paſture, in fiſheries, Indian hunts, foreſts, naval ſtores, and mines; each different ſcite produces ſome ſpecial matter of ſupply neceſſary to one part of that food and raiment become requiſite to the preſent ſtate of the world; but is, as to its own local power of produce, totally deſtitute of ſome other equally neceſſary branch of ſupply. The various nature of the lands and ſeas lying in every degree and aſpect of climate, and the ſpecial produce and vegetation that is peculiar to each, forms this local limited capacity of produce. At the ſame time that nature has thus confined and limited the produce of each individual ſcite to one, or at moſt to few branches of ſupply, at the ſame time hath ſhe extended the neceſſities of each to many branches beyond what its own produce can ſupply. The Weſt India iſlands produce ſugar, meloſſes, cotton, &c. they want the materials for building and mechanics, and many the neceſſaries of food and raiment: The lumber, hides, the fiſh, flour, proviſions, live-ſtock, and horſes, produced in the northern colonies on the continent, muſt ſupply the iſlands with theſe requiſites. On the other hand, the ſugar and meloſſes of the

ſugar iſlands is become a neceſſary intermediate branch of the North American trade and fiſheries. The produce of the Britiſh ſugar iſlands cannot ſupply both Great Britain and North America with the neceſſary quantity; this makes the meloſſes of the foreign ſugar iſlands alſo neceſſary to the preſent ſtate of the North American trade. Without Spaniſh ſilver, become neceſſary to the circulation of the Britiſh American trade, and even to their internal courſe of ſale and purchaſe, not only great part of that circulation muſt ceaſe to flow, but the means of purchaſing the manufactures of Great Britain would be equally circumſcribed: Without the Britiſh ſupplies, the Spaniſh ſettlements would be ſcarce able to carry on their culture, and would be in great diſtreſs. The ordinary courſe of the labour and generation of the negroes in the Weſt India iſlands makes a conſtant external ſupply of theſe ſubjects neceſſary, and this connects the trade of Africa with the Weſt Indies; the furr and Indian trade, and the European goods neceſſary to the Indian, are what form the Indian connection.—I do not enter into a particular detail of all the reciprocations of thoſe wants and ſupplies, nor into a proof of the neceſſary interconnections ariſing from thence; I only mark out the general *traites* of theſe, in order to explain what I mean when I ſay, that by the limitation

of

of the capacities and extent of the neceſſities of each, all are interwoven into a neceſſary intercourſe of ſupplies, and all indiſſolubly bound in an union and communion of *one general compoſite intereſt* of the whole of the Spaniſh, French, Dutch, Daniſh, and Britiſh ſettlements. This is the *natural ſtate* of the European poſſeſſions in the Atlantic and in America; this general communion is that natural intereſt under which, and by which, they muſt ſubſiſt. On the contrary, the ſpirit of policy, by which the mother countries ſend out and on which they eſtabliſh colonies, being to confine the trade of their reſpective colonies ſolely to their own ſpecial intercourſe, and to hold them incommunicable of all other intercourſe or commerce, the *artificial or political ſtate* of theſe colonies becomes diſtinct from that which is above deſcribed as their natural ſtate.—The political ſtate is that which policy labours to eſtabliſh by a principle of repulſion; the natural one is that ſtate under which they actually exiſt and move by a general, common, and mutual principle of attraction. This one general intereſt thus diſtinct muſt have ſome one general tendency or direction diſtinct alſo, and peculiar to its own ſyſtem. There muſt be ſome center of theſe compoſite movements, ſome lead that will predominate and govern in this general intereſt—

That particular branch of buſineſs and its connections in this general commercial intereſt, which is moſt extenſive, neceſſary, and permanent, ſettles and commands the market; and thoſe merchants who actuate this branch muſt acquire an aſcendency, and will take the lead of this intereſt. This lead will predominate throughout the general intercourſe, will diſſolve the effect of all artificial connections which government would create, and form the natural connections under which theſe intereſts actually exiſt,—will ſuperſede all particular laws and cuſtoms, and operate by thoſe which the nature and actual circumſtances of the ſeveral intereſts require. This lead is the foundation of a commercial dominion, which, whether we attend to it or not, will be formed: whether this idea may be thought real or viſionary is of no conſequence as to the exiſtence and proceſſion of this power, for the intereſt, that is the baſis of it, is already formed;—yet it would become the wiſdom, and is the duty of thoſe who govern us, to profit of, to poſſeſs, and to take the lead of it already formed and ariſing faſt into dominion; it is our duty ſo to interweave thoſe naſcent powers into, and to combine their influence with, the ſame intereſts which actuate our own government; ſo to connect and combine the operations of our trade with this intereſt, as to partake of

its

its influence and to build on its power. Although this intereſt may be, as above deſcribed, different and even diſtinct from the peculiar intereſts of the mother countries, yet it cannot become independent, it muſt, and will fall under the dominion of *ſome* of the potentates of Europe. The great queſtion at this criſis is, and the great ſtruggle will be, which of thoſe ſtates ſhall be in thoſe circumſtances, and will have the vigour and wiſdom ſo to profit of thoſe circumſtances, as to take this intereſt under its dominion, and to unite it to its government. This lead ſeemed at the beginning of the late war to oſcillate between the Engliſh and French, and it was in this war that the dominion alſo hath been diſputed. The lead is now in our hands, we have ſuch connection in its influence, that, whenever it becomes the foundation of a dominion, that dominion muſt be ours.

It is therefore the duty of thoſe who govern us, to carry forward this ſtate of things to the weaving of this lead into our ſyſtem, that Great Britain may be no more conſidered as the kingdom of this Iſle only, with many appendages of provinces, colonies, ſettlements, and other extraneous parts, but as a grand marine dominion conſiſting of our poſſeſſions in the Atlantic and in America

united

united into a one Empire, in a one center, where the ſeat of government is.

As the riſing of this criſis above deſcribed, forms preciſely the *object* on which government ſhould be employed; ſo the taking leading meaſures towards the forming all thoſe Atlantic and American poſſeſſions into one Empire of which Great Britain ſhould be the commercial and political center, is the *preciſe duty* of government at this criſis.

The great miniſter, whoſe good fortune ſhall have placed him at this criſis, in the adminiſtration of theſe great and important intereſts—will certainly adopt the ſyſtem which thus lies in nature, and which by natural means alone, if not perverted, muſt lead to a general dominion, founded in the general intereſt and proſperity of the commercial world, muſt build up this country to an extent of power, to a degree of glory and proſperity, beyond the example of any age that has yet paſſed;—* *id eſt viri et ducis non deeſſe fortunæ præbenti ſe, et oblata caſu flectere ad concilium.*

The forming ſome general ſyſtem of adminiſtration, ſome plan which ſhould be (whatever may be the changes of the mini-

* Liv. l. 28. § 44.

ſtry

ſtry at home, or in the governors and officers employed abroad) uniformly and permanently purſued by meaſures founded on the actual ſtate of things as they ariſe, leading to this great end, *is, at this criſis, the preciſe duty of government.* This is an object which ought not to be overlooked or miſtaken. It ought not to be a ſtate myſtery, nor can be a ſecret. If the Spaniſh, French, and Dutch governments can oppoſe it, they will; but if it be founded in nature, ſuch oppoſition will only haſten its completion, becauſe any meaſures of policy which they can take to obſtruct it, muſt either deſtroy the trade of their own colonies, or break off their connection. If they attempt to do this by force, they muſt firſt form an alliance, and ſettle the union of their mutual intereſts, and the eventual partition of the effect of it; but this will prove a matter of more difficulty, than can eaſily be compaſſed, and under the diſadvantages created thereby, there will be much hazard of the utmoſt effort of their united forces.

To enable the Britiſh nation to profit of theſe preſent circumſtances, or of the future events, as they ſhall ſucceſſively ariſe in the natural proceſſion of effects, it is neceſſary, that the adminiſtration form itſelf into ſuch eſtabliſhments for the direction of theſe intereſts

tereſts and powers, as may keep them in their natural channel, as may maintain their due connections with the government, and lead them to the utmoſt effect they are capable of producing towards this grand point.

The firſt ſpring of this direction, the baſis of this government, is the adminiſtration at home. If that department of adminiſtration, which ſhould have the direction of theſe matters, be not wiſely and firmly bottomed, be not ſo built, as to be a *practical*— be not ſo really ſupported by the powers of government, as to be an *efficient adminiſtration*, all meaſures for the adminiſtration of theſe intereſts, all plans for the government of theſe powers are vain and ſelf-deluſive; even thoſe meaſures that would regulate the movements and unite the intereſts under a practical and efficient adminiſtration, become miſchievous meddling impertinencies where that is not, and muſt either ruin the intereſts of theſe powers, or render a breach of duty neceſſary to avoid that ruin.

That part of government, which ſhould adminiſter this great and important branch of buſineſs, ought, in the firſt place, to be the center of all information and application from all the intereſts and powers which form it; and ought from this center, to be able, fully,

fully, uniformly, and efficiently, to diſtribute its directions and orders. Wherever the wiſdom of ſtate ſhall determine that this center of information ſhall be fixed; from whatever department all appointments, orders, and executive adminiſtration ſhall iſſue, it ought ſomewhere to be fixed, known, of record, and undivided; that it may not be partial, it ought to extend to all times, and all caſes. All application, all communication, all information ſhould center immediately and ſolely in this department: this ſhould be the ſpring of all nominations, inſtructions, and orders.——It is of little conſequence where this power of adminiſtration is placed, ſo that the department be ſuch, as has the means of knowledge of its buſineſs—is ſpecially appropriated to the attention neceſſary to it—and officially ſo formed as to be in a capacity of executing it. Whether this be a Secretary of State, or the Board of Trade and Plantations, is of no conſequence; but it ought to be intirely in either the one or the other. Where the power for the direction is lodged, there ought all the knowledge of the department to center; therefore all officers, civil or military, all ſervants of the government, and all other bodies or private perſons ought to correſpond immediately with this department, whether it be the Secretary of State or the Board of Trade.

While

While the military correſpond with the Secretary of State, the civil in one part of their office with the Secretary of State, in another with the Board of Trade; while the navy correſpond in matters not merely naval with the Admiralty, while the engineers correſpond with the Board of Ordnance, officers of the revenue with the ſeveral boards of that branch, and have no communication with the department which has, or ought to have, the general direction and adminiſtration of this great Atlantic and American, this great commercial intereſt, who is to collect? who does, or ever did collect, into a one view, all theſe matters of information and knowledge? What department ever had, or could have, ſuch general direction of it, as to diſcuſs, compare, rectify and regulate it to an official real uſe? In the firſt place, there never was yet any one department form'd for this purpoſe; and in the next, if there was, let any one acquainted with buſineſs dare to ſay, how any attempt of ſuch department would operate on the jealouſies of the others. Whenever, therefore, it is thought proper (as moſt certainly it will, ſome time or other, tho' perhaps too late) to form ſuch department, it muſt (if I may ſo expreſs myſelf) be ſovereign and ſupreme, as to every thing relating to it; or to ſpeak plainly out, *muſt*

be a ſecretary of ſtate's office in itſelf. When ſuch is form'd, although the military, naval, ordnance, and revenue officers, ſhould correſpond, in the matters of their reſpective duties, with the departments of government to which they are more immediately ſubordinate and reſponſible, yet, in general matters of information, or points which are matters of government, and the department of this ſtate office, they ſhould be inſtructed to correſpond and communicate with this miniſter. Suppoſe that ſome ſuch miniſter or office now exiſted, is it not of conſequence that he ſhould be acquainted with the Geography of our new acquiſitions? If, therefore, there have been any actual ſurveys made of them, ſhould not ſuch, or copies of ſuch, be ſent to this miniſter or office? If a due and official information of any particular conduct in our colonies, as to their trade, might lead to proper regulations therein, or might point out the neceſſity of a reviſion of the old laws, or the making further proviſion by new ones, would it not be proper that the cuſtom-houſe officers ſettled there ſhould be directed to correſpond and communicate with this miniſter, or office, on theſe points? Would it interfere with their due ſubordination, as officers of the revenue, to the commiſſioners of the cuſtoms?—If there were any events ariſing,

or any circumſtances exiſting, that might affect the ſtate of war or peace, wherein the immediate application of military operations were not neceſſary or proper, ſhould not the military and naval officers be directed to communicate on theſe matters with this miniſter, or office? Should not, I ſay, all theſe matters of information come officially before this miniſter, if any ſuch ſtate miniſter, or office, was eſtabliſhed?

As of information and knowledge centering in a one office, ſo alſo of power of executing, it ſhould ſpring from one undivided department. Where the power of nominating and diſmiſſing, together with other powers, is ſeparated from the power of directing, the firſt muſt be a mere privilege or perquiſite of office, uſeleſs as to the king's buſineſs or the intereſt of his colonies, and the latter muſt be inefficient. That office, which neither has the means of information, nor can have leiſure to attend to the official knowledge produced thereby, nor will be at the trouble to give any official directions, as to the ordinary courſe of the adminiſtration of the American matters, muſt certainly be always, as it is, embarraſſed with the power of nomination, and fetter'd with the chain of applications, which that power drags after it. On the other hand, what

effect

effect will any inſtructions, orders or directions, have from that board, which has not intereſt to make or diſmiſs one of the meaneſt of its own officers: this, which is at preſent the only official channel, will be deſpiſed; the governors, nay, every the meaneſt of the officers in the plantations, looking up ſolely to the *giving power*, will ſcarce correſpond with the *directing*—nay, may perhaps contrive to make their court to the one, by paſſing by the other. And in any caſe of improper conduct of theſe officers, of any neglect of duty, or even of miſdemeanour; what can this directing power do, but complain to the miniſter who nominates, againſt the officers appointed by him? If there be no jealouſies, no interfering of intereſts, no competitions of interfering friends, to divide and oppoſe theſe two offices to each other: if the miniſter is not influenced to continue, upon the ſame motives upon which he firſt appointed; if he does not ſee theſe complaints in a light of oppoſition to his nomination and intereſt; ſome redreſs may, after a due hearing between the party and the office, be had;—the authority of the board may be ſupported, and a ſort of remedy applied to the ſpecial buſineſs, but a remedy worſe than the diſeaſe—a remedy that diſhonours that board, and holds it forth to

the contempt of thoſe whom it ought to govern.

It is not only from the natural impracticability of conducting this adminiſtration under a divided State of power and direction, that the neceſſity of forming a ſome one ſtate office, or miniſter of ſtate, for the executing it ariſes: but the very nature of the buſineſs of this department, makes the officer who is to adminiſter it a ſtate officer, a miniſter for that department, and who ought to have immediate acceſs to the cloſet. I muſt here repeat, that I am no partizan of the Secretary of State's office, or for the Board of Trade: I have ceaſed to have any connection of buſineſs with either, and have not the leaſt degree of communication with the one or the other. Without reference, therefore, to either, but with all deference to both, I aim to point out, that the department of the adminiſtration of Trade and plantations, be it lodged where it may, ſhould be a State office, and have a miniſter of ſtate. That office, or officer, in a commercial nation like this, who has the cognizance and direction (ſo far as Government can interfere) of the general trade of the kingdom—whoſe duty it is to be the depoſitory and reporter of the ſtate and condition of it; of every thing which may advance or obſtruct it, of the

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ſtate of manufactures, of the fiſheries, of the employment of the poor, of the promoting the labour and riches of the country, by ſtudying and adviſing every advantage, that can be made of every event which ariſes in commercial politics; every remedy, which can remove any defect or obſtruction;—who is officially to prepare every proviſion or reviſion neceſſary in the laws of trade, for the conſideration of parliament; and to be the conductor of ſuch thro' the neceſſary meaſures—is certainly an officer of ſtate, if the Secretary of State, ſo call'd, is. That office, or officer, who has cognizance and direction of the plantations in every point of government, in every matter judicial or commercial; who is to direct the ſettlements of colonies, and to ſuperintend thoſe already ſettled; who is to watch the plantations in all theſe points, ſo far as they ſtand related to the government, laws, courts and trade of the mother country——is certainly an officer of ſtate, if the Secretary of State, ſo called, is. That office, or officer, who is to report to his Majeſty in council on all theſe points; whoſe official *fiat*, or negative, will be his Majeſty's information in council, as to the legiſlature in the colonies—is certainly an officer of ſtate. That office, or officer, who is to hear and determine on all matters of complaint, and mal-adminiſtration, of

the crown officers and others, in the plantations; and can examine witneſſes on oath —is ſurely an officer of ſtate. That office, or officer, who is to correſpond with all the ſervants of the crown on theſe points, and to be the iſſuer of his Majeſty's orders and inſtructions to his ſervants, on theſe many, great, and important points of ſtate—is certainly his Majeſty's ſecretary, and certainly a ſecretary of ſtate.

But if it be conſidered further, who the perſons are, that conſtitute the very great and extenſive commiſſion of the Board of Trade and Plantations; namely, all the great officers of ſtate for the time being, with the biſhop of London, the ſecretaries of ſtate for the time being, and thoſe more eſpecially called the commiſſioners of trade, it will be ſeen, that it is no longer a doubt or a queſtion, as to its being an office of ſtate: it is actually ſo; and has, as an office, as a board, immediate acceſs to his Majeſty in council, even to the reporting and recommending of officers. This was the plan whereon it was originally founded, at its firſt inſtitution, by Lord Sommers.

That great ſtateſman and patriot ſaw that all the powers of government, and ſeveral departments of adminiſtration diſunited, were

were interfering with, and obſtructing each other on this ſubject, and not they only here in England, but that the reſpective officers of theſe ſeveral departments carried all this diſtraction into the detail of their buſineſs in the colonies, which I am afraid is too much the caſe even at this day: he ſaw that this adminiſtration could not be conducted but by an intire union of all the powers of government, and on that idea formed the board of trade and plantations, where, and where alone, theſe powers were *united in a one office.* In which office, and in which alone, all the buſineſs of the colonies ought therefore to be adminiſtred; for if ſuch union be neceſſary, here alone is that *official union.* Unhappily for the true intereſt of government, partly from an intire neglect of this adminiſtration in time paſt, and partly from the defective partial exerciſe of it, ſince ſome idea of theſe matters began again to revive, this great and wiſe plan hath been long diſuſed; but it is fortunate for the public in this important criſis, that ſuch is the temper of particulars, ſuch the zeal of all for his Majeſty's ſervice, ſuch the union of his ſervants, that the ſpirit of ſervice predominates over theſe natural defects: ſo that all who wiſh well to the intereſt of this country, in its trade and colonies, may hope to ſee that union, at preſent only miniſterial, be-

come *official* in this buſineſs, and revive again that great, wiſe, and conſtitutional plan of office, actuated under the real ſpirit of it.

The only queſtion at preſent is, who ſhall be the executive officer of this department of ſtate; whether the ſecretary of ſtate, properly ſo called; or the firſt lord, and other commiſſioners, properly called *the board of trade*; or whether it ſhall remain divided, as it is, between the ſeveral great departments of adminiſtration; *or whether ſome more official and practical diviſion of this adminiſtration may not be made.*

Suppoſe now, it ſhould be thought proper, that this adminiſtration be placed in the ſecretary of ſtate's office, all the adminiſtration of the plantations may be given to the ſouthern department: yet the great object of the general trade of Great Britain muſt be divided between the ſouthern and the northern, as the matters of conſideration happen to lye in the one or in the other department; and how will the ſouthern department act, when any matter of commerce ariſes in the plantations, that has ſpecial connections or interferings with the Dutch, Hamborough, Daniſh or Ruſſian trade?

It cannot lie in the board of trade, properly ſo called, until it be found proper, and becomes a meaſure of government to erect that board into a ſecretary of ſtate's office for this department, which, firſt or laſt, it moſt certainly will do. That, therefore, the great buſineſs of trade and plantations may not run into confuſion, or be at a ſtand;—that it may be carried to the effect propoſed, held forth, and deſired by government, and neceſſary to it; all that can be done at preſent is, to put the whole executive adminiſtration, the nomination, correſpondence, iſſuing of conſtructions, orders, *&c.* under the ſecretary of ſtate, if he has leiſure to attend to it, and can undertake it; and to make the board of trade a mere committee of reference and report; inſtead of reporting to the king in council, to report to the ſecretary of ſtate, who ſhall lay the matters before his Majeſty, and receive and iſſue his orders;—who ſhall refer all matters to this committee, for their conſideration, and ſhall conduct through the legiſlature all meaſures neceſſary to be determined thereby. If this be not practicable, there is no other alternative, than to do directly what ought to be done, and what, ſome time or other, muſt be done; the making the officer who conducts this department a miniſter for that department, with all the powers neceſſary thereto. For

until a practical and efficient adminiſtration be formed, whatever the people of this country may think, the people of the colonies, who know their buſineſs much better than we do, will never believe government is in earneſt about them, or their intereſt, or even about governing them; and will, not merely from that reaſoning, but from neceſſity of their circumſtances, act accordingly.

Knowing, therefore, that firſt or laſt, the nature and ſtate of the king's ſervice muſt, in ſpite of every idea to the contrary, bring this meaſure into execution, I have only curſorily ſuggeſted ſome hints of the grounds on which it will ariſe: but removed as I am from every communication with adminiſtration, and uninformed, I have not preſumed to enter into the diſcuſſion of this great point. Wherever it is taken up, it muſt be by perſons who, with the benefit of real, official information, and confidential knowledge of meaſures, muſt have ſuperior, and the only lights, in which it ought to be viewed, and determined.

Upon a ſuppoſition, therefore, that this matter is ſettled, as moſt certainly it will be, ſome time or other, I will proceed, confining myſelf ſolely to the matters of the colonies,

nies, to review ſome points that deſerve, and will require, the conſideration of government, if it ever means to profit of, and lead the great Atlantic and American intereſt which it has acquired, and to unite it to its dominion.

Whenever this neceſſary meaſure of making that department of adminiſtration, which is to direct the trade and plantations of this kingdom, a ſecretary of ſtate's office, is carried into execution, the ſeveral points explained in the following obſervations will be taken up, *as matters of buſineſs*; but until that time comes, they will be treated *as matters of ſpeculation*, and mere uſeleſs, opprobrious theory.

Before entering into theſe matters, I do not think it would be impertinent juſt to mark the idea of colonies, and their ſpecial circumſtances, which makes it a meaſure in commercial governments, to eſtabliſh, cultivate, and maintain them.

The view of trade in general, as well as of manufactures in particular, terminates in ſecuring an extenſive and permanent vent; or to ſpeak more preciſely, (in the ſame manner as ſhop-keeping does) in having many and good cuſtomers: the wiſdom, there-

therefore, of a trading nation, is to gain, and to create, as many as poſſible. Thoſe whom we gain in foreign trade, we poſſeſs under reſtrictions and difficulties, and may loſe in the rivalſhip of commerce: thoſe that a trading nation can create within itſelf, it deals with under its own regulations, and makes its own, and cannot loſe. In the eſtabliſhing colonies, a nation creates people whoſe labour, being applied to new objects of produce and manufacture, opens new channels of commerce, by which they not only live in eaſe and affluence within themſelves, but, while they are labouring under and for the mother country, (for there all their external profits center) become an increaſing nation, of appropriated and good cuſtomers to the mother country. Theſe not only increaſe our manufactures, encreaſe our exports, but extend our commerce; and if duly adminiſtered, extend the nation, its powers, and its dominions, to wherever theſe people extend their ſettlements. This is, therefore, an intereſt which is, and ought to be dear to the mother country: this is an object that deſerves the beſt care and attention of government: and the people, who through various hardſhips, diſaſters, and diſappointments; through various difficulties and almoſt ruinous expences, have wrought up this intereſt to

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ſuch an important object, merit every protection, grace, encouragement, and privilege, that are in the power of the mother country to grant.—It is on this *valuable conſideration*, (as Mr. Dummer, in his ſpirited defence of the colonies ſays) that they have a right to the grants, charters, privileges and protection which they receive; and alſo on the other hand, it is from theſe grants, charters, privileges and protection given to them, that the mother country has an excluſive right to the external profits of their labour, and to their cuſtom. As it is the right, ſo it becomes the duty of the mother country to nouriſh and cultivate, to protect and govern the colonies: which nurture and government ſhould preciſely direct its care to two eſſential points. 1ſt, That all the profits of the produce and manufactures of theſe colonies center finally in the mother country: and 2dly, That the colonies continue to be the ſole and proper cuſtomers of the mother country.—To theſe two points, collateral with the intereſts, rights and welfare of the colonies, every meaſure of adminiſtration, every law of trade ſhould tend: I ſay collateral, becauſe, rightly underſtood, theſe two points are mutually coincident with the intereſts, rights and welfare of the colonies.

It

It has been often ſuggeſted, that care ſhould be taken in the adminiſtration of the plantations; leſt, in ſome future time, theſe colonies ſhould become independent of the mother country. But perhaps it may be proper on this occaſion, nay, it is juſtice to ſay it, that if, by becoming independent is meant a revolt, nothing is further from their nature, their intereſt, their thoughts. If a defection from the alliance of the mother country be ſuggeſted, it ought to be, and can be truly ſaid, that their ſpirit abhors the ſenſe of ſuch; their attachment to the proteſtant ſucceſſion in the houſe of Hanover will ever ſtand unſhaken; and nothing can eradicate from their hearts their natural, almoſt mechanical, affection to Great Britain, which they conceive under no other ſenſe, nor call by any other name, than that of *home*. Beſides, the merchants are, and muſt ever be, in great meaſure allied with thoſe of Great Britain; their very ſupport conſiſts in this alliance, and nothing but falſe policy here can break it. If the trade of the colonies be protected and directed from hence, with the true ſpirit of the act of navigation, that ſpirit under which it has riſen, no circumſtances of trade could tempt the Coloniſts to certain ruin under any other connections. The liberty and religion of the Britiſh colonies are incompatible with either

either French or Spaniſh government; and they know full well, that they could hope for neither liberty nor protection under a Dutch one. Any ſuch ſuggeſtion, therefore, is a falſe and unjuſt aſperſion on their principles and affections; and can ariſe from nothing but an intire ignorance of their circumſtances. Yet again, on the other hand, while they remain under the ſupport and protection of the government of the mother country; while they profit of the beneficial part of its trade; while their attachment to the preſent royal family ſtands firm, and their alliance with the mother country is inviolate, it may be worth while to inquire, whether they may not become and act independent of the *government and laws* of the mother country: —and if any ſuch ſymptoms ſhould be found, either in their government, courts, or trade, perhaps it may be thought high time, even now, to inquire how far theſe colonies are or are not arrived, at this time, at an independency of the government of the mother country:— and if any meaſure of ſuch independency, formed upon precedents unknown to the government of the mother country at the time they were form'd, ſhould be inſiſted on, when the government of the mother country was found to be ſo weak or diſtracted at home, or ſo deeply engaged abroad

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in Europe, as not to be able to attend to, and aſſert its right in America, with its own people:—perhaps it may be thought, that no time ſhould be loſt to remedy or redreſs theſe deviations—if any ſuch be found; or to remove all jealouſies ariſing from the idea of them, if none ſuch really exiſt.

If the colonies are to be poſſeſſed, as of right, and governed by the crown, as demeſnes of the crown, by ſuch charters, commiſſions, inſtructions, *&c.* as the crown ſhall, from time to time, grant or iſſue; then a reviſion of theſe charters, commiſſions, inſtructions, ſo as to eſtabliſh the rights of the crown, and the privileges of the people, as thereby created, is all that is neceſſary. But while the crown may, perhaps juſtly and of right, *in theory*, conſider theſe lands, and the plantations thereon, as its demeſnes, and as of ſpecial right properly belonging to it; not incorporated and of common right with the dominions and realm of Great Britain: in conſequence of which theory, ſpecial rights of the crown are there eſtabliſhed; and from which theory, the ſpecial modification under which the people poſſeſs their privileges is derived.—While this is the idea on one hand, the people on the other ſay, that they could not forfeit, nor loſe the common rights and privileges of

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Engliſhmen, by adventuring under various diſaſters and difficulties, under heavy expences, and every hazard, to ſettle theſe vaſt countries, to engage in untried channels of labour, thereby increaſing the nation's commerce, and extending its dominions; but that they muſt carry with them, whereever they go, the right of being governed only by the laws of the realm; only by laws made with their own conſent:—that they muſt ever retain with them the right of not being taxed without their own conſent, or that of their repreſentatives; and therefore, as it were by nature divided off from the ſhare of the general repreſentation of the nation, they do not hold, by tenor of charter or temporary grant, in a commiſſion, but by an inherent, eſſential right, the right of repreſentation and legiſlature, with all its powers and privileges, as poſſeſſed in England. It is, therefore, that the people do, and ever will, until this matter be ſettled, exerciſe theſe rights and privileges after the precedents formed here in England, and perhaps carried, in the application, even further, than they ever were in England; and not under the reſtriction of commiſſions and inſtructions: and it is therefore alſo, in matters where laws, made ſince their eſtabliſhment, do not extend to them by ſpecial proviſo, that they claim the right of direct-

ing themſelves by their own laws. While theſe totally different ideas of the principles, whereon the government and the people found their claims and rights, remain unſettled and undetermined, there can be nothing but diſcordant jarring, and perpetual obſtruction in the exerciſe of them; —there can be no government, properly ſo called, but merely the predominancy of one faction or the other, acting under the maſk of the forms of government. This is the ſhort and preciſe abſtract of the long and perplexed hiſtory of the governments and adminiſtrations of the colonies, under the various ſhapes with which their quarrels have vexed themſelves, and teized government here in Britain.

If this idea of the crown's right to govern theſe as demeſnes be juſt, and be as right in fact, as it is ſuppoſed to be in theory, let it be ſettled and fixed by ſome due and ſufficient authority, what it is, and how far it extends. But this is not all; let it be ſo eſtabliſhed, that where it ought, it may actually, and in practice, be carried into execution alſo. If this right be doubted; or if, being allowed, it finds itſelf in ſuch circumſtances as not to be able to carry its powers into execution, it will then become an object of government, to ſee that theſe colonies

colonies be governed, and their affairs adminiſtered ſome other way. There is no doubt in the theory of our conſtitution of the king's right, in time of war and array, to exerciſe martial law: and yet in practice it has been found right, (and would not otherwiſe be permitted) that this martial law ſhould be confirmed by parliament.

If, therefore, the ſeveral points wherein the crown, or its governors acting under its inſtructions, differ with the people be conſidered, and it be once determined what, in order to maintain the ſubordination of the government of the colonies to the government of Great Britain, is neceſſary to be done,—the mode of doing that will be eaſily ſettled. If it be a point determined, that it lies wholly with the crown to fix and actuate this order of government—the crown will duly avail itſelf of that power, with which it is entruſted, to enforce its adminiſtration. But if it be found that, however this may lie with the crown as of right, yet the crown is not in power to eſtabliſh this right,—it will of courſe call in aid the power of the legiſlature, to confirm and eſtabliſh it. But if, finally, it ſhould appear, that theſe colonies, as corporations within the dominions of Great Britain, are included within the imperium of the realm of the ſame,—it

will then of right become the duty of legiſlature to interpoſe in the caſe; to regulate and define their rights and privileges; to eſtabliſh and order their adminiſtration; and to direct the channels of their commerce. Tho' the firſt of theſe meaſures ſhould be, in ſtrict juſtice, the crown's right—yet the ſecond is the only next practicable one: and altho' the ſecond, as ſuch, may moſt likely be adopted—yet the third is the only wiſe and ſure meaſure. In the ſecond caſe, the crown, having formed its ſeveral general inſtructions for the ſeveral governments, according to their various charters, grants, and proprietaries, will order the ſame, in thoſe points which it cannot influence and determine by the effect of its own negative, to be laid before parliament, to be conſidered and confirmed by the legiſlature, in the ſame manner as are the rules for governing the army. In the third caſe, the crown will order its miniſtry to lay before parliament, the rights and powers of the crown; the rights, privileges and claims of the people; with a general ſtate of the colonies, their intereſt and operations, as related to the crown, as related to the mother country, as related to foreign powers and intereſts, and to the colonies of foreign powers, as related to the laws and government of the mother country;—perhaps pointing out ſome general

plan

plan of government, judicatory, revenue and commerce, as may become, what I hinted at in the beginning of this paper—*a leading meaſure to the forming Great Britain, with all its Atlantic and American poſſeſſions, into one great commercial dominion.* In the one caſe, the inſtructions of the crown, either ſome general form of ſuch, or the ſpecial ones given to each governor, on each freſh nomination, will be confirm'd by parliament, as the rules and orders for governing the army are. In the other, a general bill of rights, and eſtabliſhment of government and commerce on a great plan of union, will be ſettled and enacted: the governments of the ſeveral colonies, on the continent and in the iſlands, will be conſidered as ſo many corporations, holding their lands in common ſoccage, according to the manor of Eaſt Greenwich, united to the realm; ſo that, for every power, which they exerciſe or poſſeſs, they will depend on the government of Great Britain; ſo that, in every movement, they may be held, each within its proper ſphere, and be drawn and connected to this center: and as forming a one ſyſtem, they will be ſo connected in their various orbs and ſubordination of orders, as to be capable of receiving and communicating, from the firſt mover (the government of Great Britain) any political motion, in the direction

in which it is given. Great Britain, as the center of this ſyſtem, muſt be the center of attraction, to which theſe colonies, in the adminiſtration of every power of their government, in the exerciſe of their judicial powers, and the execution of their laws, and in every operation of their trade, muſt tend. They will be ſo framed, in their natural and political intereſts; in the rights, privileges, and protection they enjoy; in the powers of trade, which they actuate, under the predominating general commerce of the nation, that they will remain under the conſtant influence of the attraction of this center; and cannot move, but that every direction of ſuch movement will converge to the ſame. At the ſame time that they all conſpire in this one center, *they muſt be guarded againſt having, or forming, any principle of coherence with each other above that, whereby they cohere in this center*; having no other principle of intercommunication between each other, than that by which they are in joint communion with Great Britain as the common center of all. At the ſame time that they are, each in their reſpective parts and ſubordinations, ſo framed, as to be actuated by this firſt mover,—they ſhould always remain incapable of any coherence, or of ſo conſpiring amongſt themſelves, as to create any other equal force,

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which might recoil back on this firſt mover; nor is it more neceſſary to preſerve the ſeveral governments ſubordinate within their reſpective orbs, than it is eſſential to the preſervation of the empire to keep them diſconnected and independent of each other: they certainly are ſo at preſent; the different manner in which they are ſettled, the different modes under which they live, the different forms of charters, grants and frame of government they poſſeſs, the various principles of repulſion that theſe create, the different intereſts which they actuate, the religious intereſts by which they are actuated, the rivalſhip and jealouſies which ariſe from hence, and the impracticability, if not the impoſſibility of reconciling and accommodating theſe incompatible ideas and claims, will keep them for ever ſo. And nothing but a tampering activity of wrongheaded inexperience miſled to be meddling, can ever do any miſchief here. The provinces and colonies are under the beſt form as to this point, which they can be. They are under the beſt frame and diſpoſition for the government of the mother country (duly applied) to take place. And as there cannot be a more juſt, ſo there cannot be a wiſer meaſure than to leave them all in the free and full poſſeſſion of their ſeveral rights and privileges, as by grant, charter, or commiſ-

ſion given, and in the full exerciſe thereof, ſo far, and no further, than as derived therefrom. If, upon a reviſion, there be found any, and perhaps ſome one ſuch at leaſt, may be found, who have groſsly and intentionally tranſgreſſed theſe bounds, ſuch ſhould be an exception to this rule, and be made an example alſo to others.

Under the guidance therefore of theſe principles—that the final external profits of the labour and produce of colonies ſhould center in the mother country,—that the coloniſts are the appropriated ſpecial cuſtomers of the mother country,—that the colonies, in their government and trade, ſhould be all united in communion with, and ſubordination to the government of the mother country, but ever diſconnected and independent of each other by any other communion than what centers here:—Under the guidance of theſe principles, with a temper and ſpirit which remember that theſe are our own people, our brethren, faithful, good and beneficial ſubjects, and free-born Engliſhmen, or by adoption, poſſeſſing all the right of freedom:—Under the guidance of theſe principles, and with this temper and ſpirit of government,—let a reviſion be made of the general and ſeveral governments of the colonies, of their laws and courts of juſtice,

tice, of their trade, and the general Britiſh laws of trade, in their ſeveral relations in which they ſtand to the mother country, to the government of the mother country, to foreign countries, and the colonies of foreign countries, to one another; and then let thoſe meaſures be taken, which, upon ſuch a review, ſhall appear neceſſary; and all which government can do, or ought to do at preſent, will be done.

Upon ſuch review it will appear, under this firſt general head, in various inſtances, that the two great points which the Coloniſts labour to eſtabliſh, is the exerciſe of their ſeveral rights and privileges, as founded in the rights of an Engliſhman; and ſecondly, as what they ſuppoſe to be a neceſſary meaſure in a ſubordinate government, the keeping in their own hands the command of the revenue, and the pay of the officers of government, as a ſecurity of their conduct towards them.

Under the firſt head come all the diſputes about the King's inſtructions, and the governor's power, as founded on them.

The King's commiſſion to his governor, which grants the power of government, and directs the calling of a legiſlature, and the eſtabliſhing courts, at the ſame time that

it fixes the governor's power, according to the ſeveral powers and directions granted and appointed by the commiſſion and inſtructions, adds, " and by ſuch *further powers*, " *inſtructions*, and authorities, as ſhall, at " any time hereafter, be granted or appointed " you, under our ſignet or ſign manual, or " by our order in our privy council." It ſhould here ſeem, that the ſame power which framed the commiſſion, with this clauſe in it, could alſo iſſue its *future orders and inſtructions* in conſequence thereof: but the people of the colonies ſay, that the inhabitants of the colonies are entitled to all the privileges of Engliſhmen; that they have a right to participate in the legiſlative power; and that no commands of the crown, by orders in council, inſtructions, or letters from Secretaries of State, are binding upon them, further than they pleaſe to acquieſce under ſuch, and conform *their own actions* thereto; that they hold this right of legiſlature, not derived from the grace and will of the crown, and depending on the commiſſion which continues at the will of the crown; that this right is inherent and eſſential to the community, as a community of Engliſhmen: and that therefore they muſt have all the rights, privileges, and full and free exerciſe of their own will and liberty in making laws, which are neceſſary to that act of legiſlation,

giſlation,—uncontrouled by any power of the crown, or of the governor, preventing or ſuſpending that act; and, that the clauſe in the commiſſion, directing the governor to call together a legiſlature by his writs, is declarative and not creative; and therefore he is directed to act conformably to a right actually already exiſting in the people, &c.

When I ſpeak of full uncontrouled independent powers of debate and reſult, ſo far as relates to the framing bills and paſſing them into laws, uncontrouled by any power of the crown or of the governor, as an eſſential property of a free legiſlature; I find ſome perſons in the colonies imagine, that I repreſent the colonies as claiming a power of legiſlature independent of the King's or governor's negative.—Theſe gentlemen knowing that it is not my intention to do injuſtice to the colonies, wiſh me ſo to explain this matter, that it may not bear even the interpretation of ſuch a charge—I do therefore here deſire, that the reader will give his attention to diſtinguiſh a full, free, uncontrouled, independent power, in the act of legiſlation,—from a full, free, uncontrouled, independent power, of carrying the reſults of that legiſlation into effect, independent either of the Governor's or King's negative. The firſt right is that which I repreſent the Colo-

Coloniſts claiming, as a right eſſential to the very exiſtence of the legiſlature: The ſecond is what is alſo eſſential to the nature of a ſubordinate legiſlature, and what the Coloniſts never call in queſtion. That therefore the point here meant to be ſtated as in debate, is, Whether a ſubordinate legiſlature can be inſtructed, reſtricted, and controuled, in the very act of legiſlation? whether the King's inſtructions or letters from ſecretaries of ſtate, and ſuch like ſignifications of his Majeſty's will and pleaſure, is a due and conſtitutional application of the governors, or of the royal negative?—The Coloniſts conſtantly deny it, —and miniſtry, otherwiſe ſuch inſtructions would not be given, conſtantly maintain it. After experience of the confuſion and obſtruction which this dubitable point hath occaſioned to buſineſs, it is time ſurely that it were ſome way or other determined. I do not here enter into the diſcuſſion of this point; I only endeavour fairly to ſtate it, as I think it is a matter which ought to be ſettled ſome way or other, and ought no longer to remain in contention, that the ſeveral matters which ſtand in inſtruction, and in diſpute in conſequence of it, may be finally placed upon their right grounds; in the doing of which it muſt come under conſideration, how far the crown has or has not a right to direct or reſtrict the legiſlature of

the colonies,—or if the crown has not this power, what department of government has, and how it ought to be exerciſed;—or whether in fact or deed, the people of the colonies, having every right to the full powers of government, and *to a whole legiſlative power*, are under this claim entitled in the powers of legiſlature and the adminiſtration of government, to uſe and exerciſe in conformity to the laws of Great Britain, the ſame, full, free, independent, unreſtrained power and legiſlative will in their ſeveral corporations, and under the King's commiſſion and their reſpective charters, as the government and legiſlature of Great Britain holds by its conſtitution, and under the great charter.

Every ſubject, born within the realm, under the freedom of the Government of Great Britain, or by adoption admitted to the ſame, has an eſſential indefeaſible right to be governed, under ſuch a mode of government as has the unreſtrained exerciſe of all thoſe powers which form the freedom and rights of the conſtitution; and therefore, "the "crown cannot eſtabliſh any colony upon— "or contract it within *a narrower ſcale* than "the ſubject is entitled to, by the great "charter of England *." The government of

* Hiſtorical Review of the Conſtitution and Government of Penſylvania, p. 11.

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each colony muſt have the ſame powers, and the ſame extent of powers that the government of Great Britain has,—and muſt have, while it does not act contrary to the laws of Great Britain, the ſame freedom and independence of legiſlature, as the parliament of Great Britain has. This right (ſay they) is founded, not only in the general principles of the rights of a Britiſh ſubject, but is actually declared, confirmed, or granted to them in the commiſſions and charters which gave the particular frame of their reſpective conſtitutions. If therefore, in the firſt original eſtabliſhment, like the original contract, they could not be eſtabliſhed upon any ſcale ſhort of the full and compleat ſcale of the powers of the Britiſh government,—nor the legiſlature be eſtabliſhed on any thing leſs than the whole legiſlative power; much leſs can this power of government and legiſlature, thus eſtabliſhed, be governed, directed, reſtrained or reſtricted, by any poſterior inſtructions or commands by the letters of Secretaries of State. But upon the ſuppoſition, that a kind of general indetermined power in the crown, to ſuperadd inſtructions to the commiſſions and charter be admitted, where the Coloniſts do not make a queſtion of the caſe wherein it is exerted, yet there are particular caſes wherein both directive and reſtrictive inſtructions are given, and avowedly not admitted

mitted by the Coloniſts. It is a ſtanding inſtruction, as a ſecurity of the dependence of the government of the colonies, on the mother country, that no acts wherein the King's Rights, or the rights of the mother country or of private perſons can be affected, ſhall be enacted into a law without a clauſe ſuſpending the effect thereof, till his Majeſty's pleaſure ſhall be known. This ſuſpending clauſe is univerſally * rejected on the principles above, becauſe ſuch ſuſpenſion diſtranchiſes the inherent full power of legiſlature, which they claim by their rights to the Britiſh liberties, and by the ſpecial declarations of ſuch in their charters. It does not remove this difficulty by ſaying, that the crown has already in its hands the power of fixing this point, by the effect of its negative given to its governor. It is ſaid, that if the crown ſhould withdraw that inſtruction, which allows certain bills to be paſſed into laws with a ſuſpending clauſe, which inſtruction is not meant as a reſtriction upon, but an indulgence to the legiſlatures; that if the crown ſhould withdraw this inſtruction, and peremptorily reſtrain its governor from enacting laws, under ſuch circumſtances as the wiſdom of government cannot admit of,

* In ſome caſes of emergency, and in the caſes of the concerns of individuals, the inſtruction has been ſubmitted to, but the principle never.

that then theſe points are actually fixed by the true conſtitutional power; but whereever it is ſo ſaid, I muſt repeat my idea, that this does not remove the difficulty. For waving the doubt which the Coloniſts might raiſe, eſpecially in the charter colonies, how far the governor ought, or ought not, to be reſtricted from giving his aſſent in caſes contrary only to inſtructions, and not to the laws of Great Britain; waving this point, let adminiſtration conſider the effects of this meaſure. In caſes where the bills, offered by the two branches, are for providing laws, abſolutely neceſſary to the continuance, ſupport, and exerciſe of government, and where yet the orders of the crown, and the ſenſe of the people, are ſo widely different as to the mode, that no agreement can ever be come to in theſe points.—Is the government and adminiſtration of the government of the colonies to be ſuſpended? The intereſt, perhaps the being of the plantations, to be hazarded by this obſtinate variance, and can the exerciſe of the crown's negative, in ſuch emergencies, and with ſuch effect, ever be taken up as a meaſure of adminiſtration? And when every thing is thrown into confuſion, and abandoned even to ruin by ſuch meaſure, will adminiſtration juſtify itſelf by ſaying, that it is the fault of the Coloniſts? On the contrary, this very ſtate of the

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caſe ſhows the neceſſity of ſome other remedy.

The ſettling and determining this point is of the moſt eſſential import to the liberties on one hand, and the ſubordination on the other, of the government of the colonies to the government of the mother country.—In the examination of this point, it will come under conſideration, firſt, Whether the full and whole of legiſlature can be any way, in any ſpecial caſe, ſuſpended; and next, whether the crown, by its inſtructions, can ſuſpend the effect of this legiſlature, which by its commiſſion or charters it has given or declared; if not, the crown, whether the parliament of Great Britain can do it, and how; whether it ſhould be by act of Parliament, or whether by addreſſing the crown upon *a declarative vote*, that it would be pleaſed to provide by its inſtructions, for the carrying the effect of ſuch vote into execution, as was done in the caſe of the paper-money currency.

In the courſe of examining theſe matters, will ariſe to conſideration the following very material point. As a principal tie of the ſubordination of the legiſlatures of the colonies on the government of the mother country, they are bound by their conſtitutions and

and charters, to ſend all *their acts* of legiſlature to England, to be confirmed or abrogated by the crown; but if any of the legiſlatures ſhould be found to do almoſt every act of legiſlature, by votes or orders, even to the repealing the effects of acts, ſuſpending eſtabliſhments of pay, paying ſervices, doing chancery and other judicatory buſineſs: if matters of this ſort, done by theſe votes and orders, never reduced into the form of an act, have their effect without ever being ſent home as acts of legiſlature, or ſubmitted to the allowance or diſallowance of the crown: If it ſhould be found that many, or any of the legiſlatures of the colonies carry the powers of legiſlature into execution, independent of the crown by this device,—it will be a point to be determined how far, in ſuch caſes, the ſubordination of the legiſlatures of the colonies to the government of the mother country is maintained or ſuſpended;—or if, from emergencies ariſing in theſe governments, this device is to be admitted, the point, how far ſuch is to be admitted, ought to be determined; and the validity of theſe votes and orders, theſe Senatus Conſulta ſo far declared. For a point of ſuch great importance in the ſubordination of the colony legiſlatures, and of ſo queſtionable a caſt in the valid exerciſe of this legiſlative

power, ought no longer to remain in queſtion.

The next general point yet undetermined, the determination of which very eſſentially imports the ſubordination and dependance of the colony governments on the government of the mother country, is, the manner of providing for the ſupport of government, and for all the executive officers of the crown. The freedom and right efficiency of the conſtitution require, that the executive and judicial officers of government ſhould be independent of the legiſlative; and more eſpecially in popular governments, where the legiſlature itſelf is ſo much influenced by the humours and paſſions of the people; for if they be not, there will be neither juſtice nor equity in any of the courts of law, nor any efficient execution of the laws and orders of government in the magiſtracy: according, therefore, to the conſtitution of Great Britain, the crown has the appointment and payment of the ſeveral executive and judicial officers, and the legiſlature ſettles a permanent and fixed appointment for the ſupport of government and civil liſt in general: The crown therefore has, *à fortiori*, a right to require of the colonies, to whom, by its commiſſion or charter, it gives the power of government, ſuch

permanent ſupport, appropriated to the offices, not the officers of government, that they may not depend upon the temporary and arbitrary will of the legiſlature.

The crown does, by its inſtructions to its governors, order them to require of the legiſlature a permanent ſupport. This order of the crown is generally, if not univerſally rejected, by the legiſlatures of the colonies. The aſſemblies quote the precedents of the Britiſh conſtitution, and found all the rights and privileges which they claim on the principles thereof. They allow the truth and fitneſs of this principle in the Britiſh conſtitution, where the executive power of the crown is immediately adminiſtred by the King's Majeſty; yet ſay, under the circumſtances in which they find themſelves, that there is no other meaſure left to them to prevent the miſapplications of public money, than by an annual voting and appropriation of the ſalaries of the governor and other civil officers, iſſuing from monies lodged in the hands of a provincial treaſurer appointed by the aſſemblies: For in theſe ſubordinate governments, remote from his Majeſty's immediate influence, adminiſtred oftentimes by neceſſitous and rapacious governors who have no natural, altho' they have a political connection with the country, experience has ſhewn that ſuch governors have miſapplied the monies

nies raiſed for the ſupport of government, ſo that the civil officers have been left unpaid, even after having been provided for by the aſſembly. The point then of this very important queſtion comes to this iſſue, whether the inconveniencies ariſing, and experienced by ſome inſtances of miſapplications of appropriations (for which however there are in the King's courts of law, due and ſufficient remedies againſt the offender) are a ſufficient reaſon and ground for eſtabliſhing a meaſure ſo directly contrary to the Britiſh conſtitution: and whether the inconveniencies to be traced in the hiſtory of the colonies, through the votes and journals of their legiſlatures, in which the ſupport of governors, judges, and officers of the crown will be found to have been withheld or reduced on occaſions, where the aſſemblies have ſuppoſed that they have had reaſon to diſapprove the nomination,—or the perſon, or his conduct;—whether, I ſay, theſe inconveniencies have not been more detrimental, and injurious to government; and whether, inſtead of theſe colonies being dependent on, and governed under, the officers of the crown, the ſcepter is not reverſed, and the officers of the crown dependent on and governed by the aſſemblies, as the Coloniſts themſelves allow, that this meaſure * "renders the governor,

* Smith's Hiſtory of New York, p. 118.

" and all the other ſervants of the crown, " dependent on the aſſembly." This is mere matter of experience; and the fact, when duly enquired into, muſt ſpeak for itſelf:—but the operation of this meaſure does not end here; it extends to the aſſuming by the aſſemblies the actual executive part of the government in the caſe of the revenue, than which nothing is more clearly and unqueſtionably ſettled in the crown. In the colonies the treaſurer is ſolely and entirely a ſervant of the aſſembly or general court; and although the monies granted and appropriated be, or ought to be, granted to the crown on ſuch appropriations, the treaſurer is neither named by the crown, nor its governor, nor gives ſecurity to the crown or to the Lord High Treaſurer, (which ſeems the moſt proper) nor in many of the colonies, is to obey the governor's warrant in the iſſue, nor accounts in the auditor's office, nor in any one colony is it admitted, that he is liable to ſuch account. In conſequence of this ſuppoſed neceſſity, for the aſſembly's taking upon them the adminiſtration of the treaſury and revenue, the governor and ſervants of the crown, in the ordinary revenue of government, are not only held dependent on the aſſembly, but all ſervices, where ſpecial appropriations are made for the extraordinaries which ſuch ſer-

ſervices require, are actually executed and done by commiſſioners appointed by the aſſembly, to whoſe diſpoſition ſuch appropriations are made liable. It would be perhaps invidious, and might tend to prejudging on points which ought very ſeriouſly and diſpaſſionately to be examined, if I were here to point out in the ſeveral inſtances of the actual execution of this aſſumed power, how almoſt every executive power of the crown lodged in its governor, is, where money is neceſſary, thus exerciſed by the aſſembly and its commiſſioners. I beg leave here to repeat, that I do not enter into the diſcuſſion of theſe points; my only aim is, fairly to ſtate them, giving the ſtrongeſt and cleareſt explanations I am capable of to both ſides, that the diſcuſſion may be brought to ſome determinate iſſue;—and from that ſtate of them to ſuggeſt, the abſolute neceſſity there is of their being determined by that part of government, which ſhall be found to have the right and power to determine them; and to be ſo determined, that while the rights, liberties, and even privileges of the colonies are preſerved, the colonies may be retained in that true and conſtitutional dependance to the mother country, and to the government of the mother country, which ſhall unite them to it as parts of one whole.

It is a duty of perfect obligation from government towards the colonies, to preſerve the liberty of the ſubject, the liberty of the conſtitution: It is a duty alſo of prudence in government towards itſelf, as ſuch conduct is the only permanent and ſure ground, whereon to maintain the dependance of thoſe countries, without deſtroying their utility as colonies.

The conſtitutions of theſe communities, founded in wiſe policy, and in the laws of the Britiſh conſtitution, are eſtabliſhed by their ſeveral charters, or by the King's commiſſion to his governours, being in the nature of a charter of government. In theſe, all the juſt powers of government are deſcribed and defined, the rights of the ſubject and of the conſtitution declared, and the modes of government agreeable thereto eſtabliſhed. As theſe paſs under the great ſeal, no juriſdictions or offices will be inſerted in the powers granted, but what are agreeable and conform to law, and the conſtitution of the realm. This the King's commiſſion is barely a commiſſion during pleaſure, to the perſon therein named as governor, yet it provides for a ſucceſſion without vacancy, or interregnum, and is not revoked but by a like commiſſion, with like powers: It becomes the known, eſtabliſhed conſtitution of that province which hath been

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eſtabliſhed on it, and whoſe laws, courts, and whole frame of legiſlature and judicature, are founded on it: It is the charter of that province: It is the indefeaſible and unalterable right of thoſe people: It is the indefeaſible right by which thoſe colonies thus eſtabliſhed, are the colonies of Great Britain, and therefore not to be altered; but by ſuch means as any reform or new eſtabliſhment may take place in Great Britain: It cannot, in its eſſential parts, be altered or deſtroyed by any royal inſtructions or proclamation; or by letters from ſecretaries of ſtate: It cannot be ſuperceded, or in part annulled, by the iſſuing out of any other commiſſions not known to this conſtitution.

In theſe charters, and in theſe commiſſions, the crown delegates to the governor for the time being, all its conſtitutional power and authority civil and military—the power of legiſlation ſo far as the crown has ſuch—its judicial and executive powers, its powers of chancery, admiralty juriſdiction, and that of ſupreme ordinary.—All thoſe powers, as they exiſt and reſide in the crown, are known by the laws and courts of the realm, and as they are derived to the governors are defined, declared, and *patent*, by the charters and commiſſions *patent*. It is therefore the duty and true intereſt of the Coloniſts to maintain

theſe rights, theſe privileges, this conſtitution: It is moreover the duty and true intereſt of King, Lords, and Commons, to be watchful over, to ſupport and defend theſe rights of the colonies: It is the duty of adminiſtration to have conſtant regard to the exerciſe of them, otherwiſe it will be found a dangerous thing to have given ſo much of civil power out of the King's hands, and to have done ſo little to maintain thoſe into whoſe hands it is entruſted. How far the eſtabliſhment of the office and power of a military commander in chief, not ſubordinate but ſuperior to theſe conſtitutional commanders in chief, with a juriſdiction extending over the whole of the Britiſh empire in America, is conformable to law, to prudence, or ſound policy, is matter of very ſerious conſideration.

All military power whatſoever, as far as law and the conſtitution will juſtify the eſtabliſhment of ſuch, is reſident in the eſtabliſhed office of governor, as Captain general and commander in chief. There is no power here granted, but what is ſpecified and defined by the nature of the conſtitution. The ſubject and ſtate is duly guarded againſt any extenſions of it, by the ſeveral laws which the legiſlatures of the ſeveral colonies have provided to limit that power; and it

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can be exerciſed by none but ſuch perſons as are within the juriſdiction of the province, who deriving their powers from the ſupream powers are amenable to the laws of the province; and to the governor, who is himſelf ſpecially reſponſible for the truſt. This power thus limited becomes part of the conſtitution of the province, and unleſs thus limited, and thus conſidered as part of the conſtitution of the government, it may be matter of great doubt, whether the crown would be adviſed to erect any military powers whatever. But under ſuch limitations, and as a known eſtabliſhed part of the conſtitution, the crown may ſafely grant theſe powers, and the people ſafely live under them, becauſe the governor is "required "and commanded to do and execute all "things in due manner, that ſhall belong "unto *the truſt* repoſed in him, according "to the ſeveral powers and authorities men-"tioned in the charter." That is to ſay, according to thoſe powers which in charter governments are expreſsly part of the conſtitution; and which from the very nature of the *commiſſion patent* in ſuch conſtitutions as are called King's governments, are likewiſe to be conſidered in the ſame light.—When this military branch of the governor's office is eſtabliſhed and received as part of the conſtitution, the King may ſafely grant,

and the people ſafely act under "a power "to levy, arm, muſter, command, and "employ all perſons whatſoever reſiding "within ſuch province, to reſiſt and repell "both at land and ſea, all enemies, pirates, "and rebels, and ſuch to purſue in or out "of the limits of the province, to erect and "build forts, to fortify and furniſh, and to "commit the command of the ſame to ſuch "perſon or perſons as to ſuch governor ſhall "ſeem meet—and the ſame again to diſ-"mantle or demoliſh, and to do and execute "all and every other thing which to a cap-"tain general doth or ought of right to be-"long, as fully and amply as any other the "King's captains general doth or hath uſual-"ly done, according to the powers in the "commiſſion and charter granted." It becomes hence a queſtion of higheſt import, and leading to the moſt dangerous conſequences —Whether, after the conſtitutions and offices of a colony or province are thus eſtabliſhed, the King himſelf can diſmember the ſame, ſo as to grant to any office or officer not known to the conſtitution, any part whatſoever of thoſe powers, as he cannot diſfranchiſe a people having ſuch powers, under ſuch charters, of any the leaſt right or privilege included in, or as derived from, the eſtabliſhment of their conſtitution of government? This is a queſtion that it would

would behove the crown lawyers well to conſider, whenever it ſhall be referred to their conſideration. If every military power that can legally be included in any commiſſion which the crown will be adviſed to iſſue, is already included in the office of governor, as part of the conſtitution of theſe provinces and colonies, what commiſſion can ſupercede the ſame, or give power to any other officer than the governor to exerciſe theſe powers within ſuch province? It was ſuggeſted by the writer of theſe papers at the beginning of the late war, that if the neceſſity of the caſe in time of war urged to the appointing a military commander in chief of all North America, who ſhould command all military operations, and preſide in general over all military eſtabliſhments for the general ſervice, independent of, and ſuperior to, the powers and authorities already granted to the governors and captains general of the provinces,—it was ſuggeſted, that no commiſſions under the private ſeal and ſign manual could ſupercede, revoke, or take precedence of theſe powers granted by letters patent under the great ſeal, and it was determined accordingly, that the military commander in chief muſt have his commiſſion patent under the great ſeal. But when it came to be conſidered what powers ſhould be granted in this commiſſion, the wiſdom and prudence of the great ſtateſman and lawyer who

who was then entruſted with that ſeal, iſſued the commiſſion for the commander in chief, in general and indefinite terms, "to have, "hold, exerciſe, and enjoy the ſaid office dur- "ing pleaſure, together with all the powers, "authorities, rights and privileges, thereunto "belonging, ſubject however to ſuch reſtric- "tions, limitations, and inſtructions, as are "given, or to be given, from time to time, un- "der the royal ſign manual, and charging and "requiring all the governors, lieutenant go- "vernors, deputy governors, and preſidents "of the council of the reſpective colonies and "provinces of North America, and all other "officers civil or military within the ſame, to "be aiding and aſſiſting in this command." Theſe general powers undefined and unknown, and ſuch as no miniſter who adviſes the iſſuing ſuch commiſſion will venture to deſcribe, theſe general words, power and command, either mean nothing, or ſuppoſe every thing, when a juſtifiable occaſion, or perhaps a colourable pretext calls for the exerciſe of them. It was ſeen that theſe general deſcriptions were either dangerous or nugatory, and therefore the commander in chief had another commiſſion under the private ſeal and ſign manual, in which were inſerted all the powers for governing the forces, &c. which were not thought proper to be included and granted by letters patent under the great

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ſeal. I am no lawyer, and do not therefore preſume to give an opinion of deciſion, but venture to affirm, that it ought well to be conſidered, Whether if this commiſſion be now in time of peace interpreted to extend to any one purpoſe at all, it muſt not extend to much more than can be juſtifyed by either law or the conſtitution? Whether (the conſtitutions of the provinces and colonies remaining) the office of a commander in chief exerciſing ſuch powers as are ſuppoſed neceſſary *to the execution of that command*, can be eſtabliſhed over all North America? Theſe military powers, as they exiſt in the governor's commiſſion, exiſt and muſt be exerciſed under the civil limitations and regulations of the conſtitution, nor can any law martial, or any other military ordonnances be publiſhed, without the concurrence of the other branches of the legiſlature. But the difference of this *dictatorial power* of a military commander in chief, and the *conſular* power of the provincial governor, can not be better deſcribed than in the following paſſage: *Ea poteſtas (ſcilicet dictatoria) per ſenatum more Romano magiſtratui maxima permittitur, exercitum parare, bellum gerere, coercere omnibus modis ſocios atque cives: domi militiæque imperium atque judicium ſummum habere: aliter ſine populi juſſu nullius earum rerum conſuli jus eſt* *.

* Salluſt, Bellum Catilinarium.

If it ſhould upon conſideration and advice, of which I am no judge, be found that the dictatorial power and command of a military commander in chief, ſuperior to the provincial governors (however neceſſity, in time of war, might juſtify it, *ne quid reſpublica detrimenti capiat*) is not agreeable and conformable to law, and to the conſtitution either of Great Britain or of the colonies in time of peace; it may be ſuppoſed that ſuch will not be continued in time of peace, and that as ſoon as the hoſtile ſtate of Indian affairs ceaſes, this power will be made to ceaſe alſo.

In the conſiderations above, I have ſuggeſted the doubt; whether this commiſſion may be right as to law and the conſtitution. But if there be only a doubt of its legality, and there no longer remains an abſolute neceſſity for the continuance of it; I think it may be fairly made to appear, that neither prudence nor ſound policy can juſtify it.

Such powers with ſuch a command may be dangerous to the liberty of the ſubject, to the liberties of the conſtitution of the colonies on one hand: And on the other hand, there are no people in the whole world, when their liberties ſhall become infected and undermined, ſo liable to become the inſtruments of dominion, as a people who have

lived under a free and popular government. This has been the fate of the free ſtates of Greece and Italy; this the fate of Rome itſelf:—But may heaven avert, that this ever becomes the ſtate of the Britiſh colonies.

There is not, there cannot be any danger in this power at preſent in any degree;—but thus planted when it comes to grow, *occulto velut arbor ævo*, when it has taken root, and has ſpread its branches through the land, it will ſoon overtop and overſhadow all the weaker, humbler ſhoots of civil liberty. Set once this lord of the foreſt on a permanent footing, it will ſoon have, as Mr. Harrington ſays, "Toes that have roots, and arms that "will bring forth what fruit you pleaſe."

It is a common obſervation, but it is as trivial as common, which ſuppoſes the danger of the colonies revolting, and becoming independent of the mother country. No one colony can by itſelf become ſo—and no two under the preſent ſtate of their conſtitutions, have any poſſible communion of power or intereſt that can unite them in ſuch a meaſure; they have not the means of forming ſuch; they have neither legiſlative nor executive powers, that are extended to more than one; the laws of one extend not to the other; they have no common magiſtracy,

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no common command, in ſhort, no one principle of aſſociation amongſt them: On the contrary, as I have ſaid elſewhere, the different manner in which they are ſettled, the different modes under which they live, the different forms of charters, grants, and frame of government which they poſſeſs, the various principles of repulſion that theſe create, the different intereſts which they actuate, the religious intereſts by which they are actuated, the rivalſhip and jealouſies which ariſe from hence, and the impracticability, if not impoſſibility, of reconciling and accommodating theſe incompatible ideas and claims, will keep the ſeveral provinces and colonies perpetually independent of, and unconnected with each other, and dependent on the mother country. The particular danger here meant to be pointed out, is that of furniſhing them with a principle of union, by eſtabliſhing a commander in chief over the whole. If ever the colonies revolt, and ſet up an empire in America, here begins the hiſtory of it; from this period as from the firſt dynaſty, will future hiſtorians deduce their narrative. The Romans, as long as they governed their provinces by the vigour of policy, preſerved their dependence, and ſee what that policy was.—I will produce two inſtances, one in Italy, the other in Greece; *Cæterùm habitari tantùm, tanquam urbem,*

urbem, Capuan, frequentarique placuit : corpus nullum civitatis nec ſenatûs, nec plebis concilium, nec magiſtratus eſſe. ſine conſilio publico, ſine imperio, *multitudinem nullius rei inter ſe ſociam ad* conſenſum inhabilem fore*. The other is as follows, after the Romans had entirely overcome Perſeus, and reduced all Macedonia, they reſtore it to its liberty; but to diſarm that liberty of all power of revolt, they divide Macedon into four regions or provinces, not barely by boundary lines, and geographical diſtinctions, but by diſſevering and ſeparating their intereſts; *diviſæ Macedoniæ, partium uſibus ſeparatis, et regionatim commerciis interruptis* ‡.

Under this policy they preſerved their provinces, and maintained the empire of Rome; but when they took up the falſe policy of eſtabliſhing and continuing, in time of peace, military commanders in chief in their provinces, the people of the provinces became an army, and that army ſubverted

* Liv. lib. 26. § 16. lib. 45. § 30.

‡ I beg that it may be here underſtood, that while by this example, I mean to point the danger of giving any principle of union amongſt the ſeveral colonies, and the ſure wiſdom of keeping this diſunion of council and imperium amongſt them, I do from principles of policy as well as thoſe of ſtrict juſtice, invariably recommend the preſervation of their reſpective conſtitutions, in the full uſe and exerciſe of all their rights and privileges.

the empire. " By how much the more remote (ſays Machiavell) their wars were, by ſo much they thought thoſe prorogations more convenient, by which it happened that the commander might gain ſuch an intereſt in the army, as might make it diſclaim the power of the ſenate." Publius Philo was the firſt to whom his military commiſſion was prolonged, and this precedent once ſettled, we hear next of the ſoldiers in Spain declaring L. Marcius imperator in the field. *Res mali exempli imperatores legi ab exercitibus et ſolenne auſpicatorum comitiorum in* caſtra et provincias, *procul ab legibus magiſtratibuſque, ad militarem temeritatem tranferri* *. " This " it was that enabled Marcius and Sylla to " debauch the army; this it was that enabled Cæſar to conquer his native country. " It may be objected, that their great affairs " could not have been managed at ſo great " a diſtance, without ſuch commands:—It " is poſſible indeed, that their empire might " have been longer before it came to that " height, but then it would have been " more laſting; for the adverſary would " never have been able to have *erected a* " *monarchy* and deſtroyed their liberty ſo " ſoon."—This power, monarchical from its very nature, may have been dangerous to

* Lib. 26. § 2.

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a commonwealth, and have ruined the republic by eſtabliſhing a monarchy upon it; but it will be aſked, How can this ever be the caſe in a regulated monarchy? Can it be ſuppoſed that any future King can ever wiſh to change that conſtitution in which his power is eſtabliſhed? Can it be ſuppoſed that a free people could ever be ſo wild as to put themſelves under an unbounded military power, in order to become independent of a limited and civil power? What may be the turn of future events, Heaven only knows; yet experience has taught us that former Kings have thus miſtaken their real intereſt, and former people have been driven to this diſtraction: And if, on any ſuch future occaſion, there ſhould be found eſtabliſhed by repeated and continued cuſtom, by unreſiſted precedents, the office of commander in chief of all North America, not only in the poſſeſſion, but in the actual exerciſe of theſe powers:—*Exercitum parare—bellum gerere—coercere omnibus modis ſocios atque cives*—He might like another Monck, in ſuch critical ſituation, give the turn to the balance, and negotiate, either with the prince, or the people, as his inclinations and intereſts lead him, for the liberties of Great Britain.—If in any future period of events the fate of war ſhould reduce Great Britain to ſtruggle

for its rights, its power, perhaps its ſafety, on terms hardly equal, with all its force, to its ſupport in Europe; and in the courſe of that ſtruggle, there be eſtabliſhed in North America a commander in chief, with an army at his command; with a degree of authority preſiding over the civil power, and civil governors; with an extent of command capable of aſſociating and uniting a number of powers, otherwiſe, incapable of ſuch union: If ſuch a man, at ſuch a criſis, ſhould have ambition enough to wiſh, and ſpirit enough to dare to ſet up an independent empire in America, he could want, in ſuch criſis, no ſupport that a wiſe and artful enemy to Great Britain would not give him: *Nunc illud eſſe tempus occupandi res dum turbata omnia novâ atque inconditâ libertate eſſent, dum regis ſtipendiis paſtus cbverſaretur miles, dum ab Annibale miſſi duces aſſueti militibus juvare poſſent incepta* *. The enemy could not wiſh better ground, than ſuch an eſtabliſhment ſo circumſtanced at ſuch a criſis, nor could take a more effectual meaſure for the ruin of Great Britain, than ſetting up and ſupporting an American empire; for there could be no doubt of the ſucceſs of the meaſure, and no doubt of its effect.

* Liv. lib. 24. § 24.

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The preſent government found already eſtabliſhed, from the neceſſity of things in the ſtate of the laſt war, ſuch a power—and as the effects of that war in America can not be ſaid wholly to ceaſe, while the Indian affairs wear ſuch an hoſtile appearance, this power is for the preſent continued: But we may confide in the true genuine principles of liberty, which animate the royal breaſt; we may truſt in the wiſdom and prudence of the King's miniſtry,—that no ſuch officer as that of a military commander in chief, preſiding over all North America, and preceeding in military matters, and in the power *neceſſary to the execution of that command*, the conſtitutional power of governor; we may truſt, I venture to ſay, that no ſuch office will ever be made an eſtabliſhment *in time of peace*. Regular troops are in the ſame manner and degree neceſſary in North America, as in Britain or Ireland;—but we ſhall ſee them eſtabliſhed there under the ſame relations to the civil power as in Ireland; we ſhall ſee again the civil governments, as eſtabliſhed under commiſſions patent, and charters, predominate. If I, a private perſon, and wholly removed from all advice or conſultation with miniſtry, might be permitted to indulge a conjecture, I would ſuppoſe, from ſome leading meaſures which are already taken, of dividing the American army

into commanderies, and putting a ſtop to draughts on general contingencies, that the danger and expence of the office of commander in chief, will ſoon ceaſe: and that the ſeveral commandants of the troops appointed, each to their reſpective diſtricts, having every power neceſſary for the diſcipline and government of the regular forces under their command, will be eſtabliſhed in the ſame relation and ſubordination to the civil power of that government, within which their command lies, as the commander in chief in Ireland ſtands to the ſupream civil power of Ireland :—and that as a commander in chief of thoſe forces may in caſe of the commencement of hoſtilities, or of actual open war, be again neceſſary ;—if ſuch neceſſity appears firſt here in Europe, his Majeſty will immediately appoint ſuch, and that if ſuch neceſſity ſhould appear firſt in America, there will be proper proviſion and regulations made for the giving effect to ſuch neceſſary powers, without leaving it to the judgment or will of the army to ſay when that is neceſſary, or what powers in ſuch caſe are neceſſary.—The ſeveral governors of the colonies ſhould have inſtructions, in caſe of ſuch emergency, to meet, and in council to give effect to this command, with ſuch powers as they ſhall judge neceſſary and ſafe to a General commanding in chief, until his

Majeſty's

Majeſty's pleaſure can be known; that is to ſay, power of engaging in general expences, of ordering embargoes, of demanding veſſels and carriages, of calling upon the ſeveral governments for their aid in troops, &c. of preparing an army, of taking poſſeſſion of all poſts, forts, and caſtles, (which in the ordinary courſe of the King's charters and commiſſions patent to his governors, muſt otherwiſe be under their commands—and cannot be taken from them, unleſs the charters of the government can be ſuperceded) of having the command and diſpoſal of all military ſtores—none of which powers ought to reſide in any one office, whoſe juriſdiction extends over all North America, and preceeds the civil power of governor— unleſs in ſuch caſe of neceſſity—unleſs confirmed (until his Majeſty's pleaſure can be known) by ſuch council, and under ſuch reſtrictions as the prudence of that council would ſee proper. Under ſuch an eſtabliſhment, every caſe of ſervice that could ariſe is provided for, and every caſe of danger that might ariſe from a predominant military power, is guarded againſt.

I muſt the rather ſuppoſe that the military eſtabliſhment will have that mode given to it; as already the commander in chief, as the commiſſion now ſtands, is inſtructed in

" making any ſuch preparations as ſhall be neceſſary, and are not contained in his inſtructions, that he ſhall take the opinion and aſſiſtance of the governors."

A review and ſettlement of doubted points is no where more neceſſary, than in the maxims and rules of their law, and the ſtate of their courts. It is a rule univerſally adopted through all the colonies, that they carried with them to America the common law of England, with the power of ſuch part of the ſtatutes (thoſe concerning eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction excepted) as were in force at the time of their eſtabliſhment; but, as there is no fundamental rule whereby to ſay, what ſtatutes are admiſſible, and what not, if they admit all, they admit the full eſtabliſhment of the eccleſiaſtical juriſdiction, from which they fled to this wilderneſs for refuge;—if they once make a diſtinction of admitting ſome, and rejecting others, who ſhall draw the line, and where ſhall it paſs? Beſides, as the common law itſelf is nothing but the practice and determination of courts on points of law, drawn into precedents; where the circumſtances of a country and people, and their relation to the ſtatutes and common law differ ſo greatly, the common law of theſe countries, muſt, in its natural courſe, become different, and ſometimes even con-

contrary, or at leaſt incompatible, with the common law of England, ſo as that, in ſome caſes, the determinations ariſing both from the ſtatute and common law *muſt be rejected.* This renders the judicatories of theſe countries vague and precarious, dangerous, if not arbitrary: This leads neceſſarily (let what care will be taken, in forming and enacting their provincial laws) this leads to the rendering the common law of the country different, incompatible with, if not contrary to, and independent of, the law of the mother country, than which nothing can be more diſadvantageous to the ſubject, and nothing more derogatory from the power of the government of the mother country, and from that fundamental maxim, that the Coloniſts ſhall have no laws contrary to thoſe of the mother country.

I cannot avoid quoting here at length, a very preciſe and juſt obſervation of the author of the Hiſtory of New York. "The "ſtate of our laws opens a door to much "controverſy. The uncertainty with re-"ſpect to them, renders property precari-"ous, and greatly expoſes us to the arbi-"trary deciſion of bad judges. The com-"mon law of England is generally received, "together with ſuch ſtatutes as were enact-"ed before we had a legiſlature of our own;

"but

" but our courts exerciſe a ſovereign autho-
" rity in determining, *what parts of the*
" *common and ſtatute law* ought to be ex-
" tended; for it muſt be admitted, that the
" difference of circumſtances neceſſarily re-
" quires us, in ſome caſes, to *reject* the de-
" termination of both. In many inſtances,
" they have alſo extended even acts of par-
" liament, paſſed ſince we have had a diſtinct
" legiſlation, which is greatly adding to our
" confuſion. The practice of our courts is
" not leſs uncertain than the law. Some of
" the Engliſh rules are adopted, others re-
" jected. Two things therefore ſeem to be
" abſolutely neceſſary for the public ſecurity.

" Firſt, *The paſſing an act for ſettling the*
" *extent of the Engliſh laws.*

" *Second'y*, That the courts ordain a ge-
" neral ſet of rules for the regulation of the
" practice."

From this repreſentation of things, by an eminent practitioner in thoſe courts, it muſt be ſeen that ſomething is wanting, to fix determinately the judicial powers.——But from a further review made by government here, it will be found that much more is wanting.—Firſt, to determine (I do not at all take into conſideration which way it be de-

determined, only) I ſay, to determine ſome points on this head, which are, and will otherwiſe remain in diſpute; but which ought by no means to be ſuffered one moment to remain in diſpute.

The crown directs its governor to erect courts and appoint the judges thereto.—The actual appointment of the judges is no where *directly* diſputed.——But the power of erecting courts, according to this inſtruction, is, I believe, univerſally diſputed; it being a maxim univerſally maintained by the Coloniſts, that no court can be erected but by act of legiſlature.——Thoſe who reaſon on the ſide of the crown,—ſay,—that the crown does not, by erecting courts in the colonies, claim any right of enacting the juriſdiction of thoſe courts, or the laws whereby they are to act.——The crown names the judge, eſtabliſhes the court, but the juriſdiction is ſettled by the laws of the realm; —and "* cuſtoms, precedents, and com-" mon judicial proceedings of a court are a " law to the court, and the determination " of courts make points to be law."—— The reaſoning of the Coloniſts would certainly hold good againſt the erection of any new juriſdiction, eſtabliſhed on powers not known

* Rep. 16. 4. Rep. 53. fol. 298.

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to the laws of the realm; but how it can be applied to the oppoſing the eſtabliſhment of courts, the laws of whoſe practice, juriſdiction and powers are already ſettled by the laws of the realm, *is the point in iſſue, and to be determined.* It will then be fixed, beyond diſpute, whether the crown can, in its colonies, erect, without the concurrence of the legiſlature, courts of Chancery, Exchequer, King's Bench, Common Pleas, Admiralty, and Probate or Eccleſiaſtical courts.——If it ſhould be determined in favour of the reaſoning, and the claims of the Coloniſts,—I ſhould apprehend that the conſideration of the points under this head, would become an object of government here, even in its legiſlative capacity.——In which view it may be of conſequence to conſider, how far, and on what grounds, the rights of the crown are to be maintained by courts of King's Bench, &c. and how far the revenues by courts of Exchequer, and how far the crown and ſubject may have relief by courts of equity.——If in this view we conſider the defects which muſt be found in Provincial courts, thoſe point out the neceſſity of the eſtabliſhment of a remedial general court of Appeal; but if we view the only mode of appeal, which at preſent exiſts, we ſhall ſee how inapplicable, how inadequate that court is. I cannot, in one view,

better

better deſcribe the defects of the provincial courts in theſe infant governments, than by that very deſcription which my Lord Chief Juſtice Hales gives of our county courts, in the infancy of our own government, wherein he mentions,

" *Firſt*, The ignorance of the judges, who " were the freeholders of the county.

" *Secondly*, That theſe various courts bred " variety of law, eſpecially in the ſeveral " counties, for the deciſions or judgments " being made by divers courts, and ſeveral " independent judges and judicatories, who " had no common intereſt amongſt them " in their ſeveral judicatories, thereby in pro- " ceſs of time, every ſeveral county would " have ſeveral laws, cuſtoms, rules, and " forms of proceedings.——

" *Thirdly*, That all the buſineſs of any " moment was carried by parties and fac- " tions, and that thoſe of great power and " intereſt in the county did eaſily overbear " others in their own cauſes, or in ſuch " wherein they were intereſted, either by " relation of kindred, tenure, ſervice, de- " pendence, or application."

Upon the firſt article of this parallel, it will be no diſhonour to many gentlemen ſitting

ting on the benches of the courts of law in the colonies, to ſay, that they are not, and cannot be expected to be lawyers, or learned in the law. And on the ſecond article it is certain, that although it be a fundamental maxim of colony adminiſtration, that the colonies ſhall have no laws contrary to the laws of Great Britain, yet, from the fluctuation of reſolutions, and confuſion in the conſtruction and practice of the law in the divers and ſeveral colonies, it is certain, that the practice of their courts, and their common law, muſt be not only different from each other, but in the conſequence different alſo from that of Great Britain. In all the colonies the common law is received as the foundation and main body of their law; but each colony being veſted with a legiſlative power, the common law is thereby continually altered; ſo that (as a great lawyer of the colonies has ſaid) "by reaſon of the di-
"verſity of the reſolutions, in their reſpec-
"tive ſuperior courts, and of the ſeveral
"new acts or laws made in them ſeverally;
"the ſeveral ſyſtems of the laws of thoſe
"colonies grow more and more variant,
"not only from one another, but alſo from
"the laws of England."

Under the third article, I fear experience can well ſay, how powerfully, even in

courts, the influence of the leaders of party have been felt in matters between individuals. But in theſe popular governments, and where every executive officer is under a dependence for a temporary, wretched, and I had almoſt ſaid, arbitrary ſupport to the deputies of the people,—it will be no injuſtice to the frame of human nature, either in the perſon of the judges, of the juries, or even the popular lawyer to ſuggeſt, how little the crown, or the rights of government, when oppoſed to the ſpirit of democracy, or even to the paſſions of the populace, has to expect of that ſupport, maintenance, and guardianſhip, which the courts are even by the conſtitution ſuppoſed to hold for the crown—Nor would it be any injuſtice to any of the colonies, juſt to remark in this place, how difficult, if ever practicable it is in any of their courts of common law to convict any perſon of a violation of the laws of trade, or in any matter of crown revenue. Some of our acts of parliament direct the proſecution and puniſhment of the breach of the laws of trade, to take its courſe in the courts of Vice-admiralty: And it has been thought by a very great practitioner, that if the laws of trade were regulated on a practicable application of them to the ſtate of the colony trade, that every breach of them ſhould be proſecuted in the ſame way. That there ſhould be an

advo-

advocate appointed to each court from Great Britain, who, having a proper ſalary independent of the people, ſhould be directed and empowered to proſecute in that court, not only every one who was an offender, but alſo every officer of the cuſtoms, who through neglect, colluſion, oppreſſion, or any other breach of his truſt became ſuch.—Here I own, was it not for the precedent already eſtabliſhed by ſome of the laws of trade, I ſhould doubt the conſiſtency of this meaſure with the general principle of liberty, as eſtabliſhed in the trials by a jury in the common law courts. If theſe precedents can reconcile theſe proceedings to the general principles of liberty, there can be no more effectual meaſure taken; yet ſuch precedents ſhould be extended with caution. The defect in moſt, and actual deficiency in many of the colonies, of a court of equity, does ſtill more forcibly lead to the neceſſity of the meaſure of ſome remedial court of appeal and equity.——In all the King's governments ſo called,—the governor, or governor and council are the chancellor, or judges of the court of chancery.——But ſo long as I underſtand that the governor is, by his general inſtruction, upon ſound principles of policy and juſtice, reſtrained from exerciſing the office of judge or juſtice in his own perſon, I own I always conſidered the gover-

governor, taking up the office of chancellor, as a caſe labouring with inexplicable difficulties. How unfit are governors in general for this high office of law; and how improper is it that governors ſhould be judges, where perhaps the conſequence of the judgment may involve government, and the adminiſtration thereof, in the contentions of parties. Indeed the fact is, that the general diffidence of the wiſdom of this court thus conſtituted, the apprehenſion that reaſons of government may mix in with the grounds of the judgment, has had an effect that the coming to this court is avoided as much as poſſible, ſo that it is almoſt in diſuſe, even where the eſtabliſhment of it is allowed. But in the charter governments they have no chancery at all. I muſt again quote the opinion of a great lawyer in the colonies,— " there is no court of chancery in the char- " ter governments of New England, [and I believe I may add alſo in Penſylvania] " nor " any court veſted with power to determine " cauſes in equity, ſave only that the juſ- " tices of the inferior court, and the juſtices " of the ſuperior court reſpectively, have " power to give relief on mortgages, bonds, " and other penalties contained in deeds, in " all other chancery and equitable matters, " both the crown and the ſubject are with- " out redreſs. This introduced a practice

" of petitioning the legiſlative courts for re-
" lief, and prompted thoſe courts to inter-
" poſe their authority. Theſe petitions be-
" coming numerous, in order to give the
" greater diſpatch to ſuch buſineſs, the le-
" giſlative courts tranſacted ſuch buſineſs by
" orders or reſolves, without the ſolemnity
" of paſſing acts for ſuch purpoſes; and
" have further extended this power by re-
" ſolves and orders, beyond what a court of
" chancery ever attempted to decree, even
" to the ſuſpending of public laws, which
" orders or reſolves are not ſent home for
" the royal aſſent. The tendency of theſe
" meaſures is too obvious to need any ob-
" ſervations thereon." Nor do I ſee how this meaſure of proceeding can be ventured upon in the colonies, or ſuffered to continue by the government here, if it be ſuppoſed that by 1 Hen. 4. 14. " it is accorded, and
" aſſented, that no appeal be from hence-
" forth made, or in any wiſe purſued in
" parliament in time to come." The general apprehenſion of theſe defects occaſioned, that at the firſt planting of the colonies, the King in council here in England was eſtabliſhed as a court of appeals from the provincial judicatories.——At the time of ſettling theſe colonies, there was no precedent of a judicatory beſides thoſe within the realm, except in the caſes of Guernſey and Jerſey,

the remnants of the dutchy of Normandy, and not united within the realm: according to the cuſtom of Normandy, appeals lay to the Duke in council; and upon this ground, appeals lay from the judicatories of theſe iſlands to the King here, as Duke in council; and upon this general precedent (without perhaps attending to the peculiar caſe of the appeal, lying to the Duke of Normandy, and not to the King) was an appeal from the judicatories of the colonies to the King in council ſettled.——But, beſides the inapplicableneſs of ſuch appeal to the modes of the Engliſh law; beſides, that this appeal does not actually take place in general, and is in ſome of the charter colonies actually excluded, except in perſonal actions, wherein the matter in difference exceeds 300 *l.* ſterling;——beſides the difficulty of this appeal, and inefficiency of this redreſs,—the King in council never being, by the conſtitution, in any other caſe, between ſubject and ſubject, formed as ſuch a court of appeal, it ſcarce ever, in the temporary and occaſional ſittings, looks like ſuch a court; but is rather accidentally or particularly, than officially attended.

Theſe general apprehenſions and reaſonings, upon experience, have led many very knowing and diſpaſſionate men in the colo-

nies, into a conviction of the neceſſity of ſome eſtabliſhed and conſtitutional court of appeal and redreſs: and the following meaſure has not only been ſuggeſted, but even taken up as matter of conſideration by ſome of the ableſt lawyers in that country;—namely, the eſtabliſhment of a ſupreme court of appeal and equity, not confined to any one government, but circuiting through a certain diſtrict of governments; perhaps as follows; one to Nova Scotia and New England; one to New York, New Jerſeys, Penſylvania, and Maryland—one to Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia. It has been imagined, that this court ſhould be eſtabliſhed by a commiſſion iſſued to two or more perſons, learned in the law, not only of the mother country, but of the ſeveral governments in its ſaid diſtrict: that this commiſſion ſhould give full powers of a court of chancery, with power alſo of judging on matters of law, to be brought before this court, by writ of error, from the ſeveral ſuperior courts of the diſtrict, which this extended to. Such court would become an eſtabliſhed court of appeals and redreſs, would regulate all the courts of law, ſo that they could not exceed their juriſdiction; would have a general ſuperintendency over all inferior courts; would tend to eſtabliſh ſome regularity, and introduce a conformity, not only amongſt the

the courts themſelves, of the different colonies, but a conformity alſo to the courts of the mother country, in the conſtruction and diſpenſation of law: ſuch court would, more than any other meaſure, not only tend to preſerve the laws, and practice of law in the colonies, under a conſtitutional conformity to the laws of the mother country; but would alſo maintain that dependency therein, which is of the eſſence of colony adminiſtration.

There are gentlemen on this ſide the water, who ſeeing that this meaſure is not without defect, and not ſeeing the neceſſity of a court of chancery at all, as there is nothing contrary to the fundamentals of law, that theſe law-courts already eſtabliſhed ſhould equitize; (if I may ſo expreſs myſelf) —think, that inſtead of eſtabliſhing any new courts of chancery,—it would be very proper to aboliſh even thoſe already eſtabliſhed, extending the power which the law-courts already take in chancering bonds, *&c.*——by impowering them to equitize: and after that to take ſuch meaſures as may beſt eſtabliſh a fixt and conſtitutional court of appeals here in England.

Senſible of the danger of innovations, and abhorrent from tampering in experiments of politics, I mention the following rather as a matter of ſpeculation, than to recommend

the trial: yet I cannot but obſerve, that while the conſtitutions of the governments of the colonies take ſo exactly the model of the Britiſh conſtitution, it always ſtruck me as a ſtrange deviation in this one particular, that the governor's council of ſtate, although a diſtinct, and I had almoſt ſaid, an incompatible board,—with the council, one branch of the legiſlature, is yet always conſtituted of the ſame perſons, in general nominated and liable to be ſuſpended by the governor.—— One may ſee many advantages, beſides the general conformity to the government of the mother country, in having theſe boards diſtinct in their perſons, as well as their office. If the council of ſtate remaining under the ſame conſtitution as at preſent, was compoſed of men of the beſt experience, fortune, and intereſt in the colony, taken in common from the legiſlative council, the houſe of repreſentatives, or the courts, while the members of the legiſlative council, independent of the governor for their exiſtence, had all and only thoſe powers which are neceſſary to a branch of the legiſlature, much weight would be added to adminiſtration in the confidence and extent of intereſt that it would thereby obtain; and to the legiſlature a more true and political diſtribution of power, which, inſtead of the falſe and artificial lead, now held up by expedients, would

throw

throw the real and conſtitutional balance of power into the hands of government.

There is a matter which at firſt or laſt will be found abſolutely neceſſary to be done, and I would wiſh to recommend it at this time; that when the Lords of council ſhall take under conſideration the general ſtate of the adminiſtration of the King's delegated powers in America, they would order a general reviſion of the ſeveral powers granted by the ſeveral boards here in England, to the officers of different kinds, under their reſpective departments: If upon ſuch reviſion they ſhall find that theſe powers are given and granted without any general concert, or any reference to that union which they ought to have, as parts of the one power centering in, and derived from the crown; if they ſhall find that the ſeveral officers and offices in America, though all branches of the one united power of the crown, are by miſchievous rivalſhip of departments, perpetually croſſing and obſtructing each other; if they ſhall find them alternately labouring to depreſs and to depreciate that part of the crown's power, which does not fall within their own delegation; if they ſhall find that while the ſeveral powers of the crown are thus by parts impeached, and rendered contemptible in the eyes of the people, the whole cannot long

remain with that authority which ſhould be able to exert an equal and univerſal adminiſtration throughout the colonies: if this diſconcerted delegation of powers, accompanied with this diſtraction in the exerciſe of them, ſhould be found to lead to ſuch conſequence, it will be found, as I have repeatedly ſaid elſewhere, "That it is a dan-"gerous thing to have truſted ſo much of "civil power out of the hands of the crown; "and to have done ſo little to maintain thoſe "to whom it is entruſted." If this ſhould be found to be the ſtate of things, and there ſhould ariſe a ſerious intention of putting the adminiſtration of the colonies on a practicable footing, their Lordſhips will adviſe, that theſe powers of the crown, delegated through the powers of the ſeveral boards and offices in England, ſhall be ſo granted as not to interfere with each other; ſo granted as not to ſerve the power or purpoſes of individuals, either board offices, or officers; but in ſuch manner as ſhall unite, ſtrengthen, and maintain the powers of the crown, in the true and conſtitutional eſtabliſhment of them; and in ſuch manner as ſhall render the adminiſtration of them in the colonies, uniform, equable, and univerſal, the common bleſſing and protection of the whole. This ought to be done, and it can be done no where, but at the council board—ſitting

as the real, and true, and only efficient board of trade and plantations.

As government, by thoſe miniſters whoſe department it is to ſuperintend and adminiſter the public revenue, hath taken the colony revenue under conſideration; and as the point of right, whether the ſupreme legiſlature of Great Britain (paſſing by the ſubordinate legiſlatures of the colonies, wherein alone the Coloniſts ſay they are repreſented) can tax the colonies, is now brought forward as a matter of diſpute; I do, as writing on this ſubject, think it my duty not to conceal what has always been my idea of the matter. I do ſuppoſe that it will not bear a doubt, but that the ſupreme legiſlature of Great Britain is the true and perfect repreſentative of Great Britain, and all its dependencies: and as it is not in the power of the Houſe of Lords or Commons to exempt any community from the juriſdiction of the King, as ſupreme magiſtrate, ſo that it is not, nor ever was, or could be in the power of the crown, to exempt any perſons or communities within the dominions of Great Britain, from being ſubject and liable to be taxed by parliament. If the ſettlers of the colonies were at their migration, prior to the grants of charter and commiſſioned-conſtitutions, liable to be taxed by parliament, no charters or powers

of

of any kind granted by the crown could exempt them. When the doubt ariſes on expediency, whether parliament ſhould exerciſe this right, where the colonies have legiſlatures that do reſpectively in each colony lay taxes and raiſe revenues for the uſe of the crown in that colony, I think it cannot but be obſerved, that as there are in each reſpective colony ſervices which regard the ſupport of government, and the ſpecial exigences of the ſtate and community of that colony, ſo there are general ſervices which regard the ſupport of the crown, the rights and dominions of Great Britain in general:—That as lands, tenements, and other improved property within the colony, conſidered as the private eſpecial property of that community, ſhould be left to the legiſlatures of thoſe colonies unincumbered by parliament, ſhould, as the proper object of taxes within the colony, be the ſpecial funds of thoſe colonies; ſo revenues by impoſts, exciſe, or a ſtamp duty, become the proper fund whereon the parliament of Great Britain may, with the utmoſt delicacy and regard to the colonies power of taxing themſelves, raiſe thoſe taxes which are raiſed for the general ſervice of the crown; becauſe theſe kind of taxes are (if I may be permitted the expreſſion) coincident with thoſe regulations which the laws of the realm preſcribe to trade in general; to manufactures—

and

and to every legal act and deed;—becauſe they are duties which ariſe from the general rights and juriſdiction of the realm, rather than from the particular and ſpecial concerns of any one colony.—Whenever therefore this point, now a queſtion, ſhall be decided, and government ſhall find it expedient to extend to America, thoſe duties under which trade, manufactures, and buſineſs, is carried on in Great Britain, the proper taxes, ſo as not to interfere with the ſpecial internal property and rights of the colonies, will ariſe from an impoſt, exciſe, and ſtamp duty.—The firſt will ariſe from cuſtoms paid by the exterior trade of the colonies, regulated as hereafter to be mentioned. *Secondly*, As the objects of manufactures, the product of the colonies, and all articles conſumed by the manufacturers, ought not to be exempt from thoſe duties which are paid on the like objects and articles by the manufacturers in England;—*As the manufacturers in America ought in this caſe to be under the ſame predicament as they are in England*, the extenſion of the exciſe laws ſo far as this rule of equality goes, can never be thought any matter of injuſtice by the Coloniſts: But in theſe laws one caution muſt be carefully obſerved, that no article bought by the Coloniſts in England, wherein the exciſe duty already paid is part of the price which they give for it, ought to be liable

liable to a ſecond exciſe in the colonies. *Laſtly*, As all matters of buſineſs between man and man, tranſacted either in proceedings or by the directions of law, all matters of bargain or ſale done and performed, are done under the regulations and ſanction of the laws of the realm, it can never be objected to, as to a point of injuſtice, that theſe matters and things in America ſhould be ſubject, *mutatis mutandis*, to the ſame duty as the like matters and things are in England. However one doubt will here ariſe that ought to be well attended to, namely, how far theſe colonies, who for the neceſſity of government and the emergencies of ſervice, have already by their proper powers laid theſe duties on the people, and granted the revenue ariſing therefrom to the crown, by acts which have received the conſent of the crown; how far theſe colonies may or may not be ſuppoſed to have precluded any act of adminiſtration here on theſe heads.—I mention this matter as a point of doubt, which would unavoidably ariſe; but do not pretend to determine on it.

The rates at which the impoſt duty ſhould be laid, ought to be eſtimated by the conſideration of the reſtraints and burthens already lying on the colony trade, by the act of navigation.

The

The rates of any exciſe, if ever it ſhould be found proper to extend thoſe laws to America, ſhould be eſtimated by an average made between the price of labour, the price of proviſions, and expence of living in thoſe countries, compared with the ſame articles here in England, both which may eaſily be known.

The rates of the ſtamp duty ought to be much lower than thoſe laid here in England; becauſe the ſame kind of tranſactions, acts, and deeds, paſſed and done in America, as thoſe here in England, are done for concerns of much leſs value; but if that duty be laid *ad valorem*, it muſt regulate itſelf to the ſtricteſt point of equity.

The Coloniſts ſay with great propriety, that before the mother country determines on the meaſure of taxing them, it ought to be well informed of the abilities of the ſeveral colonies, as to the ſpecies and extent of tax which each is reſpectively able to bear; that none but their repreſentatives can be *duly* informed of that, and therefore by the very ſpirit of the Britiſh conſtitution, it hath been always hitherto left to the colonies "to judge by their repreſentatives of the ways and means by which internal taxes ſhould be raiſed

raiſed within the reſpective governments, and of the ability of the inhabitants to pay them."

To which it may be anſwered,—that ſo long as it is maintained by the government of Great Britain, and not diſallowed by the colonies, that the mother country has a right not only to judge of, but to regulate by its laws, the trade, produce, and manufactures of its colonies; the mother country ought to be ſuppoſed to have the means of being *duly* informed of the ſtate of theſe, and therefore to be the proper, and indeed the only proper judge of the whole of this ſubject, as a matter of police as well as revenue; in which perhaps the only true grounds and right of laying duties by impoſt and exciſe may lie.

It is ſaid that the abilities of the colonies are not known, but it is a ſhame that it ſhould be ſo ſaid; that ignorance ſhould be thus imputed to thoſe who ought to be fully informed of this ſubject; or the art of concealing their circumſtances, imputed to thoſe who can have no juſtifiable reaſon for concealing them from government:—But this aſſertion ariſes from a miſtake. Government here in Britain does, or at leaſt may at any time know,

1. The

1. The number of rateable polls.

2. The number of acres in each province or colony, both cultivated and lying in waſte.

3. The numbers and quantity of every other article of rateable property, according to the method uſed by the provinces themſelves, in rating eſtates real and perſonal.

4. Government may know, and ought always officially to know it, what the annual amount of the ſeveral province taxes are, and by what rates they are raiſed, and by what eſtimates theſe rates are laid.

From whence, by comparing this eſtimation with the value of each article, they may always collect nearly the real value of the property of ſuch province or colony; all which compared with the prices of labour, proviſions, and European goods imported, on one hand, and with the value of their exports, on the other, will as fully and preciſely, as all the knowledge and juſtice of their own repreſentatives could do, mark their abilities to bear, and the proportion which they ſhould bear of taxes with the mother

mother country. When this proportion ſhall be once ſettled for the ſeveral parts, by the ſupreme legiſlature which can alone extend to the whole; ſo long as the arguments and reaſoning of the Coloniſts "that they ſhould be permitted to judge by their repreſentatives of the ways and means of levying theſe *internal taxes* by rates on polls and eſtates real and perſonal," go only to the matter of expediency and good policy; whilſt this privilege is not claimed as an excluſive right, and extends only to theſe *internal funds*, I own that I cannot but think that it would be expedient and of good policy, to continue to them theſe privileges exerciſed on theſe objects, as their proper funds.

As it is my opinion that the polls and eſtates real and perſonal are, as the ſpecial internal private property of the province, the proper object of the province taxes, and that theſe ought to be left as the ſpecial funds of the province unincumbered by parliament; my endeavouring here to give ſome idea of the extent of theſe funds, and what they would produce annually, at one ſhilling in the pound on the produce, cannot be miſconſtrued to be a pointing out of theſe, as taxes proper to be laid on the colonies by Great Britain: Yet on the contrary, it may ſhow what little reaſon the Coloniſts have to complain of

thoſe moderate duties and impoſts, which the mother country expects them to bear in aid to her, whilſt government leaves to them untouched theſe internal funds, ſo fully adequate to all the internal ſervices of each province.

The following eſtimates of the provinces, Maſſachuſett's-Bay to the northward, of South-Carolina to the ſouthward, and of New Jerſey in the center, are founded in the tax-liſts of each province; which tax-liſts, being of ten Years ſtanding, muſt, in encreaſing countries as the colonies are, fall ſhort of the numbers and quantity which would be found on any tax-liſt faithfully made out at this time. The eſtimates which I have made thereon are in general at ſuch an under-valuation, that I ſhould think no man of candour in the provinces will object to them; although they be, in ſome articles, higher than the valuation which the legiſlatures directed ſo long ago to be made, as the fund of the taxes that they order to be levied on them. This valuation of the eſtates, real and perſonal, gives the groſs amount of the principal of the rateable property in the province. I think I may venture to affirm, that no man, who would be thought to underſtand the eſtimation of things, will object that I over-rate the produce of this property,

when I rate it at ſix *per cent.* only of this moderate valuation; when he conſiders that money, in none of thoſe provinces, bears leſs than ſix *per cent.* intereſt; and that under loans of money, at five *per cent.* moſt of the beſt improvements of the country have been made.

The valuation of the provinces, New-York and Penſylvania, lying on each ſide of New-Jerſey, are calculated in a different manner, by taking a medium between the ſuppoſed real value and the very loweſt rate of valuation. Without troubling the reader, or encumbering the printer with the detail of theſe tax-liſts, and the calculations made thereon, I will inſert only the reſult of them, as follows.

The provinces under-mentioned could annually raiſe, by one ſhilling in the pound on the produce of the rateable property, eſtates real and perſonal in each province:

	£.	s.	d.
Province Maſſachuſett's-Bay,	13172	7	11
New-York, - -	8000	0	0
New-Jerſey, - -	5289	17	0
Penſylvania, - -	15761	10	0
South-Carolina, -	6971	1	11
Sterling, £.	49395	16	10

	£.	s.	d.
Suppoſe now the reſt of the colonies to be no more than able to double this ſum:			
The ſum-total that the colonies will be able to raiſe, according to their old tax-liſts, and their own mode of valuation and of rating the produce of eſtates, real and perſonal, will be, at one ſhilling in the pound on the produce, *per annum*, - - - - - - -	98791	13	8

In juſtice to the reſt of the provinces, particularized above, I ought to obſerve that, by the equalleſt judgment which I can form, I think that the province of South-Carolina is the moſt under-rated.

I ſhould alſo point out to the American reader, that, as the calculations and liſts above referred to, are taken from the private collections of the writer of theſe papers, without any official communication of ſuch papers as miniſtry may be poſſeſſed of, I deſire him to give no other credit to them, than ſuch as, by referring to his own knowledge of the ſtate of things in the colonies, he finds to be juſt and near the truth. I ſhould, on the other hand, inform the Engliſh reader, that theſe were collected on the ſpot, and communicated by perſons leading,

and thoroughly converſant in the buſineſs of their reſpective provinces.

Another remark is neceſſary, That, except what relates to Penſylvania, theſe collections were made nine years ago; ſo that, wherever any difference may ariſe, from the different proportion in which theſe provinces have encreaſed, that ought to be carried to account; at the ſame time, that a certain addition may be made to the whole from the certain encreaſe of all of them.

If this moderate tax, raiſed by the above moderate valuation, be compared with the internal annual charge of government in the reſpective provinces, that charge will be found much below the ſupplies of this fund. The whole charge of the ordinary expence of government in the province Maſſachuſett's-Bay, which does, by much, more to the ſupport of government, and other public ſervices than any other province, is, in time of peace, ſterling 12937 *l.* 10 *s.* whereas that of New-York is not more than about, ſterling, 4000 *l.* annually.

When theſe points ſhall be ſettled, there cannot be a doubt but that the ſame zealous attention, which all parties ſee and confeſs to be applied in the adminiſtration of the Britiſh department to the public revenue, will be ap-

plied to the eſtabliſhing and reforming that of America.

A proper knowledge of, and real attention to, the Crown's quit-rents in America, by reviſing the *original defects*, by remedying the almoſt inſurmountable difficulties that the due collection of them is attended with, may render that branch a real and effective revenue, which at the ſame time will be found to be no inconſiderable one.

By proper regulations for ſecuring the Crown's rights in waifs and wrecks, in fines and forfeitures, and by proper appropriations of the ſame, that branch of revenue may be made effective: But, whenever it is taken up in earneſt, whenever it ſhall be reſolved upon to give a real official regard to the revenue in America, the office of *Auditor General of the plantations* muſt ceaſe to be a mere ſinecure benefice, and be really and effectively eſtabliſhed with ſuch powers as will carry the duty of it into execution, yet under ſuch cautions and reſtrictions as ſhall ſecure the benefit of its ſervice to the uſe of the crown.

Here it will be neceſſary to remark, that, while adminiſtration is taking meaſures to ſecure and eſtabliſh thoſe duties which the

ſubject ought to pay to government, it much behoves the wiſdom of that adminiſtration to have care that the ſubject hath ſome ſpecies of money out of which to pay.

The Britiſh American colonies have not, within themſelves, the means of making money or coin. They cannot acquire it from Great Britain, the balance of trade being againſt them. The returns of thoſe branches of commerce, in which they are permitted to trade to any other part of Europe, are but barely ſufficient to pay this balance.—By the preſent act of navigation, they are prohibited from trading with the colonies of any other nations, ſo that there remains nothing but a ſmall branch of African trade, and the ſcrambling profits of an undeſcribed traffic, to ſupply them with ſilver. However, the fact is, and matters have been ſo managed, that the general currency of the colonies uſed to be in Spaniſh and Portugueſe coin. This ſupplied the internal circulation of their home buſineſs, and always finally came to England in payments for what the coloniſts exported from thence. If the act of navigation ſhould be carried into ſuch rigorous execution as to cut off this ſupply of a ſilver currency to the colonies, the thoughts of adminiſtration ſhould be turned to the deviſing ſome means of ſupplying the colonies

colonies with money of ſome ſort or other: and in this view, it may not be improper to take up here the conſideration of ſome general principles, on which the buſineſs of money and a currency depends.

SILVER, *by the general conſent of mankind, has become a* DEPOSITE, *which is,* THE COMMON MEASURE *of commerce.* This is a general effect of ſome general cauſe. The experience of its degree of ſcarceneſs compared with its common introduction amidſt men, together with the facility of its being known by its viſible and palpable properties, hath given this effect: Its degree of ſcarceneſs hath given it a value proportioned to the making it a DEPOSITE, and the certain quantity in which this is mixed with the poſſeſſions and tranſactions of man, together with the facility of its being known, makes it a COMMON MEASURE amongſt thoſe things. There are perhaps other things which might be better applied to commerce as a common meaſure, and there are perhaps other things which might better anſwer as a depoſite; but there is nothing except ſilver known and acknowledged by the general experience of mankind, which is a depoſite and common meaſure of commerce. Paper, leather, or parchment, may, by the ſanction of government, become a common meaſure to an extent beyond what ſilver could reach; yet all

the ſanction and power of government never will make it an adequate depoſite. Diamonds, pearls, or other jewels, may in many caſes be conſidered as a more apt and ſuitable depoſite, and may be applied as ſuch, to an extent to which ſilver will not reach; yet their ſcarcity tends to throw them into a monopoly; they cannot be ſubdivided, nor amaſſed into one concrete, and the knowledge of them is more calculated for a myſtery or trade, than for the forenſic uſes of man in common, and they will never therefore become a common meaſure.

This truth eſtabliſhed and rightly underſtood, it will be ſeen that that ſtate of trade in the colonies is the beſt, and that adminiſtration of the colonies the wiſeſt, which tends to introduce this only true and real currency amongſt them. And in this view I muſt wiſh to ſee the Spaniſh ſilver flowing into our colonies, with an ample and uninterrupted ſtream, as I know that that ſtream, after it hath watered and ſupplyed the regions which it paſſeth through, muſt, like every other ſtream, pay its tribute to its mother ocean: As this ſilver, to ſpeak without a metaphor, after it hath paſſed through the various uſes of it in the colonies, doth always come to, and center finally in Great Britain.

The

The proportion of this meaſure, by the general application of it to ſeveral different commodities, in different places and circumſtances, forms *its own ſcale*. This ſcale ariſes from the effect of natural operations, and not from *artificial impoſition*: If therefore ſilver was never uſed but by the merchant, as the general meaſure of his commerce and exchange, coin would be (as it is in ſuch caſe) of no uſe; it would be conſidered as bullion only. Although bullion is thus ſufficient for the meaſure of general commerce, yet for the daily uſes of the market ſomething more is wanted in the detail; ſomething is wanted to mark to common judgment its proportion, and to give the ſcale: Government therefore, here interpoſes, and by forming it into COIN *gives the ſcale*, and makes it become to forenſic uſe AN INSTRUMENT in detail, as well as it is in bullion a MEASURE in general.

This *artificial marking* of this ſcale on a *natural meaſure*, is neither more nor leſs than marking on any other rule or meaſure, the graduate proportions of it: And this artificial marking of the ſcale, or graduating the meaſure is of no uſe but in detail, and extends not beyond the market;—for exchange reſtores it again in commerce. No artificial ſtandard therefore can be impoſed.

Having

Having this idea of money and coin, I could never comprehend to what general uſes, or to what purpoſes of government, the proclamation which Queen Ann iſſued, and which was confirmed by ſtatute in the ſixth year of her reign, could be ſuppoſed to extend, while it endeavoured to rate the foreign coins current in the colonies by an artificial ſtandard. It would ſeem to me juſt as wiſe, and anſwering to juſt as good purpoſe, if government ſhould now iſſue a proclamation, directing, that for the future, all black horſes in the colonies ſhould be called white, and all brindled cows called red. The making even a law to alter the names of things, will never alter the nature of thoſe things; and will never have any other effect, than that of introducing confuſion, and of giving an opportunity to bad men of profiting by that confuſion.

The ſafeſt and wiſeſt meaſure which government can take, is not to diſcourage or obſtruct that channel through which ſilver flows into the colonies,—nor to interfere with that value which it acquires there;—but only ſo to regulate the colony trade, that that ſilver ſhall finally come to, and center in Great Britain, whither it will moſt certainly come in its true value;—but if through any fatality in things or meaſures, a medium of trade, a cur-

a currency of money, ſhould grow defective in the colonies, the wiſdom of government will then interpoſe, either to remedy the cauſe which occaſions ſuch defect, or to contrive the means of ſupplying the deficiency. The remedy lies in a certain addreſs in carrying into execution the act of navigation ;—but if that remedy is neglected, the next recourſe muſt lie in ſome means of maintaining a currency ſpecially appropriated to the colonies, and muſt be partly ſuch as will keep a certain quantity of ſilver coin in circulation there,—and partly ſuch as ſhall eſtabliſh *a paper currency*, holding a value nearly equal to ſilver.

On the firſt view of theſe reſources, it will be matter of ſerious conſideration, whether government ſhould eſtabliſh a mint and coinage ſpecially appropriated for the uſe of the colonies ; and on what baſis this ſhould be eſtabliſhed. If it be neceſſary that ſilver, which in bullion is a common meaſure of general commerce, ſhould, that it may be inſtrumental alſo to the common uſes of the market, be formed into coin, it ſhould be ſo formed, that while it was the duty of the public to form this coin, it may not be the intereſt of the individual to melt it down again into bullion.

If

If a certain quantity of coin is neceſſary for the forenſic uſes of the colonies, it ſhould be ſo formed as *in no ordinary courſe* of buſineſs to become the intereſt of the merchant to export it from thence.

This coin ſhould be graduated by alloy, ſomewhat below the real ſcale, ſo as to bear a value in tale, ſomewhat better than the ſilver it contains would fetch after the expence of melting down the coin into bullion,—ſomewhat better *as an inſtrument*, in common forenſic uſe, than the merchant *in ordinary caſes* could make of it, in applying it *as a meaſure* by exporting it.

I have here inſerted the caution againſt ordinary caſes only, as I am not unaware that the lowering the intrinſic worth of the coin for America, will have in the end no other effect, than to raiſe the price of the European goods carried thither, while the coin will be exported to Great Britain the ſame as if it were pure ſilver.

If ſuch a neceſſity of an artificial currency ſhould ever exiſt in the colonies, and if ſuch a coinage waseſtabliſhed, the Coloniſts would, for the purpoſes of their forenſic buſineſs, purchaſe *this inſtrument* either in gold or ſilver

ſilver, in the ſame manner as they do now purchaſe copper coin for the ſame purpoſes.

There are two ideas of *a paper currency*. The one adopts a meaſure for eſtabliſhing a bank in the colonies, which is quite a new and untried meaſure; the other turns the view to the regulating the preſent paper money currency, which the colonies have had experience of in all its deviations, and to the eſtabliſhing the ſame on a ſure and ſufficient baſis.

I have ſeen this plan for *a provincial bank*, and think it juſtice to the very knowing perſon who formed it, to ſay, that it muſt be becauſe I do not underſtand it, that many objections ariſe in my mind to it. Whenever he ſhall think fit to produce it, it will come forth clear of all objections, with that force of conviction with which truth always flows from a mind in full and perfect poſſeſſion of it.

In the mean while, I will recommend to the conſideration of thoſe who take a lead in buſineſs, a meaſure deviſed and adminiſtered by an American aſſembly.—And I will venture to ſay, that there never was a wiſer or a better meaſure, never one better calculated to ſerve the uſes of an encreaſing country, that

that there never was a meaſure more ſteadily purſued, or more faithfully executed, for forty years together, than the loan-office in Penſylvania, formed and adminiſtered by the Aſſembly of that province.

An encreaſing country of ſettlers and traders muſt alway have the balance of trade againſt them, for this very reaſon, becauſe they are encreaſing and improving, becauſe they muſt be continually wanting further ſupplies which their preſent circumſtances will neither furniſh nor pay for:—And for this very reaſon alſo, they muſt alway labour under a decreaſing ſilver currency, though their circumſtances require an encreaſing one. In the common curſory view of things, our politicians, both theoriſts and practitioners, are apt to think, that a country which has the balance of trade againſt it, and is continually drained of its ſilver currency, muſt be in a declining ſtate; but here we may ſee that the progreſſive improvements of a commercial country of ſettlers, muſt neceſſarily have the balance of trade againſt them, and a decreaſing ſilver currency; that their continual want of money and other materials to carry on their trade and buſineſs muſt engage them in debt—But that thoſe very things applied to their improvements, will in return not only pay thoſe debts, but

create

create alſo a ſurplus to be ſtill carried forward to further and further improvements. In a country under ſuch circumſtances, money lent upon intereſt to ſettlers, creates money. Paper money thus lent upon intereſt will create gold and ſilver in principal, *while the intereſt becomes a revenue that pays the charges of government.* This currency is the true Pactolian ſtream which converts all into gold that is waſhed by it. It is on this principle that the wiſdom and virtue of the aſſembly of Penſilvania eſtabliſhed, under the ſanction of government, an office for the emiſſion of paper money by loan.

Some matters which were intended to have been inſerted here, are ſuſpended for the preſent, for reaſons which I hope may lead to more public benefit, than the making them public in this work could do. —I proceed therefore to the conſideration of the ordinary mode of making paper-money, by the legiſlatures of the colonies iſſuing government-notes, payable at a certain period by a tax. It may be uſeful to give ſome deſcription of this, and to point out ſuch regulations as will become neceſſary in this caſe.

This paper-money conſiſts of promiſſory notes, iſſued by the authority of the legiſlature of each province, deriving its value from being

being payable at a certain period, by monies ariſing from a tax proportioned to that payment at the time fixed. Theſe notes paſs as lawful money, and have been hitherto a legal tender in each reſpective province where they are iſſued.

As any limitation of the USES of theſe notes as a currency, muſt proportionably decreaſe its value; as any inſecurity, inſufficiency, or uncertainty in the FUND, which is to pay off theſe notes, muſt decreaſe their value; as any QUANTITY emitted more than the neceſſities of ſuch province calls for as a medium, muſt alſo decreaſe its value; it is a direct and palpable injuſtice, that that medium or currency which has depreciated by any of theſe means from its *real value*, ſhould continue *a legal tender at its nominal value*.

The outrageous abuſes practiſed by ſome of thoſe legiſlatures who have dealt in the manufacture of this depreciating currency, and the great injury which the merchant and fair dealer have ſuffered by this fraudulent medium, occaſioned the interpoſition of parliament to become neceſſary:— Parliament very properly interpoſed, by applying the only adequate and efficient remedy, namely, by prohibiting theſe colony legiſlatures from being able to make the paper cur-

currency *a legal tender*. And government has lately for the ſame prudent reaſons made this prohibition general to the whole of the colonies. For, *when this paper-money cannot be forced in payment as a legal tender*, this very circumſtance will oblige that legiſlature which creates it, to form it of ſuch internal right conſtitution, as ſhall force its own way by its own intrinſic worth on a level nearly equal to ſilver. The legiſlature muſt ſo frame and regulate it as to give it *a real value*.

Theſe regulations all turn upon *the ſufficiency and certainty of the* FUND, *the extent of the* USES, and the proportioning the QUANTITY to the actual and real neceſſities which require ſuch a medium.

The FUND ſhould at leaſt be equal to the payment of the principal *in a limited time*; and that time ſhould be certainly ſo fixed, as that the legiſlature itſelf could not alter it. Where the paper currency is treaſurer's notes given for ſpecie actually lent to government, the fund whereon it is borrowed ſhould be alſo capable of paying, *ad interim*, a certain intereſt, as is the caſe of treaſurer's notes in the province Maſſachuſetts-Bay.

This medium ought to be applicable to all the equitable as well as legal USES of ſilver

money within the colony or province, except that of being a legal tender.

The QUANTITY ought always to be proportioned to the neceſſity of the medium wanted; which (the *fund and uſes* being fairly and abſolutely fixed) may always be judged of by the riſe or fall of the *value* in its general currency or exchange: for where the quantity iſſued is more than neceſſity requires, the value will depreciate: and where the fund is good, and all proper uſes of the medium ſecured, ſo long as no more paper is iſſued than neceſſity does require, it will always hold a value near to, though ſomewhat leſs than ſilver. On this ſubject I here refer the reader to the following very judicious tract, written and given to me, ſeveral years ago, by *Tench Francis*, Eſq; late attorney-general of the province of Penſylvania, converſant in theſe matters, both as a lawyer and a merchant. I print and publiſh it by leave of a near relation, and ſubjoin it as containing the moſt exact and deciſive ſentiments on this ſubject that I have any where met with. I entitle it, CONSIDERATIONS ON A PAPER-CURRENCY.

ALL value is given to things for their fitneſs or power to anſwer or procure the neceſſary

ceſſary conveniencies or pleaſures of human life.

This value may be conſidered as abſolute or relative. Abſolute value terminates in our eſteem of any thing, without referring to any other; relative is that which it has compared with another. The latter only I ſhall have occaſion to treat of.

Men have power to diſcover qualities in a thing, which ſhall give it value. They can by laws, cuſtoms, or faſhions, greatly increaſe that value; yet, to know or fix its worth or price, compared with other things *à priori*, has always been found beyond their reach and capacity.

This is owing to an inability to foreſee, eſtimate, and govern exactly all the points and circumſtances, on which the value of things turns, which are ſuch as are in, or follow the nature and order of things in general, and then may be foreſeen and judged of with ſome certainty; or which conſiſt of the paſſions, prejudices, and miſapprehenſions of mankind, whoſe number and influences we cannot rate or calculate.

From the *natural* ſtate and order of things, I think it may be affirmed, that the worth

or price of any thing will always be, as the quantity and uſes amongſt mankind; as the uſes directly, and as the quantity reciprocally or inverſely. Uſe is the ſole cauſe of value, and value the neceſſary effect of uſe. Abating theſe diſtinctions of cauſe and effect, uſeleſs and worthleſs, are ſynonymous terms. Every man muſt agree, that if you add to a cauſe, you muſt increaſe the effect; ſubſtract from it, and the contrary effect muſt follow. Let the quantity of any thing be as 20, and the uſes as 20, and let it have a value; let the uſes be increaſed to 30, without inlarging the quantity; it is plain, the equal proportion that every man can enjoy will be as 20 divided by 30, $\frac{2}{3}$ds only. But this being leſs by $\frac{1}{3}$ than each man requires, the demand for it, and conſequently the value muſt riſe. Subſtract 10 from the uſes when 20, and then under an equal diſtribution, each ſhall have double the value he wants, which muſt leſſen the demand, and the value dependent upon it.

Governing the uſes is one of the rational powers, that men have over the value of things.

Experience teaches the meaneſt underſtanding, that price depends on quantity, and that they are to each other inverſely, or the more

more of one the leſs the other. Water is as neceſſary as any thing, and a diamond perhaps as little; yet the ſuperfluous plenty of one has rendered it of no worth in moſt places, and the ſcarcity of the other has carried it to an extravagant price.

Limiting the quantity is another rational power men have over the value of things; and I do not know a third.

From hence it appears, that increaſing the uſes, and leſſening the quantity, and leſſening the uſes, and increaſing the quantity, muſt always have the ſame influence upon the rates and prices of things. Therefore, whenever I ſhew the effect of one, for brevity's ſake, let it be underſtood, that I ſuppoſe the ſame conſequence will attend the other reſpectively.

Although I affirm, that variation in quantity or uſe ſhall cauſe a change in the price of a thing, yet I do not ſay, that this change ſhall be in proportion equal to the variation in the quantity or uſe; for I think the contrary. To inſtance in quantity, let it be in any thing as 30, and let the uſe be as 30, and it ſhall then have a mean value. The uſe unchanged, let the quantity be at one time as 20, at another 40. Whoever con-

ſiders the prevalence of men's appetites for a ſcarce commodity, under the dreads and apprehenſions of wanting it, with their different abilities to procure it, on one hand, and their great contempt of uſeleſs exceſs on the other, muſt agree it is more than probable, that the difference between the means and the extremes ſhall not be the ſame in the prices, as in the quantities. Merchants, by experience, have found the truth of what I advance. I think they have obſerved, that leſſening a commodity one third from the mean quantity, *cæteris paribus*, nearly doubles the value; adding a third, ſubſtracts one half from it; and that by further increaſing or diminiſhing the quantity, theſe diſproportions between the quantity and prices vaſtly increaſe.

It is extremely difficult, if not impoſſible, to inveſtigate theſe proportions mathematically; but events ſpringing from uſe and experience have equal certainty in them, and to all practical purpoſes are as much to be relied and depended upon.

It is further worth obſervation, that whatever fluctuates much in quantity, and conſequently in worth, will ſink beneath its mean value.

Suppoſe

Suppoſe the quantity of any thing produced in every 50 years be exactly the ſame: let the annual product be as *one* anſwerable to the neceſſities of mankind, then the value in each year ſhall be as one, and the whole equal to 50. But if the quantity of the annual product fluctuates, there will be annual fluctuations in the value; but as the proportions of the decreaſe of value, from experience above ſtated, will be greater than the proportions of the increaſe of value, this fluctuation will cauſe a deficiency in the mean value, which deficiency will always be in proportion to the greatneſs and quickneſs of the changes. This, I preſume, is occaſioned by the deſire of mankind in general to reſt on certainty, rather than rely on what is fluctuating and inconſtant, though they ſhould expect gain equal to the riſque, and by the low circumſtances of the majority of men, whoſe fortunes, in all prudence, direct to the firſt, rather than the latter. The caſe of inſurances is an evident proof of this remark. If the inſurers gain, which I think muſt be admitted, then they receive a premium beyond the value of the riſque, and this gain the inſured pay for *certainty* againſt *contingent loſſes*.

Theſe few rules of eſtimating the value of things, well applied, will, I preſume,

ſhew when it is convenient to introduce paper-money into a country, and when it will prove hurtful; what are its advantages and inconveniencies, general and particular, when introduced; of what great importance it is to prevent an exceſs in quantity, and to extend the uſes; and nearly what its value will be in any given ſtate.

If a nation has a quantity of money equal to its commerce, the lands, commodities, and labour of the people ſhall bear a middle price. This ſtate is the beſt, and tends moſt to enrich the people, and make their happineſs laſting. If they ſhould mint paper to paſs for money, the increaſe of quantity in the former will leſſen the value of the latter, will raiſe the price of lands and rents, and make the labour of ſuch a people, and the commodities, be *rated* higher than in other places. Men's fortunes will riſe in *nominal, not real value*; from whence idleneſs, expence and poverty ſhall follow. Under theſe circumſtances, their *real money*, inſtead of their commodities, ſhall be exported from them. Here the paper will be their bane and deſtruction. But if their commerce, or uſes of money, exceed the quantity of it, their lands, labour, and commodities ſhall ſink beneath their worth in other countries. Few purchaſers of lands will be found

found in regard to the ſuperior profit that muſt attend the uſe of money in trade: the *wealthy merchant ſhall be at the head of affairs*, with few competitions; he ſhall be able to grind down the farmer in the ſale of his commodities, and, when thoſe fail to ſupport him, in the purchaſe of his lands. The artiſan's labour ſhall be depreciated by the merchant who exports it, or the needy farmer that uſes it. The wealthy only ſhall accumulate riches, the commonwealth ſhall decline, and in time farmers and artiſans muſt deſert the place for another, where their labour ſhall be better rewarded. Here the uſe of paper-money will ſhake off the fetters and clogs of the poor. Merchants will multiply; they will raiſe the price of labour, and of the fruits of the earth, and thereby the value of lands. An equal diſtribution of gain and profit ſhall ſucceed, and deſtroy the partial accumulations of wealth.

I think theſe marks, taken from the value of lands, labour, and commodities, compared with their worth in other countries, will be found the only infallible rules to judge of an equality, exceſs, or defect of money in any place whereſoever; and conſequently will, at all times, unerringly ſhew the neceſſity of increaſing coins, or the contrary. Had a neighbouring province well underſtood

and

and weighed theſe points, they had not created a paper credit far exceeding all their uſes for money, when they were able to ſupply themſelves with gold equal to their trade, nor at the ſame time have dammed up ſo many uſes for it, which now cover them with clouds and confuſion, that no man can ſee his way through. The beſt method they can uſe is to ſink it as faſt as poſſible, and not let their fund lie in Britain at an intereſt leſs than 4 *per cent.* when it is worth 6 in their own country, and their paper paſſes 50 *per cent.* leſs than the nominal value. But to return: when it is found neceſſary to add *paper-money* to the coin of any country, to ſupport its value ought to be the main and principal view. This will turn upon the FUND, the USES, and the QUANTITY.

All value ariſing from the uſe, I beg leave to call *extrinſick.*

Having ſhewn that paper-money acquires its extrinſic value from the uſes, which uſes apparently may be encreaſed or diminiſhed; I think it would be needleſs and miſpending the reader's time, to demonſtrate, that this value muſt be in direct proportion to the uſes; for it would really amount to no more than the proof of an axiom univerſally acknowledged, that the effect ſhall always be adequate

adequate to the cauſe. Therefore, in all future arguments, I ſhall take it for granted.

The fund ought to be as ſatisfactory to mankind as human wiſdom can deviſe and furniſh.

The community ſhould become ſecurity to anſwer all deficiencies in the FUND; this is not only the higheſt juſtice, but the beſt policy. It is juſt, becauſe it is a creature of their own, calculated for their private utility and advantage, and is in the management of the country by their repreſentatives and officers. But when they receive an intereſt from the money, the equity of it is unanſwerable: for it ſeems wholly inconſiſtent with juſtice, that one ſhould receive the intereſt, and another run the riſque of the principal. Policy requires it, becauſe the community will certainly receive more profit from its credit under their ſupport, than, with due caution, they can probably loſe by accidents in the fund.

Our next conſideration, with reſpect to the value, turns on *what* the fund is to pay, and *when*. Theſe are arbitrary, being within the power of thoſe by whoſe authority the money is emitted. But for the preſent purpoſe: let us ſuppoſe it is to pay ſilver money, according

according to the late Queen's proclamation, to the value of 1000 *l.* for ſo much of the paper, as, according to the *nominal value*, amounts to that ſum at the end of 15 years. In this ſtate the 1000 *l.* paper, *with regard to the fund alone*, at the time of its emiſſion, is worth no more proclamation money than what will produce 1000 *l.* of that money at the end of the term, at compound intereſt, under as good ſecurity.

For example, take a 1000 *l.* paper, and let it repreſent that the poſſeſſor ſhall receive 1000 *l.* proclamation money for it at the end of 15 years, and let the uſe of money be worth 6 *per cent. per annum*; rebate 6 *per cent. per annum* with compound intereſt for 15 years, and you have the value of the 1000 *l.* proclamation money in hand, which appears to be but 417 *l.* 5 *s.* $3\frac{1}{2}$; more it cannot be worth, becauſe 417 *l.* 5 *s.* $3\frac{1}{2}$, with 6 *per cent. per annum* compound intereſt for 15 years added, will amount to 1000 *l.*

On this ſtate it appears, that the longer the term, the leſs the value, with regard to the fund alone. From whence it follows, that by increaſing the term, this value may be reduced to a degree beneath eſtimation. But whatever the value thus proved be, I call it *intrinſick*.

The

The FUND eſtabliſhed, I proceed to the USES as they next require our attention in regard to the value of the paper-money.

If value, in reſpect to the uſes of things, ſhall always be in direct proportion to thoſe uſes, (which I preſume I have heretofore proved in general, and ſhall hereafter ſhew is true in relation to paper-money) and we deſign to raiſe the power, it follows clearly, that to bring this to paſs, we ought to give it all the uſes of money, or coined gold and ſilver in other countries. From theſe uſes alone it muſt derive all the worth it ſhall bear beyond what I called the *intrinſick* value. For the purpoſe *take the caſe ſtated* on the Fund only, that the poſſeſſor of 1000 *l.* paper ſhall receive 1000 *l.* proclamation money in exchange for it, at the end of 15 years. On this account the paper appeared to be worth but 417 *l.* 15 *s.* $3\frac{1}{2}$. But ſuppoſe this 1000 *l.* paper may be immediately exchanged for 800 *l.* proclamation money, which is 382 *l.* 14 *s.* $8\frac{1}{2}$ more than the intrinſick worth, how has it acquired this exceeding price or value? I think plainly from the uſes. To prove the truth of this, ſuppoſe all the uſes as money taken away; unqueſtionably then the worth of 1000 *l.* paper in proclamation money will be reduced to what I call the intrinſick value; becauſe, depending upon the

the fund alone, it will be exactly in the ſtate of a fund to be paid at a future day; for in neither caſe can the creditor uſe it in the mean time. But if the creditor can by any contrivance uſe the ſum in that time, as he may the paper when it paſſes for money, that uſe muſt be ſomething worth. And when experience ſhews, that under this uſe the value advances from 417*l.* 15*s.* 3½ to 800*l.* I apprehend it is evident to a demonſtration, that the difference is derived from the uſe. To deny it muſt be as irrational and abſurd, as if, upon adding and extracting an ingredient to and from a compoſition, we perceived properties in the compoſition appear and diſappear, and yet were to deny that ſuch ingredient was the cauſe of thoſe properties. This leads me to attempt the ſolution of a queſtion I have known frequently made. If we in Penſylvania, upon a ſufficient fund anſwerable in ſilver, at a future day, mint a quantity of paper equal to the uſes of the people for money, and they willingly and univerſally accept of the paper in all payments, why ſhould it not, at all times, have *value* equal *to the nominal value*, or to the ſum chargeable on the fund at the day to come. This reaſon, urged by many, to ſupport the paper to this degree, is drawn from the nature of money in general. Money, ſay they, is but a ticket or counter, which repreſents to the mind of the poſſeſſor a quan-

a quantity or degree of power. No man, on the receipt of it, ever examines how, or from whence it acquired that power, but in order to diſcover its reality and duration. For inſtance, when an Engliſh crown is received, does the acceptor regard any properties in the metal, or the figures of it, but thoſe which are to convince him that it is what it appears to be? a crown. It muſt be confeſſed, he does not. If ſo, then why may not a piece of paper, under diſtinguiſhing characters and impreſſions, affixed by law and common conſent, have the power of an Engliſh crown annexed to it? It is to paſs in the ſame manner as a crown does, and in the end will as certainly be a crown as the real one.

Therefore they conclude, that the paper may, and ought at all times, to be eſteemed equal to the quantity of ſilver the fund is to yield for it at the end of the term.

I confeſs I think this reaſoning fair, and the concluſion juſt and ſatisfactory, if we do not uſe ſilver in our *commerce, foreign or domeſtick:* otherwiſe not. The fact is, we do uſe ſilver *in our foreign commerce.* I preſume it will be eaſily admitted, as the paper repreſents the ſilver in the fund, and from thence obtains its credit, that it ſhall always be

be at leaſt of equal uſe with, or be as readily received as paper. Then if ſilver in hand has one power, *one uſe more* than the paper, to wit, that of procuring foreign commodities, it is impoſſible we can eſteem them equally. For that would be to controul the different virtues and influences of things over the mind of man, which neceſſarily depending upon the things themſelves, no laws or conſent can, by any means, vary or direct. Wherefore, in the caſe ſtated, it ſeems to me certain and undeniable, that the paper muſt have leſs worth than the ſilver.

Having ſaid, that the uſes of the paper ſhould be as many as poſſible, it may be proper for me to ſpeak of ſome of thoſe uſes, the equity and advantage of which have been very much controverted. But here let it be underſtood, that I proceed upon the caſe laſt ſtated, that the quantity of paper is to be equal to all the uſes of money *within* the country. For that ſtate, and a partial ſupply of paper credit, differing in principles, requiring different reaſoning, and infer quite oppoſite conſequences.

Firſt, then, it ſeems juſt and reaſonable to compel all perſons contracting for ſilver money, after the law that raiſes the paper money to be paid in the country, to receive the

the paper in lieu of it, and at the value ſtruck from the fund, although that be inferior to the real value. This perhaps may not be ſtrict equity *between the contracting parties*, but it is juſt *from the community*, who have power from the conſent of every member, by laws, to prohibit the exerciſe of a particular natural right inconſiſtent with the welfare of the whole, and to inflict a penalty upon diſobedience to the law. To uſe ſilver or gold with the paper, muſt depreciate the latter. Therefore the law forbids it. This can't be unfair, becauſe every man has notice of what coin he is to be paid in, and *is not obliged to exchange more* for the paper, than he thinks agreeable to the *real worth*. And if any ſhould endeavour ſuch uſe, the loſs of the difference between gold or ſilver and paper, is a kind of penalty for violating the law, which muſt be as juſt as any other penalty impoſed on an act, *not evil in itſelf, but prohibited* only.

Again, upon breach of contracts for payment of money in foreign countries, I think it both convenient and right, that ſatisfaction ſhould be made in the paper. The convenience of it will appear, if we ſuppoſe the debtor a member of the ſociety amongſt whom the paper paſſes; for as ſuch, being reſtrained by law from trafficking for gold

or ſilver, and thereby diſabled from procuring them, he muſt either pay paper in compenſation, or lie in a goal, if the ſeverity of his creditors requires it. In theſe circumſtances, no man in his ſenſes would dare to contract a foreign debt, or transfer foreign money in the uſual manner, by exchange; the bad conſequences of which are too numerous and obvious to admit of, or need particular mention, and evidently prove the convenience of allowing ſatisfaction to be made in paper.

The equity of this ſatisfaction will be indiſputable, if the debtor pays a ſum of paper really of equal value with the foreign money. It is the common caſe on breach of ſpecifick contract. If it cannot be performed, the moſt exact juſtice requires no more than *an equivalent compenſation.*

Some perſons imagining the real worth of the paper equal to the nominal, have affirmed, that it ought to diſcharge theſe debts *at the nominal value*; others confeſſing a difference between theſe values, under ſome political views, have aſſerted the ſame. As I ſhall have occaſion to ſpeak on theſe opinions hereafter, upon a point ſimilar to this I ſhall only add here, that if this mode of payment ſhould take place, it would as effectually

fectually deſtroy foreign credit and negociations by exchange, as if gold or ſilver were to be inſiſted on here, to diſcharge a foreign debt. In one caſe, it would be the higheſt imprudence to be the debtor, in the other, it muſt be equally indiſcreet to become a creditor.

Purſuing the uſes, I come to that of diſcharging by paper, the ſilver debts contracted antecedent to the law that raiſes the paper.

To ſhew the neceſſity of admitting this, I ſuppoſe it will be granted me, that there muſt at all times be a very great number of debtors who depend on their future labour and induſtry to pay their debts. This dependence is reaſonable and juſt, founded on the natural right of all fairly to purchaſe ſilver, the then current money of the country. The debtor has the continuation of this right in view and expectation at the time of his contract; without it he cannot be ſuppoſed either prudent or honeſt to borrow. If then, for the convenience and advantage of the whole ſociety, this right muſt be taken away by a ſubſequent law which he could not foreſee, it cannot be agreeable either to reaſon or good conſcience, to exact a payment in ſpecie; for that would be re-

quiring a performance when we had expreſsly taken away the means. Therefore I think it clear in reſpect to the debtor, that the paper ſhould have this uſe. But how will this ſtand with the right of the creditor, who upon the contract as certainly expected to be paid ſilver, as the debtor did the opportunity of acquiring it to pay.

I preſume, if he receives as much paper as ſhall be equal in power or value to the ſilver, it will be juſt in itſelf, and perfectly ſatisfactory to him. But can any man offer ſo high a degree of violence to his own reaſon, and the underſtanding of others, as to affirm, if he is forced to accept leſs, that ſtill he has juſtice diſpenſed him. If I borrow 100*l.* in ſilver before the law, under agreement to repay it at the end of the enſuing year, and before the day of payment the law takes place, commanding the lender to receive 100*l.* paper for it, which ſhall be worth, or have power to procure 82*l.* ſilver money only; with truth can this be called a rational or upright law? Certainly no. Nor ſhall it be any juſtification to me in conſcience to detain 18*l.* of my creditor's money.

The rules of natural juſtice flowing from our fixed and unchangeable relations to each other,

other, and the invariable nature and order of things, inforced by the expreſs commands of God, are of eternal and indiſpenſible obligation. No laws, no combinations of human power, cuſtoms, uſages, or practice, can controul or change them. We may, by the conſent of a majority, tie up the compulſory hand of the civil magiſtrate, and thereby diſſolve the power of coercive laws, but can no more abſolve from the moral duty, than we can reverſe decrees inrolled in heaven. If my debtor ſhould be ſo extremely weak, as to ſuppoſe this not criminal becauſe it is legal, (which I think next to impoſſible to imagine of a rational creature, and I make bold to affirm, never was the caſe of a creditor of underſtanding, ſufficient to know the meaſure of his demand) his opinion perhaps may ſerve for an excuſe, or extenuation of his crime, but never can prove the rectitude of the act, and ſtill the guilt muſt reſt ſomewhere. The lawmakers, the authors of his miſtake, are culpable, unleſs they are under the ſame deluſion, which is yet more difficult to apprehend. Some, who gave up the juſtice of the law, defend their practice under it, by ſaying, they are creditors as well as debtors: and as they are obliged to receive, ſo they ſhould have liberty to pay. Alas! what feeble arguments ſatisfy, when they are caſt

into the ſcale of intereſt, and gain is the conſequence of conviction. If the actions of men towards us are to be the meaſures of our dealing with others, then he that is cheated by any perſon, may juſtly plunder the next he meets. And truly I can't ſee why it ſhould ſtop here; for as we may be many times defrauded, and not know it, to be ſecure, and keep the ballance on the right ſide, we ſhould pillage our neighbours as often as an opportunity offers. This may ſeem ſevere reaſoning, but really I think it fair from the firſt poſition; that becauſe one keeps back part of another's due, therefore he may honeſtly detain the right of a third innocent perſon.

Again, paying an equivalent cannot be injurious to the debtor. For ſuppoſe he pays 120 *l.* paper. If 100 pounds worth of coin'd ſilver, reduced to bullion, will then yield him ſo much, what does he more than perform his contract to pay 100 *l.* of coin'd ſilver? ſeeing a compleat recompence is perfectly conſiſtent with the right of each contracting party. Any remaining objections muſt ariſe from its being hurtful or injurious to the ſociety in general. This has been aſſerted, and endeavours have been uſed to ſupport the truth of it, by this kind of reaſoning.

Firſt,

Firſt, if the law ſhould oblige the debtor (for the purpoſe) to pay 120 *l.* paper in lieu of 100 *l.* ſilver, the legiſlature would thereby confeſs the inferior worth of the paper, which will be attended with this ill conſequence, that the general current value of the paper ſhall be leſs than if the law had declared it equal to ſilver.

Secondly, That leſſening the current value will be a loſs to the ſociety in general. To the firſt, That obliging to pay a larger ſum of paper for a leſs of ſilver, acknowledges an inequality of value under the like denominations is ſelf-evident. But from thence to infer, that the paper ſhall paſs in general, at leſs value than if they had been declared equal, with ſubmiſſion, I think miſtaken, and inconcluſive reaſoning.

To be clearly underſtood, permit me to examine this upon the fact. Suppoſe the law, in the ſtrongeſt terms, enacts that the paper ſhall be in value equal to ſilver money, according to their ſeveral denominations. Carry the paper from thence to uſe, by offering it in exchange or payment for ſome commodity, and then I aſk a ſhort queſtion, Who it is that really ſets a value on the paper, the legiſlature, or the perſon that has the commodity to ſell? If it be anſwered, the firſt, then I ſay, this cannot be, unleſs they

alſo limit the price of the commodity. For if the ſeller can raiſe and proportion the price of it to what he thinks the real worth of the paper, the law-maker's declaration notwithſtanding, it is he that ſtrikes the value, and not they. For inſtance, put the caſe; a farmer, juſt upon emitting the paper, has a buſhel of wheat to ſell, which he rates at, and will not part with, under three ſilver ſhillings. The future current worth of the paper being unknown to him, let him by gueſs imagine theſe three ſhillings equal to four ſhillings paper. A purchaſer then preſſes him, under the influence of the law, to accept of three paper ſhillings for this wheat; but he, without regard to the law, according to his own opinion, demands and receives four ſhillings for it. Will any man ſay, the legiſlature determined the value of the paper here? Apparently the ſeller did. For the legiſlature commanded, that the three paper ſhillings ſhould be valued at three of ſilver, but the farmer has made his eſtimate at three fourths of that value only. Unqueſtionably the vender muſt always have this power, unleſs, as I ſaid before, the law-makers can limit the price of all commodities, which is not practicable, conſiſtent with the order of things, or the preſervation of men's properties. But it may be alledged, although the receiver of the money

ney is not bound to obſerve the legiſlative command, yet ſtill it may have ſome weight. He may conſider it to be the impartial opinion of the wiſeſt part of the ſociety, what the future current value of the paper ſhall be, and thereby add, in ſome degree, to its worth.

In anſwer I muſt obſerve, firſt, this gives up the point of power, and changes it to a matter of meer advice. Then, ſuppoſing that of any import, ſurely delivering it in a mandatory way, will be very little able to produce the deſired effect. Imperative advice (pardon the expreſſion) ſavours too much of ſelling the rabbit, to prevail or perſuade. In ſhort, the words command and adviſe, convey two ideas ſo widely different, and ſo oppoſite and repugnant to each other, that it is abſolutely impoſſible we ſhould take the firſt for the laſt. But granting it to be interpreted as a piece of cordial advice. Shall it be received implicitly, and paſs without any examination? I preſume not. When it comes to be examined, if the people ſhould be informed, that, upon a nice examination, the legiſlature had found a fourth, fifth, or ſixth difference between ſilver and paper, as ſuch calculations are generally out of the reach and comprehenſion of moſt people, it ſeems not improbable that the paper might paſs at

firſt,

firſt, agreeable to the given difference. *I ſay at firſt*; for I contend, if the calculation ſhould be erroneous, (which the uſe of the money in time will diſcover) this effect ſhall not be laſting. But if, on the contrary, they learn that the paper, without any calculation, by gueſs, was pronounced equal to ſilver, which every man's judgment, who knows the ſuperior power of the laſt, muſt diſapprove of, what influence can the legiſlative advice then have? Undoubtedly it will be univerſally rejected, and each perſon turned at large to make his eſtimate as well as he can, without the leaſt regard to the legiſlative opinion.

Once more, take it, that the quantity of ſilver in 100 ſhillings proclamation money is now worth 120 paper ſhillings in Penſylvania, and ſuppoſe this requiſite had hitherto been omitted in all laws relating to the paper: let the ſupreme authority to-day enact, that from henceforth all perſons ſhall give as much for 100 ſhillings paper as they do now for that quantity of ſilver, would this make the leaſt alteration in the current value of the paper? Might a man, with reaſon, expect to buy more bread or wine to-morrow with 100 paper ſhillings, than he can to-day? if the legiſlative power can bring this to paſs, perhaps it may prove more than

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ſome people deſire; for I conjecture it will ſhew, that we never had any occaſion for paper. Whatever quantity of ſilver we had amongſt us, when the paper was ſtruck, might have been extended in value proportionable to our wants, and all the buſineſs of paper-money done at once. The abſurdity of this lies open to the meaneſt capacity; yet I aver, that to raiſe the value of paper by authoritative words or commands, is equally irrational and unfeaſible.

I know no juſt means whereby mankind can give value to things, but increaſing or leſſening the *uſes* or *quantity*. The paper derives its *intrinſick worth from* THE FUND which is ſtable and fixed. The *uſes* give it further value, but that ſhall always be in inverſe proportion to the quantity. The quantity is abſolutely under the direction of the legiſlature, but the uſes not. As they are raiſed, ſo they muſt be limitted, by our neceſſities, and the diſpoſition and order of things. The utmoſt the legiſlature can do, or is needful to be done, is to make the paper anſwer *all thoſe uſes*. When they have aſcertained the FUND, the *uſes* and *quantity*, their power expires. And the current value, if the people receive it, flows from them by ſo unavoidable and a neceſſary conſequence, that whatever the legiſlature or others will

will or do, (if it alters not the fund, uſes, or quantity) can work no change in it in general. For a time, as long as people are ignorant, I confeſs it may; but when experience, that excellent miſtreſs, has diſcloſed what worth they give, all imaginary value ſhall ceaſe and vaniſh, and on the three requiſites, as on a ſolid and firm foundation, it ſhall ultimately reſt and ſettle.

I conclude what I have to ſay on this point with a ſhort obſervation. That all the attempts of aſſemblies in America in this way even by penalties on diſobedience, have proved fruitleſs and abortive. And it has been extremely remarkable, that although tranſgreſſing the law, by making a difference between ſilver and paper, has been every day's practice, not in ſecret, but openly, I have never heard, that any perſon has been ſo much as queſtioned publickly, or has loſt any degree of reputation privately for doing it. So far do the dictates of juſt and right reaſon ſurpaſs and tranſcend the force and power of any human device or inſtitution, that oppoſes or contradicts them.

I come now to conſider the ſecond poſition; that leſſening the current value will be diſadvantageous to the ſociety in general.

This

This cannot be maintained without proving, that it will occaſion a loſs, or obſtruct ſome gain.

A ſociety can gain but two ways, from the earth, and from their neighbours. When I ſay from the earth, I do not mean from her ſimple productions only; for I include therein mens labour and manufactures upon them afterwards. Excepting diſtinction, which has no weight in the preſent queſtion, they can loſe only by the contrary, neglecting the fruit and product of the earth, and ſuffering their neighbours to carry away their wealth.

I preſume it will be very hard to ſhew, how a different valuation of the money can influence the induſtry of the land-holder or the artiſan.

Upon the quantities of the fruits of the earth, and manufactures produced, entirely depend the wealth of the country. A farmer and tradeſman, for a certain portion of their commodities one year receive 8 ſhillings, and with them can purchaſe an ounce of ſilver. The money being raiſed in value next year, they can get but 7 ſhillings for the ſame quantities; but ſtill that ſum will buy an ounce of ſilver. Can this difference,

ference, in the value of the paper, cauſe the one to till the more or leſs ground, or the other to make a greater or leſs quantity of his manufacture? What is it to them how the money is rated, if they receive and part with it at the ſame value? Gold, comparing quantity to quantity, is more valuable than ſilver. If ſilver was to vaniſh out of the world, and gold ſhould be made the only medium of commerce, can any one imagine that mankind would grow more induſtrious to procure it, becauſe more valuable than ſilver, when the quantity they ſhall get muſt be proportionably leſs? Do we in fact find theſe different effects from gold or ſilver at preſent? I think we may as reaſonably expect, that varying the meaſure of the buſhel or yard, will induce people to make more or leſs corn or cloth, as that changing the value of the money, which is another kind of meaſure for commodities, ſhould excite or abate men's diligence to raiſe and make them.

All gain from our neighbours muſt be by getting their money or their goods. Theſe are to be acquired only by conqueſt or commerce. The firſt I paſs over as impertinent to this purpoſe. Then let us ſee whether advancing the value of the money can reflect any gain to us from them in the latter. Gain in trade may be conſidered as derived

rived from the manner or the meaſure of it. The manner of trade in general is of ſhort circuit, and conſiſts of importing foreign money or commodities, and the exportation of our own. In theſe negociations we ſhall find the worth of the paper affords us no advantage over, or an opportunity to get from our neighbours.

Suppoſe a foreigner imports 800 *l.* proclamation money, and finding That not the medium of our commerce, propoſes to exchange it for paper. Let the value of the paper be ſuch, that he can get but 800 *l.* of it for his ſilver. With the paper he purchaſes corn, which he tranſports. What have we got from this foreigner? 800 *l.* in ſilver. Should we have got leſs had he received 1000 *l.* for his ſilver, and with it bought the ſame quantity of wheat? Certainly no. Neither caſe makes us richer or poorer than the other; and the ſame conſequence will be found to attend all foreign imports whatever.

When we export our commodities, the value of the paper is quite out of the queſtion; for in their ſales, or the returns, it is in no ſort concerned. If we ſend the paper abroad, and ſell it, unleſs it by kept in expectation of what the fund will yield for it at the end of the term (which I intend to

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ſpeak to hereafter) we ſhall find it but an exchange of merchandizes between us and them. For the ſeller brings the goods he receives here, and the buyer, by means of the money, carries back our goods; the paper is but a meaſure, as it was in the caſe of imports and exports in return; and if it be rated alike abroad and at home, no loſs or gain can enſue to either country, or to the traders from a high or low valuation of it.

He that is not ſatisfied by theſe reaſons, may perhaps be convinced by the experience of others. The coins of England being finer than thoſe of Holland, quantity to quantity, are of more value; but was it ever thought the Engliſh had therefore more power or traffick, to obtain the money and merchandize of other nations, than the Dutch?

Were it poſſible that the profit of trade could be affected by lowering the coin, that cunning and ſkilful generation would hardly have debaſed theirs by deſign, much leſs have continued for ſo long a time as they have done. The paper-currency of New England, by a great exceſs in the quantity, is ſunk to a ſhameful degree. From hence we hear of much fraud and diſhoneſty amongſt them; but it was never yet objected that it injured them in trade. In truth, if it had, as they principally ſubſiſt by commerce,

merce, they muſt have been ruined and undone long ago.

The currencies of North and South Carolina are in the ſame condition; but ſtill their trades go on as uſual, without the leaſt alteration. In reſpect to the meaſure of our commerce, it is evident that cannot be impaired by reducing the value of our money, unleſs we are thereby deprived of a ſufficient quantity to carry it on: for inſtance, if 60,000 *l.* proclamation money be neceſſary to carry on all our trade, and we ſtrike 60,000 *l.* paper, in hopes it ſhall have that value, upon experience it proves worth but 50,000 *l.* proclamation. Then, for want of the remaining 10,000 *l.* ſome of the wheels of trade muſt ſtand ſtill or move ſlower, which apparently will obſtruct a part of our gain. But the impediment vaniſhes, by raiſing an additional ſum of paper equal to the 10,000 *l.* deficiency. The power of doing this we have hitherto enjoyed and exerciſed without any reſtraint; and probably ſhall retain as long as we uſe it with diſcretion and prudence.

Seeing then, that by raiſing the value of our money, we are not likely to get any thing from our neighbours, let us now try whether by lowering it they can get any thing from us. I preſume I have proved, that in com-

mon commerce, receiving and returning the money for merchandizes, they cannot; conſequently no method remains, but keeping the money to receive ſilver from the fund at the end of the term. By theſe practices they can gain from us only upon one ſuppoſition; that they purchaſe the money at leſs than what I call the intrinſick worth: for if at more they loſe by it, and we gain from them. I have ſhewn, rating intereſt at 6 *per cent. per annum*, that 1000 *l.* payable at the end of 15 years, is worth 500 *l.* to take a round ſum, in hand. If our neighbour can buy it for 400 *l.* he gets 100 *l.* from us. But on the contrary, if he gives 800 *l.* for it, he loſes 300 *l.* For he lends us 800 *l.* for 15 years, at 2 *l.* 8 *s. per cent. per annum*, when it is really worth 6 *l.* and the difference, which on computation will be found in the whole to amount to 300 *l.* or nearly, we gain from him. But neither of theſe caſes can poſſibly happen while men have the leaſt capacity to diſcern and preſerve their own intereſt. Indeed I have never heard one ſound reaſon, either moral or political, for this manifeſt deviation from juſtice and equity. So far is it from good policy, that if I am not miſtaken, it muſt work an effect contrary to the deſign; and inſtead of ſupporting the credit of the paper, undermine and diminiſh it.

The

The public authority is guarantee for the payment of all juſt debts. Every body muſt agree, that the value of paper money is nothing but ſo much public credit. Now, is it poſſible for the public authority to break its own engagements, in reſpect of the payment of the debts, without in ſome degree blaſting that credit which is to be the ſupport of the money? Public and private faith are, in this reſpect, exactly alike; and it is as eaſy to ſee how violating one public obligation ſhall impair the value of the paper-money, as how a known breach of private contract in a goldſmith ſhould leſſen the worth of his bills or notes.

A ſecond inconvenience attending it, is loſs of foreign credit, which muſt be a great misfortune to a trading country. This is occaſioned in the ſame manner, by which I juſt now ſhewed the value of the money might be affected; and let it not be thought amiſs that I mention a third inconvenience, namely, proſtituting and debaſing the dignity and excellence of the divine and moral laws in the eyes of the people, and encouraging them, by ill practices and examples, to depart from true honeſty and virtue. For if a man can once believe, he may juſtly, by human authority, tranſgreſs thoſe laws, he loſes much of the due and neceſſary reſpect

that ought to be paid them, and ſhall afterwards be able to reſiſt their checks and admonitions with greater eaſe and facility: and he that owes to 20 people, and pays them with five ſixths of their due, and ſees his neighbour do the like, under colour of law to-day, will, I am afraid, with leſs regret and compunction, defraud his creditors without a law to-morrow.

But now, granting entire recompence ought to be made, it may be aſked how the quantum of paper to be paid for antecedent ſilver debts ſhall be aſcertained.

The legiſlature cannot ſettle it with exact juſtice, becauſe no ſkill can diſcover what the future current value ſhall be; and if the people are left to do it themſelves, it will introduce many law-ſuits and oppreſſions, and ſtill they may be as far from right as if the legiſlature had done it. The greater inconveniencies in the latter, rationally determine the power to the former. When they come to exerciſe it, if it is the firſt experiment of the kind, I imagine they can do little more than gueſs at the value. But as it is within demonſtration, that the paper cannot be equal to ſilver, ſurely it ought not to be rated ſo. Impartiality requires the gueſs to be as near as may be, and then, although it

may be miſtaken upon the laws of change, it may be perfectly equal, becauſe either party may loſe or gain. It is a common caſe in life, and muſt be always ſo in untried things, and no man can juſtly complain of the event, becauſe all errors are owing to our weakneſs, not our faults.

If any of our neighbours have iſſued paper-money, the value of theirs will afford us ſtrong lights to diſcover the worth of our own, and allowing for different circumſtances, we ought to rate ours as they have found theirs upon trial. But when experience has taught us the true worth of the money, all difficulty ends, and whatever debts or precontracts remain (as many from their growing nature muſt) ſhould be ſatisfied according to that value.

I have now run through all the uſes that occur to me worthy of obſervation; and therefore ſhall proceed to the quantity.

When it is deſigned, that paper ſhall be the only money of a country, the quantity, according to the nominal value, ought to be, as near as poſſible, adequate to the uſes, or in other words, to all commerce, foreign and domeſtick. It is eaſier to ſee the truth of this rule in ſpeculation, than to reduce

it to practice; becauſe the number and extent of the uſes of money, in a populous and induſtrious country, are far beyond our knowledge and comprehenſion. From the circumſtances of other places, the quantity of money current before iſſuing the paper, and the value of their exports, rational conjectures may be formed, but experience alone can teach us what ſum will ſuffice. To ſtrike the neceſſary quantity at once, would be moſt advantageous to the ſociety, and equal with reſpect to individuals; but as that cannot be known, let it be approached as near as may be. And ſince we may expect to err, I preſume it will be better to err on the ſide of deficiency than exceſs, ſeeing additions are eaſy, but ſubſtractions oftentimes very difficult after emiſſion.

FROM what I have ſaid above, which the foregoing treatiſe doth fully confirm and elucidate, the following propoſitions, which I apprehend to be truths, do ariſe. That in colonies, the eſſence of whoſe nature requires a progreſſive increaſe of ſettlements and trade, and yet who, from the balance of trade with the mother country being againſt them, muſt ſuffer a conſtantly decreaſing quantity of ſilver money, *a certain*

tain quantity of paper-money is neceſſary. It is neceſſary to keep up the increaſing operations of this trade, and theſe ſettlements; it is alſo neceſſary, in ſuch circumſtances, to the equal diſtribution and general application of theſe benefits to the whole colony, which benefits would otherwiſe become a monopoly to the *monied merchant only*: it is prudent, and of good policy in the mother country to permit it, as it is the ſureſt means of drawing the balance of the colony trade and culture to its own profit.

Theſe reaſonings further ſhew, how, by ſecuring the *fund*, extending the *uſes*, and regulating the *quantity*, this meaſure of a paper-currency may be carried to the utmoſt extent of which it is capable. Nor do they ſtop here; for as they give the rule whereby to judge of the exceſs or defect of money in any place whatſoever, ſo do they, at all times, ſhew the neceſſity of encreaſing it, or the contrary.

Although the reaſonings, which from my own ſentiments of the matter, I have applied to this ſubject, and thoſe, with which I am able to oblige the world, by publiſhing the above very judicious and able tract, do perfectly coincide in theſe points: yet upon the point of the USES, in conſidering the reme-

dies to be provided againſt the iniquity of any fallacious depreciation of this paper-money, our reaſonings ſeem to divide on quite different ſides of the queſtion. The author of the above tract aſſerts, that in colonies, where paper-money is created, the people of that colony *ſhould be compelled by law to receive* it in payments: and he ſtates two or three different caſes in proof of his aſſertion. My opinion ſuggeſts, that this paper-money ought *by no means to be a legal tender:* and yet, different as theſe propoſitions may appear, they will be found to coincide in the application of the remedy; in the only proper and radical remedy, *the not permitting the paper-money to be a legal tender.* This gentleman experienced in the politicks of the colonies, and knowing the danger, if not the impracticability, of any legiſlature in theſe colonies adopting this maxim, takes up the reaſonableneſs and neceſſity of this paper-money being forced into payments by law;— but then, in all the caſes wherein he ſtates the remedy in equity, againſt the injuſtice, which may ariſe from the artificial value of this paper-money thus declared, he firmly aud juſtly declares, that the payment thus by law forced upon the creditor *in paper, ought not to be according to the nominal legal value* of that paper, but according to the real value, an equivalent to the debt.——

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This judgment totally deſtroys the maxim of its being a legal tender. In the application therefore of the remedy, our opinions do not differ, but the truth of them becomes the more elucidated by this coincidence of two thus ſeemingly different propoſitions.—I will therefore proceed in ſaying, that by the reaſonings above it appears, that the only and proper remedy, againſt the iniquities of a falacious, depreciating paper-currency, is *that radical one, of not permitting this paper-money to be a legal tender.*——On the other hand, ſo confirmed am I in my opinion of the neceſſity and propriety *of a certain quantity* of paper money in the colonies, that were I not convinced, that the reſtraining of it from being a legal tender, will not deſtroy the exiſtence of it, but, on the contrary, amend its currency; I would even ſacrifice my conviction to this point of utility: but whatever apparent value this paper-money may ſeem at firſt view to loſe by reſtraint of this one uſe, this very reſtraint, (if the colonies will have paper-money) muſt become an occaſion of ſo meliorating and ſecuring the *fund*, of ſo exactly regulating *the quantity*, and of adding ſome *other valuable uſe*, namely an intereſt, or ſome premium equivalent to it; that the paper-money ſhall become thus intrinſically, and of its own nature, a better and ſurer currency than all the power and authority of colony-government could make

make it. For not being forced into currency, by any external value derived from authority, it muſt, like bullion in coin, derive its currency from its intrinſick value and applicableneſs to the purpoſes of money;—ſo that thus becoming, from neceſſity, a more determinate meaſure, a more practical inſtrument of trade, and a more beneficial depoſit, as bearing an intereſt even while in currency, it becomes to have *all the uſes* of bullion in coin, and one more,——ſo as even to bear a premium,—which in fact is the caſe of the treaſurer's notes in the province of the Maſſachuſetts-bay in New England, though they are not a legal tender.

However, here, as on every other point, I have ſtated the reaſonings on both ſides of the queſtion:——I have brought the queſtion to its iſſue, and left thoſe, whoſe duty it is, and who have a right to do it, to determine the truth and right of it.

Matters being reviſed and regulated as to the ſeveral points of the conſtitution, and internal police, our politicks ought next to conſider and have regard to thoſe relations, by which the intereſts of the American ſettlements ſtand referred to the Indian country, and its inhabitants. Our colonies muſt neceſſarily

ceſſarily have connections both of trade and politicks with theſe people, of a nature different from any other, as they are planted in countries inhabited by a race of people, who differ in their circumſtances and in their politicks from any other nation with whom there remains, either in hiſtory or on record, any example of alliance.

Perhaps it may not be unentertaining, I am ſure it is neceſſary to the true knowledge of Indian affairs, to take up this ſubject ſomewhat higher than has been uſual in the ordinary way of conſidering it.

The different manner in which this globe of earth is poſſeſſed, and occupied by the different ſpecies of the human race which inhabit it, muſt form the ſpecific difference in their intereſts and politicks.

The human race, which are at preſent found on this earth, may be preciſely divided into three families, generically, and in their eſſential properties, diſtinct and different each from the other. And, for aught I know, it is to this natural truth, that the heaven-directed pen of the author of the books of Moſes may refer, when he gives preciſely and only three ſons to Noah. Theſe three different ſpecies, or race, are—The white race—

race—the red—the black. It is not barely the colour of theſe two firſt, which diſtinguiſhes them; the form of their ſkull, and their hair, where there has been no mixture, is ſpecifically different from each other; and a true Indian will not judge by any other diſtinction: the black race has wool inſtead of hair, as alſo a form of ſkull different from each. Theſe books, after having given a philoſophical account, cloathed in drama, of the origin of things, ſeems to confine its real narrative to the hiſtory of the white family, to that race of people who have been landworkers from the beginning, who, wherever they have ſpread themſelves over the face of this globe, have carried with them the art of cultivating vines, and fruit trees—and the cultivation of bread corn; who, wherever they have extended themſelves, have become ſettlers, and have conſtantly carried with them the ſheep, goat, oxen and horſe, domiciliated and ſpecially applied to the uſes and labour of a ſettlement.

Of the black family I ſay nothing in this place, as not concerned in the preſent conſideration.

The red family, wherever found, are wanderers. The Tartars are in one part wandering herdſmen, and in other parts hunters

hunters and fiſhermen. The American inhabitants, Indians, as we call them, from the word Anjô, or Ynguo, ſignifying a man in their language, are the ſame race of people from one end of the continent to the other; and are the ſame race or family as the Tartars, preciſely of the ſame colour, of the ſame form of ſkull, of the ſame ſpecies of hair,—not to mention the language and their names.

America, in its natural ſtate, is one great foreſt of woods and lakes, ſtocked not with ſheep, oxen, or horſes; not with animals of labour, and ſuch as may be domiciliated, but with wild beaſts, game and fiſh; vegetating not with bread-corn, but with a ſpecies of pulſe, which we call maize, of which there is great doubt whether it be indigenous or not.—All therefore that this country afforded for food or raiment muſt be hunted for. The inhabitants conſequently would naturally be, as in fact they were, *not land-workers, but hunters; not ſettlers, but wanderers.* They would therefore, conſequently, never have, as in fact they never had, any idea of property in land, of that property which ariſes from a man's mixing his labour with it. They would conſequently never have, as in fact they never had, any one communion of rights and actions as extend-

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ed to ſociety; any one civil union; and conſequently they would not ever have any government. They know no ſuch thing as adminiſtrative or executive power, properly ſo called: they allow the authority of advice, a kind of legiſlative authority; but there is no civil coercion amongſt them: they never had any one collective actuating power among the whole, nor any magiſtrate or magiſtrates to execute ſuch power.

The race of white people migrating from Europe, ſtill continue landworkers, and have made ſettlements in parts of America which they occupy, and have tranſported thither bread-corn, ſheep, oxen, horſes, and other uſual and domeſtic animals, that are domiciliate with theſe ſettlers.

They are a community—they are a ſociety——they live under government, and have a fixed property in their lands, have a fixed permanent intereſt, which muſt ſubſiſt *under a continued ſeries of ſecurity.* The locality of the labour of theſe ſettlers, neceſſarily produces a reciprocation of wants and an intercommunion of ſupply, by exchange of mutual neceſſaries. This alſo leads to an intercourſe of commerce with others, who are not immediately within their community—

nity—And hence ariſes a commercial intereſt to theſe ſettlers.

From the European deſire of having the furs and peltry of the Indian hunters, and from the Indian deſire of having the more uſeful and neceſſary tools and inſtruments of improved life, an artificial reciprocation of wants has ariſen between the European ſettlers, and the original inhabitants of America, which hath gradually extended itſelf to many articles not at firſt called for——And from this intercourſe of commerce has ariſen a neceſſary relation of politicks between them.

The only true ſpirit which ought to actuate theſe politicks, muſt ariſe from a due knowledge of the circumſtances and intereſts of each, and from a conſtant invariable attention to that compoſite intereſt which is formed by their alliance.

The intereſt of a community of ſettlers muſt lye in *a permanent ſeries of ſecurity* to their cultured lands, as the making ſettlements is by the ſucceſſive yearly application of repeated labour, and of its eventual future effect. Settlers and landworkers want but ſmall tracts of land; but muſt have a fixed and permanent local property therein. A nation of hunters require a much greater extent

extent of country, in proportion to the wide extended produce of a hunt, to the local bounded produce of a farm or ſettlement; ſo that the Indian property of country conſiſts of two ſorts, their dwelling lands, and their hunt.

The intereſt of a tribe of wanderers lyes in the protection and ſupport of the aged, of the women and children—under the temporary locations of dwelling, which the ſeverity of the winter ſeaſon, the occaſion of the procuring pulſe in the ſeaſon of vegetation, and the times of parturition, render neceſſary even to wanderers.

As fixed regulations and protection of trade, muſt be the eſſential ſpirit of the politicks and the law of nations to a commercial nation *, ſo an exact and ſtrict obſervance

* Hunting being but the amuſement, the diverſion of a nation of ſettlers, the rights and laws of it may not appear as national points—but to a nation of hunters theſe become the national intereſts and the laws of nations.—A violation of theſe laws of nations; as ſubſiſting between nations of hunters, was the cauſe of the war between the Five-nation confederacy, and the Oïlinois. The Ohio hunt, to the ſouth-eaſt of lake Erie, was common to theſe nations; the laws of the hunt required, that at each beaver-pond, the Indians ſhould leave a certain number of males and females; the Oïlinois, on ſome occaſion of pique, deſtroyed all. The

ſervance of the laws of ſporting, the protection of the game, and the moſt rigid ſanction of the *hunt*, (better perhaps underſtood by our ſportſmen than our politicians) become the *laws of nations* to an *hunting nation*.

From theſe principles let us carry our conſiderations into facts.

The European landworkers, when they came to ſettle in America, began trading with Indians; and * obtained leave of the Indians to cultivate ſmall tracts as ſettlements or dwellings. The Indians having no other idea of property, than what was conformable to their tranſient temporary dwelling-places, eaſily granted this. When they came to perceive the very different effect of ſettlements of landworkers creating a permanent property always extending itſelf, they became

The Five-nations declared war againſt the Oïlinies. The Indian war ends not but in the total reduction of the one or the other. The Oïlinies were totally conquered. The conquered country, as well as the hunt, became the right of the Five-nations, and were, amongſt the reſt of their lands, put, by them, into the hands of the Engliſh in truſt.

* Perhaps New-England may be an exception: The Indians began an unjuſt war againſt them; they conquered theſe Indians, and their claim is beſt, as well as juſtly, founded in conqueſt, which the Indians acknowledge.

very uneaſy; but yet, in the true ſpirit of juſtice and honour, abided by the effects of conceſſions which they had made, but which they would not have made, had they underſtood beforehand the force of them.

From this moment the politics of the Indians were fixed on, and confined to two points. The guarding their dwelling lands and their hunts from the encroachments of the European ſettlers; and the perpetually labouring, to our utter ſhame, in vain, to eſtabliſh ſome equitable and fixed regulations in the trade carried on between them and the Europeans.

The European encroachments, not only by the extent of their ſettlements, but by their preſuming to build forts in the Indian dwelling lands, and in the territories of their hunts, without leave, or by colluſion; and the impoſitions and frauds committed againſt the Indians in trading with them, has been the occaſion of conſtant complaint from the Indians, and the invariable ſource of Indian hoſtilities: and yet even theſe might have been ſurmounted, were it not that we have conſtantly added an aggravation to this injuſtice, by claiming a DOMINION in conſequence of a *landed poſſeſſion*. Againſt this the free ſpirit of an Indian will revolt, to the laſt drop of his blood: This will be perpetual, unre-

unremitted cauſe of war to them againſt us. Againſt it, they have at all times, and upon all occaſions proteſted, and they will never give it up. As long as we keep up this uſeleſs, faithleſs claim of dominion over them, ſo long ſhall we be embroiled in war with them. The European power may perhaps finally extirpate them, but can never conquer them. The perpetual increaſing generations of Europeans in America, may ſupply numbers that muſt, in the end, wear out theſe poor Indian inhabitants from their own country; but we ſhall pay dear, both in blood and treaſure, in the mean while, for our horrid injuſtice. Our frontiers, from the nature of advancing ſettlements, diſperſed along the branchings of the upper parts of our rivers, and ſcattered in the diſunited valleys, amidſt the mountains, muſt be always unguarded, and defenceleſs againſt the incurſions of Indians. And were we able, under an Indian war, to advance our ſettlements yet farther, they would be advanced up to the very dens of thoſe ſavages. A ſettler, wholly intent on labouring on the ſoil, cannot ſtand to his arms, nor defend himſelf againſt, nor ſeek his enemy: Environed with woods and ſwamps, he knows nothing of the country beyond his farm: The Indian knows every ſpot for ambuſh or defence. The farmer, driven from his little

cultured lot into the woods, is loſt: the Indian in the woods, is every where at home; every buſh, every thicket, is a camp to the Indian, from whence, at the very moment when he is ſure of his blow, he can ruſh upon his prey. The farmer's cow, or his horſe, cannot go into the woods, where alone they muſt ſubſiſt: his wife and children, if they ſhut themſelves up in their poor wretched loghouſe, will be burned in it: and the huſbandman in the field will be ſhot down while his hand holds the plough. An European ſettler can make but momentary efforts of war, in hopes to gain ſome point, that he may by it obtain a ſeries of ſecurity, under which to work his lands in peace: The Indian's whole life is a warfare, and his operations never diſcontinued. In ſhort, our frontier ſettlements muſt ever lie at the mercy of the ſavages: and a ſettler is the natural prey to an Indian, whoſe ſole occupation is war and hunting. To countries circumſtanced as our colonies are, an Indian is the moſt dreadful of enemies. For, in a war with Indians, no force whatever can defend our frontiers from being a conſtant wretched ſcene of conflagrations, and of the moſt ſhocking murders. Whereas on the contrary, our temporary expeditions againſt theſe Indians, even if ſucceſsful, can do theſe wanderers little harm. Every article of their property

property is portable, which they always carry with them—And it is no great matter of diſtreſs to an Indian to be driven from his dwelling ground, who finds a home in the firſt place that he ſits down upon. And of this formidable enemy, the numbers, by the lateſt accounts, are 23105 fighting men.

If we entertain an idea of conqueſt, in ſupport of this ambitious folly of dominion, we muſt form ſuch a ſeries of magazines and entrepôts for ſtores, ammunition and proviſions; we muſt maintain in conſtant employ ſuch a numerous train of waggons for the roads, ſuch multitudes of boats and veſſels for the waters; we muſt eſtabliſh ſuch a chain of fortified poſts; we muſt ſupport ſuch a numerous army; we muſt form and execute ſuch an enlarged and comprehenſive ſyſtem of command, as ſhall give us military poſſeſſion of the whole Indian country. Let now any ſoldier or politician conſider the enormous endleſs expence of all this conduct, and then anſwer to what profitable purpoſe ſuch meaſure leads, which may in a much better and juſter way be obtained.

If our government conſiders this well, and will liſten to thoſe who are beſt verſed in Indian affairs, it will be convinced that honeſty is the beſt policy; and that our domi-

nion in America, will be beſt and ſureſt founded in faith and juſtice, toward the remnant of theſe much injured natives of the country.

In this hope, and with this view, I will endeavour to ſtate the Indian rights and our duty toward them; and to point out that line of conduct, which leads to it—And firſt of the Kenunctioni, or the Five-nation confederacy.

The Indian lands are of two kinds—— Their dwelling land, where their caſtles are, and their hunting ground. The dwelling lands of the Kenunctioni, or the Five-nation confederacy, is called Kenunctionîga, and is at the top or higheſt part of the continent, from whence the waters run every way—By the waters of Canada into the gulph of St. Laurence, by all the rivers of the Engliſh colonies into the Atlantic ocean, by the waters of the Miſſiſſippi into the gulph of Mexico. They may, in a general manner, be thus deſcribed, by a line run from near Albany, north-weſtward, along the Mohawk river on the north ſide of it, north round Oneida lake, to the north-eaſt corner of lake Ontario; thence along the lakes to Canahôga on lake Oſwego or Erie; thence ſixty miles directly back into the country; thence

to

to Shamôkin, on the Suſquehanna river; thence along the Cuſhïêtung mountains; thence again to the lower Mohawk caſtles. The Indians themſelves deſcribing, under confidence, to a friend of mine at Onondaga, this their ſituation, ſaid, "That it has many advantages ſuperior to any other part of America. The endleſs mountains ſeparate them from the Engliſh, all the way from Albany to Georgia. If they ſhould have any deſign againſt the Engliſh, they can ſuddenly come down the Mohawk's river, the Delaware, the Suſquehanna, and Potomac, and that with the ſtream. They have the ſame advantage of invading the French, by the waters of the river St. Lawrence, Sorel, *&c.* If the French ſhould prevail againſt this country, they can, with their old men, wives and children, come down the ſtreams to the Engliſh. If the Engliſh ſhould prevail in attacking their country, they have the ſame conveyance down to the French; and if both ſhould join againſt them, they can retire acroſs the lakes."

Their hunting lands are—*Firſt*, Couxſachraga, a triangle, lying on the ſouth-eaſt ſide of Canada, or St. Lawrence river, bounded eaſtward by Saragtoga, and the drowned lands; northward, by a line from

Regiôchne point (on lake Champlain, or, as the Indians call it, Caniaderiguarûnte, the lake that is the gate of the country) through the Cloven Rock, on the ſame lake, to Oſwegatchie, or la Galette; ſouth-weſtward by the dwelling lands of the Mohawks, Oneidas, and Tuſcaroraos.

Secondly, Ohio, all that fine country (and therefore called Ohio) lying on the ſouth and eaſt ſides of lake Erie, ſouth-eaſt of their dwelling lands.

Thirdly, Tieuckſouckrondtie; all that tract of country lying between the lakes Erie and Oïlinois.

Fourthly, 'Scaniaderiada, or the country beyond the lake; all that tract of country lying on the north of lake Erie, and north-weſt of lake Ontario, and between the lakes Ontario and Hurons.

The right of the Five-nation confederacy to their dwelling lands and the hunting ground of Couxſachrága, and even down to the bottom of lake Champlain, was never diſputed. The lands to the northward of Regiôchne, and la Galette, have long ſince been ceded to the Canada Indians as an hunting ground.

In

In the year 1684, the Five Nations finding themſelves hard preſſed by the French and their Indians, did, by a treaty at Albany, put the lands and caſtles of the Mohawks and Oneidas *under the protection of the Engliſh government:* and the Engliſh accordingly undertook *the truſt* to guarantee them to theſe Indians. And as the external mark, by which this act and deed ſhould be anounced, the Indians deſired that the duke of York's arms might be affixed to their caſtles.

The right of the Five-nation confederacy to the hunting lands of Ohio, Tieûck-ſouchrondite and 'Scaniaderiada, by the conqueſt they had made in ſubduing the Shaöanaes, Delawares, (as we call them) Twiƈtwes and Oïlinois, may be fairly proved as they ſtood poſſeſſed thereof, at the peace of Reſwick, in 1697.

In the year 1701, they put all their hunting lands under the protection of the Engliſh, as appears by the records, and by the recital and confirmation thereof in the following deed.

In the year 1726, the Seneccas, Cayougaes and Ononda-agaes acceded to the ſame terms of alliance, in which the Mohawks and Oneidas were already—So that the whole

whole of the dwelling and hunting lands of the Five-nation confederacy were put under the protection of the Engliſh, and held by them IN TRUST, for and to the USE of theſe Indians and their poſterity.

Copy of Agreement with the Sachems of the Five Nations.

TO all people to whom this preſent inſtrument of writing ſhall come, Whereas the Sachems of the Five Nations did, on the nineteenth day of July, One thouſand ſeven hundred and one, in a conference held at Albany, between John Nanfan, Eſq; late lieutenant-governor of New York, give and render up all their land where the beaver-hunting is, which they won with the ſword, then 80 years ago, to Coorakhoo *, our great king, praying that he might be their protector and defender there, for which they deſired that their ſecretary might then draw an inſtrument for them, to ſign and ſeal, that it might be carried to the king, as by the minutes thereof, now in the cuſtody of the ſecretary for Indian affairs at Albany, may fully, and at large appear.

WE, Kanakarighton and Shanintſaronwe, Sinneke Sachems; Ottſoghkoree Dekaniſoree and Aenjeueratt, Cayouge Sachems;

* It is by this name that they mean the King of England.

Racly-

Raclyakadorodon and Sadageenaghtie, Onondaga Sachems, of our own accord, free and voluntary will, do hereby ratify, confirm, ſubmit and grant; and by theſe preſents do (for ourſelves, our heirs and ſucceſſors, and in behalf of the whole Nations of Sinnekes, Cayouges and Onondages) ratify, confirm, ſubmit and grant unto our moſt Sovereign Lord George, by the Grace of God, King of Great Britain, France, and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, &c. his heirs and ſucceſſors for ever, all the ſaid land and beaver-hunting, *to be protected and defended by his ſaid majeſty*, his heirs and ſucceſſors, *to and for the* USE *of us, our heirs and ſucceſſors, and the ſaid three Nations*; and we do alſo of our own accord, free and voluntary will, give, render, ſubmit and grant, and by theſe preſents do, for ourſelves, our heirs and ſucceſſors, give, render, ſubmit, and grant unto our ſaid Sovereign Lord King George, his heirs and ſucceſſors for ever, all that land lying and being ſixty miles diſtance taken directly from the water, into the country, beginning from a Creek called Canahôge, on the lake Oſwego, all along the ſaid lake, and all along the narrow paſſage from the ſaid lake to the falls of Oniâgara, called Canaquaraghe, and all along the river of Oniâgara, and all along the lake Cataraqui to the creek called Sodons, belonging to the Sinnekes, and from Sodons to the hill called Tegechunckſerôde, belonging to the Cayouges,

youges, and from Tegechunckſerôde to the creek called Cayhunghâge, belonging to the Onondages; all the ſaid lands being of the breadth of ſixty Engliſh miles as aforeſaid, all the way from the aforeſaid lakes or rivers, directly into the country, and thereby including all the caſtles of the aforeſaid three Nations, with all the rivers, creeks and lakes, within the ſaid limits, *to be protected and defended by his ſaid majeſty, his heirs and ſucceſſors for ever, to and for our* USE, *our heirs and ſucceſſors, and the ſaid three Nations.*—

In teſtimony whereof, we have hereunto ſet our marks and affixed our ſeals, in the city of Albany, this fourteenth day of September, in the thirteenth year of his majeſty's reign, *Annoque Domini* 1726.

The mark of Raclyakoderodon. a Sachem of the Onondages. (L. S.)

The mark of Kanakarighton a Sachem of the Sinnekes. (L. S.)

The

The mark of Otſoghkoree, a Sachem of the Cayouges. (L. S.)

The mark of Sadegeenaghtie, a Sachem of the Onondages. (L. S.)

The mark of Dekaniſoree, a Sachem of the Cayouges. (L. S.)

The mark of Shanintſaronwee, a Sachem of the Sinnekes. (L. S.)

The

The mark of Aenjeweratt, a Sachem of the Cayouges. (L. S.)

Signed, ſealed, and delivered,
in the Preſence of us

Philip Livingſton, Mynderſt Schuyler,
Peter Vanbrugh, Lawrance Clauſen.

Secretary's Office, New-York. The preceding is a true copy of the Record in Lib. Patents, Numb. 9. p. 253, 254. Examined and compared therewith by

GEO. BANYAR, Deputy Secretary.

Inſtead of executing *this truſt* faithfully and with honour, by extending to the Indians our civil protection againſt the frauds of the Engliſh, and our military protection againſt the attempts of the French, we have uſed this truſt only as a pretence to *aſſume a dominion* over them—We have ſuffered the Engliſh ſettlers to profit of every bad occaſion

to

to defraud them of their lands—We have never made any effectual regulations to prevent their being defrauded in their trade; and until our own intereſt appeared to be affected, we abandoned them to their own chance and force, oppoſed to the ſtrength of a powerful enemy. Nay, when at laſt we thought neceſſary for the ſake, not of national faith and honour, for the ſake, not of theſe our faithful allies, but for the ſake of our own ſafety and intereſt to interfere, in oppoſing the French encroachments, we took it up as diſputing the empire of America with the French; not as protecting and guarding the Indian lands and intereſt to their uſe, agreeable to the ſacred truſt by which we were bound.—And thus theſe ſavages (as we to our own ſhame call them) repeatedly told us, "That both we and "the French ſought to amuſe them with *fine* "*tales* of our ſeveral upright intentions; "that both parties told them, that they "made war for the protection of the Indian "rights, but that *our actions* plainly diſco-"vered that the war was only a conteſt "who ſhould become maſters of that coun-"try, which was the property neither of "the one nor the other." Since we have driven the French government from America, we have confirmed this charge of the Indians againſt us, by aſſuming that dominion

which in faith and juſtice we cannot ſay we have gained over the Indians, which, in fact, we have not gained, and which, be it remembered, will coſt more blood and treaſure before we do gain it, than it is for the honour and intereſt of Great-Britain to expend in ſo bad and uſeleſs a cauſe. While theſe poor tribes of hunters remain, it will be our own fault if they do not remain in perfect harmony and good alliance with us. As hunters, their intereſt can never interfere with ours, as ſettlers; but, on the contrary, will become the ſource of the natural and moſt profitable trade to us as traders. They are continually wearing away, and as they diminiſh or retire, they cede their lands to us in peace; which we, thus in time as faſt as we can really want them, may poſſeſs in right and juſtice, untainted with the impeachment of having been gained by murder and fraud. While therefore we do remain a great and juſt nation, as we pride ourſelves Great-Britain is, we ſhould abhor the black baſe thought of uſing the power which providence hath given us, to the ruin and deſtruction of theſe brave and free people; of theſe people who gave us our firſt ſettlement in this country, and have lived with us, except under ſome temporary interruptions, in a ſeries of faithful alliance.

If theſe conſiderations, taken up in the courſe of that general review of the colonies, and of the adminiſtration of their affairs, which I now publiſh, were intended as an expreſs treatiſe on Indian affairs, I ſhould think it right to examine all the complaints and ſeveral claims of juſtice which the Five-nations have made, and have repeated for many years, which I would found firſt on extracts from the records of Indian affairs, and ſecondly, on the hiſtory of the landed patents, and thirdly, of the occaſions taken to erect, without their leave, forts on the Indian lands, which meaſure the Indians always conſider as an act of dominion. In this general view I ſhall only point out that ſhameful patent of Ka-y-adaroſſeros above Albany: that pretence of claim by the corporation of Albany for the Mohawk-flats, the very reſidence of the Mohawks, and ſome others on the carrying place, at the head of the Mohawk river---all which ought to be taken into immediate conſideration, that juſtice may be done both to the Indian and European claimants; and that the matter may not remain perpetual cauſe of umbrage, and perhaps the ſource of war. Government ought alſo very ſeriouſly to reviſe the principles on which they are now endeavouring to take poſſeſſion of the Indian country by forts and

 gariſons;

gariſons; built many within the Indian dwelling lands, and many within their hunting lands, and on the paſſes and communications of theſe. It is undoubtedly right to maintain the command of that country; but there is a way to do it with ſafety and juſtice. The meaſures we are taking by force will be found to have neither the one nor the other in them; nor do I ſee how common prudence can adopt the enormous charge to which ſuch meaſures muſt lead.

We have ſeen that Sir William Johnſon, although he took Niagara *from the French* by force of arms, never conſidered this as a conqueſt of theſe lands *from Indians*; but has, agreeably to his uſual prudence and his perfect knowledge of Indian affairs, obtained by formal treaty, a ceſſion of theſe lands from the Indians to the crown of Great-Britain. The wiſdom, as well as the ſucceſs of this example, ought to lead our politicks to the ſame conduct in every other caſe, where we have built or obtained forts within their lands, eſpecially as many of them were built under expreſs promiſe of their being diſmantled as ſoon as the war ſhould ceaſe: and as the Indians were expreſsly and ſolemnly promiſed to have a ſatisfaction given to them for the uſe of theſe lands.

The

The Shawäneſe and Delawares are more immediately connected with the province of Penſylvania; and although, as ſubdued, they are under obedience to the confederacy of the Five-nations; yet, under tutelage and protection of the confederacy, they poſſeſs their rights to their own country. Was this, as I have ſaid, a particular treatiſe on Indian affairs, I might here point out "*the cauſes of the alienation of the Delawares and Shawäneſe Indians from the Britiſh intereſt, by extracts from the public treaties, and other authentic papers relating to the tranſactions between the government of Penſylvania and the ſaid Indians for near forty years paſt*," as ſet forth in a memoir which I have had by me for many years. I could alſo from a ſeries * of letters for ten years, from Monſieur de Vaudreüil, while governor of Louiſiana, to his court, point out thoſe neglects and errors, as alſo the manner in which the French profited of thoſe our errors, by which we loſt the Cherokees, and other ſouthern tribes.

After what has been explained, it will be ſufficient here to ſay, that, 1ſt, Doing juſtice to our faith and honour, by treating the In-

* Theſe letters in manuſcript are authentic; but I am not at liberty to ſay how they came into my poſſeſſion.

dians according to the real ſpirit of our alliances with them; 2dly, That doing the Indians juſtice in their lands, and 3dly, giving up that idle, uſeleſs claim of dominion over them, are points abſolutely and indiſpenſibly neceſſary to be adopted into our politicks, unleſs we have ſeriouſly taken the reſolution to force our way by war. Until theſe points are adopted, we never ſhall have peace——And it deſerves thorough and mature deliberation how we engage to ſettle and poſſeſs America by war.

Theſe meaſures of ſound policy once fixed upon, the next ſtep is to eſtabliſh an Adminiſtration for the conducting Indian affairs—This part of the plan is in part adopted, by dividing the management of Indian affairs into two Intendencies—one for the northern, the other for the ſouthern nations—But, as every thing which I could ſay further on this head hath been ſome years paſt ſtated in the memorial annexed to theſe papers, I will here refer the reader to that memorial on theſe points. The meaſures recommended therein I have by an opportunity of comparing them with the events of eight years, found to be ſuch as I do moſt ſincerely wiſh to ſee carried into execution. And if a private perſon might preſume to obtrude advice, that has not formerly been neglected, I would now venture

to

to recommend the conſideration of theſe meaſures to thoſe whoſe duty it is to act upon theſe matters. When theſe matters ſhall be ſettled as they ought to be, then it may be time to take up the conſideration of proper regulations for the Indian trade; and when that time comes, if a plan, which I have accidentally ſeen, be carried into execution, I would venture to ſay, that every thing which can or ought to be done in Indian affairs will be effected.

If with the ſame ſpirit, guided by the ſame principles *, a reviſion was made of the laws of trade, ſo far as they reſpect the colonies, it would anſwer more wiſe ends of government, and more the intereſt of the governed, both here as well as in the colonies, than any endeavour, even tho' ſucceſsful, to carry the preſent laws into execution.

The principles on which the act of navigation is founded are juſt, and of ſound policy, but the application of them, by the modes preſcribed, as the laws now ſtand, to the preſent ſtate of the colony trade, is neither founded in juſtice or prudence. Any ſpirit that would force this application, would injure the principles themſelves, and prove injurious to that commercial intereſt, which

* This hath been in part done by the late American revenue act.

thoſe very acts of trade mean to ſecure to Great-Britain: whereas, upon a due reviſion of thoſe laws, it would appear that there are means of producing this ſame end conſiſtent with the particular intereſt of the colonies, and what would carry the general commercial intereſt of the mother country to the utmoſt extent that it is capable of.

Before I proceed I cannot avoid quoting, and laying before the reader a paſſage in a letter written by Sir William Temple to lord Eſſex, in July 22, 1673, concerning the ſtate of Ireland, wherein the reader will ſee the ſurvey taken of the trade of that country, at that time ſo appoſite to the ſtate of the trade of the colonies at this ſeaſon, that it will be impoſſible not to apply it. "In "this ſurvey one thing muſt be taken notice "of as peculiar to this country, which is, "that as in the nature of its government, "ſo in the very improvement of its trade "and riches, it ought to be conſidered not "only in its own proper intereſt, but like-"wiſe in its relation to England, to which "it is ſubordinate, and upon whoſe weal "in the main, that of this kingdom "depends, and therefore a regard muſt be "had to thoſe points wherein the trade of "Ireland comes to interfere with any main "branches of the trade of England, in which "caſe the encouragement of ſuch trade ought

"to

" to be either declined or moderated, and ſo
" give way to the intereſt of trade in Eng-
" gland. Upon the health and vigour
" whereof the ſtrength, riches and glory
" of his majeſty's crown ſeem chiefly to
" depend. But on the other ſide, *ſome ſuch*
" *branches of trade ought not wholly to be*
" *ſuppreſſed*, but rather ſo far admitted as
" may ſerve the general conſumption of the
" kingdom, *leſt by too great an importation*
" *of commodities, though out of England it-*
" *ſelf, the money of this kingdom happen to be*
" *drawn away in ſuch a degree, as not to*
" *leave a ſtock ſufficient for turning the trade*
" *at home.*"

The general principle of the laws of trade regulating the colony trade, is, that the colonies ſhall not, on one hand, be ſupplied with any thing but from a *Britiſh market*, nor export their produce any where but to a *Britiſh market*. In the application of this principle, the preſent laws direct, except in ſome ſpecial particulars, that the colonies ſhall import all their ſupplies *from Britain*, and carry all their produce *to Britain*.

If now, inſtead of confining this market for the colonies to Britain only, which is a partial and defective application of the general principle whereon the act of Naviga-

tion is founded; this colony trade was made, amidſt other courſes of trade, an occaſion of eſtabliſhing *Britiſh markets even in other countries*, the true uſe would be derived to the general intereſt from theſe advantageous circumſtances, while in particular the colonies and the mother country would be mutually accommodated. In the firſt caſe, the general intereſt, perverted to partial purpoſes, becomes ſo far forth obſtructed; in the ſecond, it would be carried by the genuine ſpirit of it to its utmoſt extent.—If, under certain reſtrictions, ſecuring alſo thoſe duties which the produce of the colonies, carried to market, ought to pay to the mother country, the colonies were permitted to export their produce (ſuch as are the baſis or materials of any Britiſh manufacture excepted) directly to forein countries, if ſo be they ſold it to any *Britiſh houſe* eſtabliſhed in ſuch place, and were alſo permitted, if they bought their ſupplies from a *Britiſh houſe* eſtabliſhed in thoſe parts, to ſupply themſelves with the natural fruits and produce of that country (all manufactures that any way interfere with the Britiſh manufactories excepted) paying there to ſome Britiſh officer, or upon their arrival in the colonies, the ſame duties as they would have paid by purchaſing the ſame commodities in England, every end propoſed by the principal of the act of Navigation would be anſwered; the exports of the colonies would

would be encouraged; and *the Britiſh market* greatly extended.

The colonies would not only trade to, and be ſupplied by, a *Britiſh market*, but would become an occaſion of eſtabliſhing that Britiſh market in foreign countries. The ſame reaſons of commerce, which, in a narrower view, became the grounds for eſtabliſhing factories at Peterſburgh, Riga, Hamborough, Liſbon, Cadiz, &c. would on a more general and extenſive baſis become the foundation for eſtabliſhing and building up *theſe Britiſh markets* in every region to which our trade extended itſelf; for while it neceſſarily enlarged the ſpecial intereſt of the colonies, it would enlarge it only at Britiſh markets, and to the final profit of the Britiſh general commerce. The profits of ſuch market finally centering in Great Britain. If this maxim be not true, that the profits of the factories ſettled in foreign ports finally center in Great Britain, the meaſure of eſtabliſhing ſuch is falſe in policy; if the maxim be true, the permitting our colony exports to go directly to the ports where ſuch factories are eſtabliſhed, is not contrary to the principle on which the act of Navigation aroſe, but becomes coincident with, and aiding to it, in extending the Britiſh navigation and Britiſh markets, and ſecuring the final profits thereof to Britain only.

If

If this method of reaſoning be found not contrary to the principle of the act of Navigation; if this meaſure at the ſame time that it encourages the trade of our colonies, is found to do it in a way ſubſervient to the general commerce of Great Britain, extending the Britiſh markets, and ſecuring the final balance of profit to Britain only; if this ſpirit of adminiſtration, ſo far as government has a right to direct the courſe of trade, be adopted in this part of it, the great points which it has to ſecure, are firſt, that the colony exports to, and the ſupplies purchaſed by them from theſe foreign ports, *be ſold and bought at a Britiſh market only.*——The government has a right to extend its laws to theſe colony traders, and to the factories eſtabliſhed in foreign ports.——It can therefore, partly by ſuch laws as it finds proper to enact, for the regulation of this factory trade, and partly by obliging theſe colony traders to give bond before their departure from the colonies, ſecure and confine all theſe tranſactions of that commerce, which is permitted at any ſuch port, to a Britiſh market only, the laws that eſtabliſhed theſe being a favour extended to the colonies, and promoting the intereſt of theſe factories, would, as all laws of trade ſhould do, execute themſelves; and by giving the requiſite powers to a conſul or naval officer reſi-

dent

dent there, would be eaſily adminiſtered by ſuch officer.

The next point to be guarded, would be the ſecuring thoſe duties which this trade ought to pay to the government of Great Britain; If the ſame duties were paid, or ſecurity for them taken in theſe foreign ports, as would be or ſhould be paid by the colony trade, if the traders were ſtill obliged to come to Britain, every end would be anſwered to the government revenue, and theſe charges might be ſufficiently ſecured, by obliging all theſe traders to ſail under bond. The arrangements to be taken in ſuch caſe ought to be that of adding to the office of conſul, ſuch powers as in the colonies, before the eſtabliſhment of ſpecial revenue officers there, were given to the naval officer, or to eſtabliſh a naval officer. The conſul or naval officer, in this branch of his adminiſtration, ſhould be ſubordinate to the commiſſioners of the cuſtoms and the lords of the treaſury. If the duties were collected by him, in the ports of his diſtrict, he ſhould account and give ſecurity for the ſame; if bonds only, as ſecurity for the payment at ſuch Britiſh or plantation ports, were given, he ſhould keep the regiſter of the ſame, and correſpond with the commiſſioners of the cuſtoms, and ſuch officers as they direct,

as

as to the fulfilling, cancelling, or proſecuting to effect ſaid bonds. Theſe general arrangements taken, together with ſuch further ſpecial regulations, as the experience of the commiſſioners of the cuſtoms ſhould ſuggeſt, the revenue of the colony and factory trade, under this mode of adminiſtration, would be well ſecured, chearfully paid, and eaſily collected.

Under the adminiſtration of ſuch meaſures, there does not appear any reaſon why all the produce of the Britiſh colonies, which are not the baſis of, or do not interfere with the Britiſh manufactures, might not be carried directly to a Britiſh market at a foreign port, —and why the carrying of rice to foreign ports might not be extended, under theſe laws, to all ſuch foreign ports whereat a Britiſh factory is eſtabliſhed.——Nor under this mode of commerce can any ſufficient reaſon upon earth ſubſiſt, why the colony traders ſhould not be permitted to load at theſe ports, the fruits, wine, oil, pickles, the produce of that country, and alſo ſuch raw unmanufactured produce, as would not interfere with the manufacture of Great Britain, inſtead of being obliged to come to Britain to buy or reload here, after the expence of an unneceſſary voyage, thoſe very commodities which they might have bought in a *Britiſh market*,

market, at the port which they left. Why not any of theſe as well as ſalt, as well as wines from the Madeiras and weſtern iſles? In the ſame manner, by the ſame law, why may not our colony traders be permitted to carry ſugar, ginger, tobacco, rice, &c. to ſuch ports in the rivers Weſer and Elbe, in the Sound and in Ruſſia, whereat a Britiſh factory is, or may be eſtabliſhed? It can never be right policy to ſuffer labour in vain in a community: it is juſt ſo much loſt to the community: and yet this coming round by England is labour in vain: If the ſubordinacy of the colony-trade, and the duties ariſing thereon, can be by any other means ſecured, it is ſo much labour loſt. The two points of a *Britiſh market*, and the revenue of the duties being ſecured, why may not theſe traders be permitted to load at theſe ports directly for the colonies, hemp, yarn, and ſuch coarſe linens, as do no way interfere with the Britiſh manufactories? Theſe meaſures taken, which would prove to be the true means of encouraging the colony-trade, the beſt method to put a ſtop to the contraband trade carried on in this branch of buſineſs, and the true grounds whereon to eſtabliſh the general commercial intereſt of Great Britain, Government could not be too ſtrict in enforcing the execution of the laws of trade, nor too ſevere in puniſhing the

the breach of them.—Wherever they found theſe traders endeavouring to carry from theſe ports to the colonies raw ſilk, ſilks, velvets, foreign cloths, laces, iron, ſteel, arms, ammunition, ſails or rigging, or any manufactures whatever, that interfere with the manufacture of Great Britain: whenever they found theſe traders endeavouring to carry from the colonies to thoſe ports, any dying-wood whatever, indigo, cotton, ſilk, bees or myrtle-wax, flax-ſeed, naval ſtores, furs, ſkins or peltry, hides, proviſion, grain, flour, bread or biſcuit; whale-oil, blubber, bone, or any other fiſh-oil, or tallow, or candles, with an exception perhaps to myrtle and ſpermaceti candles, Government could not be too ſtrict and watchful to reſtrain them. Under proper regulations, the rum of the northern colonies ſhould be carried to Africa, and the ſale of it to the French on the banks of Newfoundland encouraged, if ſuch vent could be procured, as we ſhould thereby reap at leaſt ſome ſhare even of the French Fiſhery.

In the above reviſion of, and the propoſed regulations for the colony trade, as connected with that of Europe, it will be ſeen that all mention of Eaſt India goods is purpoſely omitted. I think a ſpecial meaſure might be contrived of ſupplying the colonies with

Eaſt-

Eaſt-India goods, in a way that would effectually put a ſtop to that contraband trade, by which it is complained they are at preſent ſupplied, in a way by which one of the greateſt marts in the world, with every attendant advantage to the Britiſh general commerce, and the ſpecial intereſt of the Eaſt-India trade, might be eſtabliſhed.

If meaſures were at this juncture taken, between the government and the Eaſt-India company, ſo that an Eaſt-India ſhip might annually ſtop at ſome iſland in the Weſt-Indies, the traders, not only of the Weſt-Indies, but of North America, would ſupply themſelves with every advantage at ſuch mart, not only for their own proper conſumption, but alſo for a trade of the greateſt extent; and this mart, in return, would be to the Eaſt-India company, the collector of all the ſurplus ſilver of America, and perhaps even of ſome of the gold and ivory of Africa alſo. The extenſive advantages of this meaſure cannot but be ſeen; nor would this any way interfere with that ſupply with which the Eaſt-India trade, by way of the Manilla's, furniſhes the Spaniſh Weſt-Indies, ſo far as our Eaſt-India company may be ſuppoſed to be concerned, but would, in other reſpects, open a better channel of trade between the Eaſt and Weſt-Indies, which

our company muſt command. The difficulties in the execution lie in ſecuring to government the revenue that ſhould ariſe from the duties duly paid by this trade, and in ſecuring the company againſt the perverſion of this trade to the profit of their officers and ſervants.——If ſome of the iſlands ſurrendered to us, as the Granadas, or of the neutral iſlands, were made the place of this mart, with a grant of lands to the company, at the ſame time that a profit might derive hence to the company, the collateral good advantage to the public would ariſe, of having created a very beneficial ſettlement.

In the ſame manner, ſome reviſion of the ſtate of the trade of the colonies of the ſeveral maritime powers amongſt each other will be neceſſary.——The laws and ordonnances of theſe do in general prohibit all trade of foreign colonies with their own;—and yet, without ſome ſuch trade as ſupplies the Spaniſh provinces with Britiſh goods and proviſions, as ſupplies the Britiſh colonies with Spaniſh ſilver, as ſupplies the French iſlands with Britiſh lumber, fiſh, proviſions, horſes, and live ſtock, as ſupplies the Britiſh colonies with French moloſſes, the trade and culture of theſe colonies would be greatly obſtructed and impaired; and yet notwithſtanding this fact, our laws of trade,

by

by an impracticable duty, extend to the prohibiting the importation of French melloſſes into our colonies.—If the government, under this law, could prevent effectually this importation, not only into the northern colonies, *but into the Britiſh iſles alſo*, the reward of that pains would be the deſtruction of a beneficial branch of trade, perhaps of driving the Britiſh American diſtillery into the French, Dutch, or Daniſh iſles, or of forcing the French, contrary to their own falſe policy, into a profitable manufacture of that produce which they now ſell as refuſe materials. I need not point out here the very eſſential change that this would make in the colony trade.——On the contrary, it is the duty of government to permit, nay even to encourage, under proper regulations, theſe branches of trade; in the firſt place, in order to extract out of the foreign colonies, to the benefit of the Britiſh commerce, as much as poſſible the profits of theſe colonies, and which is more material, in order to create a neceſſary dependance in the trade and culture of thoſe colonies for their ſupplies on the Britiſh commerce.—When it is remembered that the law, which lays a duty equal to a prohibition, on the importation of French melloſſes in the Britiſh colonies, was obtained at the ſolicitation of the Britiſh iſles, it will be ſeen, that the obtaining

this law is not ſo much meant to prohibit totally the introduction of French melloſſes into the Britiſh trade, as to determine a ſtruggle between the Weſt India and North American traders, who ſhould have the profits of it. And thus, from the predominant intereſt of theſe partial views, has government been led to embarraſs the general courſes of its trade.——But as the Weſt India traders ſee that this law has not, never had, and never will have the effect propoſed, they will be better reconciled to its ceaſing; and as government muſt now, after the experiment, ſee the falſe policy of it, there is no doubt but that it will ceaſe, ſo far as to reduce the duty to a moderate and practicable charge, ſuch as will be paid, and ſuch as will raiſe to the crown a very conſiderable revenue thus paid.

I ſpeak not this by gueſs; but, from a compariſon of the quantity of ſugars and melloſſes brought to account in the cuſtom-houſe books of the *King's revenue*, with the quantity of the ſame article, in the ſame ports, brought to account in the impoſt-books of the *colony revenue*, for ſix years together, could, with ſome preciſion, mark the extent of it. I own I did always apprehend that two-pence *per* gallon on foreign melloſſes imported into any Britiſh plan-

plantation, and ſo in proportion of ſugars, was the beſt rate at which to fix this duty; that being thus *moderate*, it might be eaſier and with leſs alarm and oppoſition collected, and might therefore the ſooner introduce the practice of fair trade, and the ſooner become an *effective revenue:* But when I ſee a groundleſs clamour raiſed, which repreſents the rate fixed by the late revenue-act as deſtructive of the American diſtillery, as ruinous to the American fiſhery, as a prohibition of the returns made from the foreign iſlands for the North American fiſh; I muſt own that I have never ſeen any fact ſtated, or calculation fairly made on which ſuch aſſertions found themſelves.

The French iſles, ſince the ſurrender of Canada and Louiſiana, muſt depend entirely for their ſupplies of lumber, ſtaves, heads, proviſions, live ſtock, horſes, &c. on the Britiſh colonies, immediately exported from thence to thoſe iſles, unleſs by ſome means ſupplied from markets created at New Orleans and the iſland of St. Peter, as from another Iſle of Man; it will therefore be the duty of government to keep a watchful eye to the formation and extent of theſe markets;—ſo at leaſt, if they be permitted, as to have the command of them, and ſo as to prevent their being, to the French traders,

the means of ſupplying the Spaniſh markets alſo, as well as their own.

Since the writing of what the paragraph above contains, very proper regulations have been by the late American-revenue act provided; and if proportionate care be taken in the execution of it, this danger is for the preſent guarded againſt.

Some reviſion alſo will be neceſſary in the laws about naval ſtores, eſpecially that reſpecting the maſts. The preſent law, under an idea of preſerving the White Pine or maſt trees, directs, That no White Pines ſhall be cut or felled within the limits of any townſhip, if not actually private property.—This part of the law ariſes from a miſtaken apprehenſion of a townſhip, there being no lands within ſuch but what are private property.—2*dly*, That no Pines out of a townſhip, of the dimenſions of 24 inches and upwards, diameter, at the heighth of 20 inches from the ground, ſhall be felled.—This part of the law is *felo de ſe*.—Thoſe who find their profits in cutting down theſe trees for logs or making ſhingles, &c. or who know the embarraſſments which would ariſe to their property, if they ſhould ever apply for a grant of theſe lands, by letting ſuch Pine-trees, the property of the crown, grow

grow there, never (if they have not other means to evade this law) will permit theſe Pines to come to *this dimenſion* which makes them royal property. The falſe policy of this law, and the defects in the eſtabliſhment of an office of ſurveyor-general of his Majeſty's woods, will ſoon, if not obviated, be felt in the ſcarcity and price of maſts, which will be the effect of it. The neceſſity of their going a great diſtance from the rivers for the maſts has already taken effect, and the caſe of there being none within any practicable diſtance will ſoon follow. The navy-office finding that their maſt ſhips do come regularly hitherto to England, cannot entertain any fear of ſuch want, and it will be the intereſt of others to ſuppreſs and contradict this fact; yet it is a fact, and will be ſoon known in is effects. On the contrary, if it is conſidered how diſproportionate a value the price of the Pine-tree growing bears to the price of the maſt when brought in the middle of winter, over the ſnow, with 70 or 80 yoke of oxen to the water-ſide; if, inſtead of aiming to make theſe trees, thus growing, *royal excluſive property*, the crown was not only to permit a free maſting in lands not granted, and to make the maſt-trees of all dimenſions, *private property* on lands actually granted, but alſo (as it is done in other caſes of naval ſtores) to give a bounty

bounty beſides the price, to the perſon who ſhould bring down any ſuch maſts to the water-ſide, it would have an immediate effect in ſupplying the crown with maſts at a cheaper rate, and in the preſervation of theſe trees, thus become a branch of trade.

I would wiſh here alſo to recommend the giving ſome advantages and encouragement to the importation of American timber into Great Britain.

I have not gone into the thorough examination of theſe ſubjects above-mentioned, nor have I pointed out, in all their conſequences, the effects that this or that ſtate of them would have. I have only pointed them out as worthy the attention of government; and, I am ſure, whenever government takes them under conſideration, they will be better underſtood than any explanation of mine can make them.

Were ſome ſuch arrangements taken for a reviſion and further eſtabliſhment of the laws of trade, upon the principle of extending the Britiſh general commerce, by encouraging the trade of the colonies, in ſubordination to, and in coincidence therewith, the trade of the colonies would be adminiſtered by

by that true ſpirit from whence it roſe, and by which it acts; and the true application of the benefits which ariſe to a mother country from its colonies would be made. Under this ſpirit of adminiſtration, the government, as I ſaid above, could not be too watchful to carry its laws of trade into effectual execution.—But under the preſent ſtate of thoſe laws, and that trade, there is great danger that any ſeverity of execution, which ſhould prove effectual in the caſes of the importation into the colonies of foreign European and Eaſt-India goods, might force the Americans to trade for their imports, upon terms, on which the trade could not ſupport itſelf, and therefore become in the event a means to bring on the neceſſity of theſe Americans manufacturing for themſelves. Nothing does at preſent, with that active and acute people, prevent their going into manufactures, except the proportionate dearneſs of labour, as referred to the terms on which they can import; but encreaſe the price of their imports to a certain degree, let the extent of their ſettlements, either by policy from home or invaſion of Indians abroad, be confined, and let their foreign trade and navigation be, in ſome meaſure, ſuppreſſed;——their paper-currency limitted within too narrow bounds, and the excluſion of that trade which hath uſually ſupplied them with ſilver-money too ſeverely inſiſted upon;

——this proportion of the price of labour will much ſooner ceaſe to be an object of objection to manufacturing there, than is commonly apprehended. The winters in that climate are long and ſevere; during which ſeaſon no labour can be done without doors. That application therefore of their ſervants labour, to manufactures for home conſumption, which under any other circumſtances would be too dear for the product created by it, becomes, under theſe circumſtances, all clear gains. And if the coloniſts cannot on one hand purchaſe foreign manufactures at any reaſonable price, or have not money to purchaſe with, and there are, on the other, many hands idle which uſed to be employed in navigation, and all theſe, as well as the huſbandmen, want employment; theſe circumſtances will ſoon overbalance the difference of the rate of labour in Europe and in America. And if the colonies, under any future ſtate of adminiſtration, which they ſee unequal to the management of their affairs, once come to feel their own ſtrength in this way, their independence on government, at leaſt on the adminiſtration of government, will not be an event ſo remote as our leaders may think, which yet nothing but ſuch falſe policy can bring on. For, on the contrary, put their governments and laws on a true and conſtitutional baſis, regulate their money, their revenue,

revenue, and their trade, and do not check their ſettlements, they muſt ever depend on the trade of the mother country for their ſupplies, they will never eſtabliſh manufactures, their hands being elſewhere employed, and the merchants being always able to import ſuch on * terms that muſt ruin the manufacturer. Unable to ſubſiſt without, or to unite againſt the mother country, they muſt always remain ſubordinate to it, in all the tranſactions of their commerce, in all the operation of their laws, in every act of their

* This is a fact too well known and underſtood to need any particular proof—but if need were, the writer of theſe papers could demonſtrate this from the prices of wool, hemp, and flax, and the labour of carding, dreſſing, ſpinning, weaving, &c. in North America, compared with the prices of the ſame articles of produce and labour in Britain. It is therefore an idle vaunt in the Americans, when they talk of ſetting up manufactures *for trade*; but it would be equally injudicious in government here to force any meaſure that may render the manufacturing for *home conſumption* an object of prudence, or even of pique in the Americans. And yet after all, ſhould any thing of this ſort extend itſelf to a degree that interfered with the exports of Great Britain to the colonies—the ſame duties of an exciſe which lie upon the manufactures of Great Britain, levied upon thoſe of America, would ſoon reſtore the balance. This conſideration, one might imagine, would induce thoſe who are prudent in America, to adviſe the reſt to moderation in their oppoſition.

government:——The ſeveral colonies, no longer conſidered as demeſnes of the crown, mere appendages to the realm, will thus become united therein, members and parts of the realm, as eſſential parts of a one organized whole, *the commercial dominion of Great Britain.* THE TAKING LEADING MEASURES TO THE FORMING OF WHICH, OUGHT, AT THIS JUNCTURE, TO BE THE GREAT OBJECT OF GOVERNMENT.

The END.

APPENDIX.

SECTION I.

ALTHOUGH the following papers, at the time in which they were written, had reference to the ſtate of the ſervice as oppoſed to the French meaſures and power in America: Although they are parts of another work intended to be publiſhed at ſome future time, yet they are here annexed to *the Adminiſtration of the Colonies*, as they treat of matters very worthy preſent conſideration; and as in general they contain ideas of police, which reſpect the poſſeſſion, preſervation, and improvement of thoſe acquiſitions which our conqueſts have put into our hands,—and the forming them into ſome ſyſtem of Empire that ſhall be the Empire of Great Britain.

The firſt paper, which had for its object the forming of the Britiſh poſſeſſions, together with thoſe of our allies the Indians, into a ſyſtem of barrier againſt the French, was written at a time when the ſubject was entirely new, ſcarce ever brought forward to conſideration here in England, and when authentic accounts of the true ſtate of the country as poſſeſſed by the Engliſh and French, were with great difficulty, if at all, to

be obtained; and I may venture to ſay, utterly unknown to our military.

The latter of theſe papers, was written after it became neceſſary to change the object of the war; and the only thing which I wiſh to ſay of the ideas that it contained, is, that they were literally juſtified by the events.

A MEMORIAL:

STATING the NATURE of the SERVICE in NORTH AMERICA, and propoſing a GENERAL PLAN of OPERATIONS, as founded thereon.

Drawn up by Order of, and preſented to, his Royal Highneſs the Duke of Cumberland, 1756.

HIS Majeſty has now united the ſervice in North America into one power of action, and under one direction, by appointing a commander in chief over all North America, with powers to direct, and with force to carry on this ſervice as a one whole. The next and neceſſary point therefore is, that there ſhould be ſome *one general plan of operations* fixed, which may be carried on, not only by the general forces employed in the general and military part of this plan, but by every particular province and colony, within its own private councils, and own

private operations, coincident with the whole. When ſuch plan is fixed, every ſum of money that is raiſed for this ſervice, will be applied to what ſhall be of real ſervice and permanent uſe; and every the moſt minute operation that is undertaken, will become as part of ſuch plan, Ἔργον εἰς αἰεί;———and every (the moſt otherwiſe inſignificant) meaſure would become of more importance, and more ſervice, than twenty the moſt expenſive and buſtling operations, that ariſe from momentary and partial ſtarts of whim, vanity, or intereſt: There could not even a logg houſe be built, nor ſcarce a piquet ſtuck down in any part of the country, but what would be a neceſſary meaſure and whoſe uſe (however trifling the thing in itſelf) would extend to the grand ſervice of the whole: There would not be a pound, ſcarce a penny raiſed, but would have its ſhare in this grand ſervice. On the contrary, while private perſons, or particular independent bodies of people, have conſulted only the momentary partial ſtarts of whim, vanity, party, or intereſt, under the influence of ſuch motives, without any general ſcheme to the defence of the country, the *taking poſſeſſion* of it, or the command of it, without any reference to any general idea, forts have been built up and down the country, that could never have been of uſe, have never been uſed, have never been ſupported, have been left to go to ruin, have been abandoned to the enemy; or, if they have been kept up at all, have been a private ſtanding job to all concerned in them: While thus large ſums of money have been ſquandered away to no uſe, or bad ones; while thus fruitleſs detached meaſures, that have

been of no uſe, but a perverſion and incumbrance on the general ſervice, and interfering amongſt each other, have been purſued by vague, random fits and ſtarts, the public ſervice has not only been ruined, but the people have loſt all opinion and confidence in military operations, have been diſcouraged and alienated from engaging in any active meaſures, and always ſuſpicious, that whatever ſums they give to ſuch, are either thrown away, or put into the private pocket of ſome jobb. On the contrary, were there ſome one general plan of operations formed, upon the practicability and really intended execution of which they might confide, the aſſemblies might be perſuaded, the people would be willing, and I verily believe, would be perſuaded to give amply and chearfully: So that it is not only neceſſary to the gaining the end propoſed, but alſo abſolutely neceſſary to the gaining the means, that ſome ſuch general plan ſhould be fixed.

In order to which, the following paper propoſes to conſider,

1*ſt*, The ſite of the country:

2*dly*, The intereſts of the poſſeſſions and ſettlements:
As the baſis of

3*dly*, The ſtate of the ſervice in America.

It becomes neceſſary to a right underſtanding of theſe propoſed objects, to recur and run up to the firſt principles on which they were founded,

not

not only becauſe the ſubject is *new*, but becauſe it has been miſconceived, and miſrepreſented.

1ſt, Prior to any obſervations on the ſettlers and ſettlements, it will be neceſſary to take ſome notice of the peculiar ſtate and ſite of the countries, in which they are ſettled: For it is the ſite and circumſtances (I mean thoſe that are unchangeable) of a country, which give the characteriſtic form to the ſtate and nature of the people who inhabit it.

The conſideration of the continent of America may be properly divided into two parts, from the two very different and diſtinct ideas that the face of the country preſents, but more eſpecially from the two diſtinct effects which muſt neceſſarily, and have actually ariſen, from the two very different ſorts of circumſtances to be found in each tract of country.

All the continent of North America, as far as known to the Europeans, is to the weſtward of the endleſs mountains, a high level plain: All to the ſouth-eaſt of theſe mountains, ſlopes away ſouth-eaſterly down to the Atlantic Ocean. By a level plane, I muſt not be underſtood, as if I thought there were no hills, or vallies, or mountains in it; but that the plane of a ſection, parallel to the main face of the country, would be nearly an horizontal plane, as the plane of a like ſection of this other part would be inclined to the horizon, with a large ſlope to the Atlantic Ocean. The line that divides theſe two tracts, that is the ſouth eaſt edge of theſe planes, or the

higheſt part of this ſlope, may in general be ſaid to run from Onondaga, along the weſternmoſt Allegehani ridge of the endleſs mountains, to Apalatche in the gulf of Mexico.

2*dly*, In conſidering firſt the main continent, this high plain, it may be obſerved, with very few exceptions in compariſon to the whole, that the multitude of waters found in it is properly ſpeaking but of two maſſes: The one compoſed of the waters of the lakes and their ſuite, which diſembogue by the river St. Lawrence; the other that multitude of waters which all lead into the Miſſiſippi, and from thence to the ocean; the former into the gulf of St. Lawrence, the latter into the gulf of Mexico.

There are in all the waters of Miſſiſippi, at leaſt as far as we know, but two falls; the one at a place called by the French St. Antoine, high up on the weſt or main branch of Miſſiſippi; the other on the eaſt branch called Ohio. Except theſe, and the temporary rapidity ariſing from the freſhes of ſpring, and the rainy ſeaſons; all the waters of the Miſſiſippi run to the ocean, with a ſtill, eaſy and gentle current.

As to all the waters of the five great lakes, and the many large rivers that empty themſelves into them, the waters of the great Otawawa river, the waters of the lake Champlain, of Trois Rivieres, and the many others that run into the river St. Lawrence above Quebec, they may all be conſidered in one maſs, as a *ſtagnation* or lake of a wilderneſs of waters, ſpreading over the country

country by an infinite number and variety of branchings, bays, ſtraits, &c. for although at particular places of their communications, and at the mouths of their ſtreams, they ſeem to pour out ſuch an immenſe ocean of waters, yet when they are all collected and aſſembled together, as at a general rendezvous where they all diſembogue themſelves into the river St. Lawrence, the whole embouchure of this multitude of waters is not larger than the * Seine at Paris; the waters of each reſpective maſs not only the leſſer ſtreams, but the main general body of each going through this continent in every courſe and direction, have, by their approach to each other, by their interlocking with each other, by their communication to every quarter and in every direction, an alliance and unity, and form one maſs, a one whole.

Let any one raiſe in his mind the idea of ſome low country incapable of being travelled, except on the roads, cauſeways, dykes, &c. that have been made through it, and that theſe roads have throughout the whole country a communication which connects and forms them into a one ſyſtem of deſign, a one whole: Such perſon will readily conceive how eaſily and with what few numbers a General may take poſſeſſion and hold the com-

* About 12 French leagues above Quebec, over againſt a place called la Loubiniere the river St. Lawrence appears to be of a very conſiderable breadth; but when the tide, which runs up much higher than that place, has at its ebb entirely retired, that breadth which one would have judged to have been that of the St. Lawrence river, remains all dry, except a ſmall channel in the middle, which does not appear to be much larger than the Seine at Paris, nor the waters of it that paſs there to have a greater current.

mand of this country; and when once poſſeſſed how eaſily he may defend it, by fortifying with redoubts and ſuch works, the ſtrong holds and paſſes in it, and at what an almoſt inſurmountable diſadvantage any one who aims to recover it muſt act, even with twenty times the numbers. If theſe roads and lines have thus a communication forming a one whole, they are the foundation or baſis of a command throughout the whole country; and whoever becomes poſſeſſed of them has the command of that country.

Now let any one behold and conſider the continent of America, as it really is, a wilderneſs of woods and mountains, incapable of land carriage in its preſent natural unwrought form, and not even to be travelled on foot, unleſs by the good will of the inhabitants, as ſuch travelling in thoſe woods and mountains is perpetually and unavoidably liable to ambuſcades, and to the having the communication from the one part to the other cut off: Let ſuch perſon alſo know, that the waters for theſe reaſons have ever been the only roads that the inhabitants uſe, and until art and force make others, are the only roads that any body of people can in general take. Compare this ſtate of country with what is above deſcribed, and the ſame concluſion, *mutatis mutandis*, will be found to be derived from it.

Seeing this, as fact and experience ſhews it to be, let ſuch perſon then recollect what is ſaid above of the communication and alliance amongſt the ſeveral waters of this continent—of the unity, one maſs, and one whole, which they form;—he will ſee in a ſtrong light how the watry element claims and holds dominion over this extent

of

of land; that the great lakes which lie upon its boſom on one hand, and the great river Miſſiſippi and the multitude of waters which run into it, form there a communication,—an alliance or dominion of the watry element, that commands throughout the whole; that theſe great lakes appear to be *the throne*, the *centre of a dominion*, whoſe influence, by an infinite number of rivers, creeks and ſtreams, extends itſelf through all and every part of the continent, ſupported by the communication of, and alliance with, the waters of Miſſiſippi.

If we give attention to the nature of this country, and the one united command and dominion which the waters hold throughout it, we ſhall not be ſurprized to find the French (though ſo few in number) in poſſeſſion of a power which commands this country; nor on the other hand, when we come to conſider the nature of this eaſtern part of America, on which the Engliſh are ſettled, if we give any degree of attention to the facts, ſhall we be ſurpriſed to find them, though ſo numerous, to have ſo little and languid a power of command even within the country where they are actually ſettled. I ſay a very ſtrong reaſon for this fact ariſes out of the different nature of the country, prior to any conſideration of the difference ariſing from the nature of their government, and their method of taking poſſeſſion of this country.

This country, by a communication of waters which are extended throughout, and by an alliance of all theſe into a one whole, is capable of being, and

and is naturally a foundation of a one ſyſtem of command: Accordingly, ſuch a ſyſtem would, and has actually taken root in it under the French. Their various *poſſeſſions* throughout this country have an order, a connection and communication, an unity, a ſyſtem, forming faſt into a one government, as will be ſeen by and by: Whereas the Engliſh ſettlements have naturally, neither order, connection, communication, unity, nor ſyſtem. The waters of the tract on which the Engliſh are ſettled, are a number of rivers and bays, unconnected with, and independent of each other, either in intereſt or natural communication within land. The vague diſſipated random ſettlements therefore, ſcattered up and down theſe, will have no more communication or connection amongſt themſelves, than there is amongſt the various independent ſtreams they are ſettled upon.—This country, inſtead of being united and ſtrengthened by the alliance of the waters which run in it, is divided by theſe ſeveral various ſtreams, detached from, and independent of each other, into many ſeparate detached tracts, that do naturally and have actually become the foundation of as many ſeparate and independent intereſts.

As far as the communion of the waters of any river, or the communion there may be between any two rivers extends, ſo far extended will ariſe a communication of ſyſtem, of intereſt and command; the ſettlements therefore on this tract of country, would be naturally, as they are actually, divided into numbers of little weak, unconnected, independent governments—Were I to point out the

natural diviſion of theſe tracts and intereſts, it would point out a new diviſion of the governments of the colonies, which is not the purport of this paper.——

The conſideration of this country, ſo far as it is connected with, or has any effect upon the intereſts and politicks of the Engliſh ſettlements, preſents itſelf to view divided in two ideas. 1*ſt*, The country between the ſea and the mountains: 2*dly*, The mountains themſelves. The firſt part is almoſt throughout the whole capable of culture, and is entirely ſettled: The ſecond, a wilderneſs, in which is found here and there in ſmall portions, in compariſon of the whole, ſolitary detached ſpots of ground fit for ſettlements: the reſt is nothing but cover for vermine and rapine, a den for wild beaſts, and the more wild ſavages who wander in it.

Thus far of the ſite of the country, as it becomes the foundation of a natural difference between the Engliſh and French poſſeſſions in America. The next point that preſents itſelf to conſideration is, the manner in which the Engliſh and French have taken poſſeſſion of, and ſettled in this country: And,

1*ſt*, Of the French.

The French in their firſt attempts to ſettle themſelves in theſe parts, endeavoured to penetrate by force of arms, to fix their poſſeſſions by military expeditions, till through the perpetual and conſtant abortion of theſe meaſures, and the cer-

certain diſappointment and ſure loſs that attended them, they through a kind of deſpair gave over all thoughts of ſuch attempts.

Whether the dear-bought experience that they learnt from hence, or whether deſpair leaving their colony to make its own way, or whether rather, the right good ſenſe of Mr. Frontenac and Mr. Calliers lead them to it, is neither eaſy nor material to determine; but ſo it was, they fell afterwards into that only path, in which the real ſpirit and nature of the ſervice led.

The native inhabitants (the Indians) of this country are all hunters; all the laws of nations they know or acknowledge, are the laws of ſporting, and the chief idea which they have of landed poſſeſſions, is that of a *hunt*. The French ſettlers of Canada univerſally commenced hunters, and ſo inſinuated themſelves into a connection with theſe natives.

While the French kept themſelves thus allied with the Indians as hunters, and communicated with them in, and ſtrictly maintained all the laws and rights of ſporting, the Indians did eaſily and readily admit them to a local landed poſſeſſion; a grant which rightly acquired and applied, they are always ready to make, as none of the rights or intereſts of their nation are hurt by it: While on the contrary, they experience and receive great uſe, benefit, and profit, from the commerce which the Europeans therein eſtabliſh with them. Whereas on the contrary, the Engliſh with an inſatiable thirſt after landed poſſeſſions, have gotten

gotten deeds and other fraudulent pretences grounded on the abuſe of treaties, and by theſe deeds claim poſſeſſion even to the excluſion of the Indians, not only from many parts of their hunting grounds, (which with them is a right of great conſequence) but even from their houſe and home, as by particular inſtances from one end of the continent to the other might be made appear. Upon theſe pretences they have driven the Indians off their lands.—The Indians unable to bear it any longer, told Sir William Johnſon, that they believed ſoon they ſhould not be able to hunt a bear into a hole in a tree, but ſome Engliſhman would claim a right to the property of it as being his tree:—And whatever the great proprietors, patentees, and land jobbers, may affirm or affect to prove, or however angry they may be with thoſe who declare this truth; this is the *ſole ground* of the loſs and alienation of the Indians from the Engliſh intereſt, and this is the ground the French work upon.—On the contrary, the French poſſeſſions interfere not with the Indians rights, but aid and aſſiſt their intereſt, and become a means of their ſupport.—This will more clearly and better appear, by a more minute and particular attention to the French meaſures in theſe matters.

1*ſt*, No Canadian is ſuffered to trade with the Indians, but by licence from the government, and under ſuch regulations as that licence ordains. The main police of which is this. The government divides the Indian countries into ſo many hunts, according as they are divided by the Indians themſelves. To theſe ſeveral hunts there are

are licenſes reſpectively adapted, with regulations reſpecting the ſpirit of the nation whoſe hunt it is; reſpecting the commerce and intereſt of that nation; reſpecting the nature of that hunt.

The Canadian having ſuch licence, ought not to trade and hunt within the limits of ſuch hunt, but according to the above regulations; and he is hereby abſolutely excluded under ſevere penalties to trade or hunt beyond theſe limits, on any account whatever.

It were needleſs to point out the many good and beneficial effects ariſing from this police, which gave thus a right attention to the intereſt of the Indians, which obſerved the true ſpirit of the alliance in putting the trade upon a fair foundation, and which maintained all the rights and laws of the hunt, that the Indians moſt indiſpenſably exact.

But the conſequence of the moſt important ſervice which ariſes out of this police, is a regular, definite, preciſe, aſſured knowledge of the country.

A man whoſe intereſt and commerce are circumſcribed within a certain department, will pry into, and ſcrutinize every hole and corner of that diſtrict: When ſuch a hunt is by theſe means as full of theſe coureurs des boix, as the commerce of it will bear, whoever applies for a licence muſt betake himſelf to ſome new tract or hunt, by which again begins an opening to new diſcoveries and freſh acquiſitions.

When

When the French have by theſe means eſtabliſhed a hunt, a commerce, alliance and influence amongſt the Indians of that tract, and have by theſe means acquired a knowledge of all the waters, paſſes, portages, and poſts, that may hold the command of that country, in ſhort, *a military knowledge* of the ground, then, and not before, *they aſk and obtain leave* of the Indians to ſtrengthen their trading houſe, to make it a fort, to put a garriſon in it.

In this manner, by becoming hunters and creating alliances with the Indians as brother-ſportſmen, by founding that alliance upon, and maintaining it (according to the true ſpirit of the Indian law of nations) in a right communication and exerciſe of the true intereſt of the hunt, they have inſinuated themſelves into an influence over the Indians, have been admitted into a landed poſſeſſion, and by locating and fixing thoſe poſſeſſions in alliance with, and by the friendly guidance of the waters, whoſe influence extends throughout the whole, they are become poſſeſſed of a real intereſt in, and real command over the country. They have thus throughout the country ſixty or ſeventy forts, and almoſt as many ſettlements, which take the lead in the command of the country, *not even one of which forts, without the above true ſpirit of policy, could they ſupport, with all the expence and force of Canada:* Not all the power of France could; 'tis the Indian intereſt alone, that does maintain theſe poſts.

Having

Having thus got poſſeſſion in any certain tract, and having one principal fort, they get leave to build other trading houſes and entrepôts, at length to ſtrengthen ſuch, and in fine to take poſſeſſion of more and more advanced poſts, and to fortify and garriſon them, as little ſubordinate forts under the command of the principal one.

Though theſe principal forts have ſubordinate forts dependent on them, they are yet independent of each other, and only under the command of the governor general; there is a routine of duty ſettled for theſe, and the officers and commanders are removed to better and better commands: What the particulars of this are, and of the diſtribution of the troops, I have not yet learned as to Canada; but in general the preſent eſtabliſhment for this ſervice is three thouſand men, of which there are generally two thouſand three or four hundred effective.

I have not been able to get an exact liſt of the forts in Canada, but the following is ſufficient to ſketch out the manner in which they conduct this ſervice.

It will be neceſſary firſt to deſcribe the line which now divides Canada and Louiſiana in the Illinois country. It begins from the Oubaſch at the mouth of Vermillon river, thence to the poſt called Le Rocher on the river Pæorias, and from thence to the peninſula formed at the confluence of Rocky river and the Miſſiſippi.

Forts

Forts in CANADA.

ST. FREDERICK, { St. John. / Carillon or Tieonderôga.

FRONTENAC, { L' Preſentation. / Les Coudres. / Quintez.

NIAGARA, { Torento. / One other.

MISSILIMAKINAC, and its Dependencies.

DU QUESNE, { Preſq' Iſle. / Riviere au Bœuf. / One other.

LE DETROIT, Two { 'Twas propoſed to the Court in the year 1752, to erect this into a Lieutenancy du Roy.

The POST MIAMIS and SIOUX.

NIPIGON, { Two or three. / One on the River Michipocoton. / One other on the Long River.

ST. JOSEPH, and one other.

LE PETIT PARIS.

ALIBI.

SAGUENAY.

ST. JOHNS, in Nova Scotia.

In all about ſixty.

Moſt of theſe forts have fine ſettlements round them, and they do entirely ſupport themſelves;

it being uſual for both officers and men to defer receiving their pay till the garriſon is relieved, which is generally in ſix years; and ſcarce any thing is ſent to theſe garriſons, but dry goods and ammunition.

There is a fine ſettlement at Detroit, of near two hundred families; a better ſtill at St. Joſeph, of above two hundred; a fine one at St. Antoine, many fine ones about Petit Paris. But the French government does not encourage theſe, and has, by a poſitive ordonance, abſolutely forbid any one to make a ſettlement without ſpecial licence; which meaſure they found neceſſary to take, in order to reſtrain the Canadians from totally abandoning Canada.

The eſtabliſhments, poſts, and ſettlements of Louiſiana, are as follow:

Thirty ſeven companies of fifty men each, and two Swiſſe companies of ſeventy five men each.

1. The garriſon of New Orleans:

French -	900	
Swiſſe - -	75	975

Out of which are garriſoned the outpoſts of Báliſſe, and other ſmall poſts.

Detour Anglois: The garriſon of this conſiſts of four companies, which have their tour of duty with the Mobile, Illinois, &c.

Mobile,

Brought over	975
Mobile, eight French companies, and one Swiſſe - - - - -	475

" It is neceſſary to fix this number here, " on account of the proximity of Panſa- " cola, on one part, and of the Engliſh " on the other; as alſo to influence the In- " dians, as there are at our meetings and " treaties, held here annually with the In- " dians, ſometimes 2, ſometimes 3,000 " Indians preſent *.

Tombechbé, Alibamous, } One company each, a detachment from the garriſon of Mobile.

Four companies of this garriſon relieved every year.

The Illinois, ſix companies - -	300

The poſts were, in 1752,
- Caſkaſias.
- Fort de Chartres.
- Village de St. Philip.
- Praire de Rocher.
- Cohôkias.
- Village de St. Jeune Veuve.

The Akanſas, a leſs principal poſt, one company - - - - -	50
The Natches, one company - -	50
	1850

* Mr. Vaudreuil to the court.

Brought over	1850
The Nachitoches, one company - - for the preſent, on account of their not being able to prevent deſertions to the Adages, a Spaniſh poſt within 7 leagues of it. They propoſe, when they ſhall be able to ſettle a cartel with the Spaniſh governor, and his Majeſty approves of it, to fix two companies there, it being a frontier poſt.	50
The Point Coupe, one company - -	50
The German Settlement, one company	50
Total	2,000

The ſettlements of Louiſiana in general, produce Indigo equal to the Guatimalo, which admit three cuttings or crops annually; rice in great abundance, cotton, but they find great difficulty in cleanſing it from the ſeeds that accompany its growth here, tobacco, pitch, tar, they have a trade with their own iſlands; flour, peas, beans, ſalted or corned wild beef, and pork, hams of hogs and bears, tallow, greaſe, oil, hides, lumber, planks; they have alſo myrtle wax, which they export to France; they do alſo, in ſmall quantities, manufacture the buffalo wool. From the abundance and natural growth of mulberry trees, they have their thoughts turned to ſilk, iron, lead, copper, and coals in abundance; beſides the ſkins and coarſe furs, ariſing from the Indian trade and hunt, they had, ſo long ago as in the year 1744, ſeveral veſſels at their port, which came from Florida and Havanna, and the bay of Campeachy, to trade for boards, lumber, pitch,

dry

dry goods, and live ſtock, to the value of 150,000 pieces of eight. They had a ſettled treaty of commerce with the Royal Company of Havanna, by the terms of which, the French were to deliver them at Louiſiana, pitch at two piaſtres a barrel, tar at three piaſtres a barrel, boards at two reals each. Their ſettlements towards the mouth of Miſſiſippi, are almoſt deſerted and ruined, the ſettlers not being able to ſupport the expence of banking againſt the inundations of the ſea and land floods. Mr. Vaudreuil ſays, in a letter to the court, September 28, 1752, he thinks it would be much better, to defer for ſome years attempting ſettlements here, till the ground be more raiſed and elevated by the accretion of ſoil, as it has been three feet in fifteen years laſt paſt.

I mention nothing here of the poſts of New Orleans, Detour Anglois, and Baliſe, nor of Mobile; becauſe, being marine poſts, the conſideration of them does not come within the ſcope of this paper. I will obſerve, that they require our particular attention: They are become the ports to which all the men and ſtores, with which the country of the Ohio is furniſhed, are ſent annually and conſtantly; as from New Orleans to this country, the way is much ſhorter than through Canada, the diſtance being at the moſt, where they are obliged at low water to follow all the windings of the river, not more than 340 French leagues; but at the uſual times that they ſend their convoys, not more than 300, and to which they can go up with decked ſloops, nine or ten months in the year. The trade comes down from the Illinois, about the latter end of

December, and goes up towards the latter end of January, or the beginning of February.

I ſhall deſcribe the poſt of Tombechbé, from Mr. Vaudreuil's letters.

April 20, 1751. This poſt reſtrains the Alibamôus, Talapouches, Abekas, and Cowêtas, preſerves the communication between the waters of Mobile, Alibamous river and the Miſſiſippi; 'tis neceſſary for us in order to keep up amongſt the Chactaws, the ſpirit of
January 6, 1746. warring againſt the Chickaſaws; 'tis alſo neceſſary as an entrepôt in our expeditions againſt the
October 28, 1746. Chickaſaws and Engliſh. From hence we can go within ſeven or eight leagues of the villages of the Chickaſaws with periaugoes, by the river Tombechbé, over which, ſeven or eight leagues of land carriage, we can eaſily go by land, and carry cohorns and light field pieces: from hence alſo it is, that we muſt ſend out our parties
March 6, 1749. againſt the Carolinians; yet this fort being a heavy expence, and with great difficulty ſupplied, and being ſo ſituated as to be of no uſe to hinder the Engliſh from going to the Chactaws, when that nation is inclined to receive them, as they may conduct their convoys a little above, or a little below the fort, without our being able to
September 24, 1751. oppoſe them. This being the caſe, were the Chactaws entirely ſecured in our intereſt, were the Chickaſaws deſtroyed, and had the Engliſh loſt and given up all hopes of ſtrengthening themſelves in that quarter, as we hope to effect, I then think it would be no longer neceſſary to
January 12, 1751. keep up this poſt; yet till this be effected, it muſt be kept up, and more eſpecially as by ſuppreſſing

preſſing it now, the Chactaws would think themſelves abandoned. This poſt, as well as Alibamôus, ſhould always be victualled for a year, leſt by any revolution in Indian affairs, the road to it ſhould be obſtructed. May 30, 1751.

As to the poſts in the Illinois country, I am not able to deſcribe them particularly; but what appears to be of more conſequence, I collect from Mr. Vaudreuil's letters, (from 1743, to 1752) the general idea upon which the fortifying and ſecuring that country is founded.

The firſt fort of their plan, in fortifying the Illinois country, was on the peninſula, in lat. 41. 30. This was a check upon, and barrier againſt the ſeveral nations of Sioux (not then in confederacy with them.) The next poſt in this plan was on the river Dorias, (ſo called after the junction of the Illinois river and Theakiki) which would be of more eſpecial uſe, if ſituated on the north of the lake on that river, whence the roads divide, that lead to Maſſilimakinac and St. Joſeph: This he deſcribes as the key to the Illinois country from Canada. July 18, 1743. Auguſt 30, 1744.

The next is the garriſoning and fortifying the country, from the mouth of Miſſouris to Kaſkaſias, where there are five poſts. Mr. Vaudreuil thinks that Kaſkaſias is the principal, as it is the paſs and inlet of the convoys of Louiſiana, as alſo of thoſe of Canada, and of the traders and hunters of the poſt Detroit, and that of the greateſt part of the ſavage nations. May 15, 1751.

There is alſo at this poſt, a river where the ſloops which come from New Orleans, may be ſafely laid up in winter.

Mr. M'Cartey to Mr. Vaudreuile, January 20, 1752.

But Mr. M'Carty, who was on the ſpot, thinks the environs of Chartres a far better ſituation to place this poſt in, provided there were more inhabitants. He viſited fort Chartres, found it very good, only wanting a few repairs, and thinks it ought to be kept up.

The next poſt (I take them in order of place, not of time) which comes into this plan, is on the Ohio, over againſt the mouth of the Cherokee river: This, he ſays, would be the key of the colony of Louiſiana, would be a ſufficient barrier againſt the Engliſh, and reſtrain their incroachments, and would obſtruct their deſigns in alienating the Indians of the Ohio; it would reſtrain the incurſions of the Cherokees, on the river Ouabaſh, and river Miſſiſippi; it would alſo check the Chickaſaws, and would by theſe means ſecure the navigation of the Miſſiſippi, and the communication with our poſts. He here expreſſes the greateſt uneaſineſs, (as the French court did not care to engage in the meaſure at that time) leſt the Engliſh ſhould build a fort here, in which caſe, ſays he, we muſt give up all communication with the Illinois; for the Engliſh would become maſters of all the navigation of that country.

November 4, 1745.
Auguſt 30, 1744.
May 15, 1751.
November 4, 1745.

April 8, 1752.

Mr. Jonquiere propoſes another fort at the mouth of Rocky river, (this is in the government

ment of Canada) which, he ſays, would ſecure the tranquillity of the ſouth of Canada. This, ſays Mr. Vaudreuil, together with the poſt of the Illinois, would reſtrain and become a barrier againſt the Engliſh, and cover all our Indian allies to the weſt, from our enemies, the Engliſh, the Cherokees, Catawbas, and others.

By theſe poſts above, and the poſts of the Miamis, this whole country is ſecured and fortified. This country, ſays Charlevoix, (in 1721) will become the granary of Louiſiana, and in 1746 we find it actually becoming ſo; for in that year it ſent down to New Orleans fifty ton of flour; in 1747, we find it well furniſhed with proviſions, and having fine crops; and in a letter of Mr. Vaudreuil's 1748, we have an account of its produce and exports—flour, corn, bacon, hams, both of bears and hogs, corned pork and wild beef, myrtle wax, cotton, tallow, leather, tobacco, lead, copper, ſome ſmall quantity of buffalo wool, veniſon, poultry, bears-greaſe, oil, ſkins, and ſome coarſe furs; and we find a regular communication ſettled with New Orleans, by convoys which come down annually the latter end of December, and return at lateſt by the middle of February.

Thus the French do not only *ſettle* the country, but alſo *take poſſeſſion of it*; and by the form, ſite, and police of ſuch poſſeſſions, (led on and eſtabliſhed by the guidance of, and in alliance with the waters,) a natural foundation of a one command, have they acquired, and become poſſeſſed of *the command of this country*.

By

By theſe means, I repeat it, have they created an alliance, an intereſt with all the Indians on the continent; by theſe means have they acquired an influence, a command throughout the country: They know too well the ſpirit of Indian politicks, to affect a ſuperiority, a government, over the Indians; yet they have in reality and truth of more ſolid effect, an influence, *an aſcendency* *, in all the councils of all the Indians on the continent, and lead and direct their meaſures, not even our own allies, the Five nations, excepted; unleſs in that remains of our intereſt, which, partly the good effects of our trading houſe at Oſwego, and partly General Johnſon, has preſerved to the Engliſh, by the great eſteem and high opinion the Indians have of his ſpirit, truth, and honor.

* I mention nothing here of the influence of the Jeſuit miſſionaries, becauſe nothing is meant leſs than religion by them.

EAST.

In the French Intereſt.

Eſquimaux.
St. John's.
Micmacs.
Penobſcots.
Noridgwalks.
Abenakais.
St. Francis Indians.
Cachnewage.
Scaatecoke.
Oſwegatchie.

Senekes.
Onondagas.
Cayuges.
Oneides.
Tuſkaroras.
} Suppoſed to be in the Britiſh Intereſt, but greatly debauched by the French.

Mohawks.
Mehikanders.
} Wholly in the Britiſh Intereſt.

Delawares.
Shaweneſe.
} Loſt to the Engliſh, except a few on Suſquehanah.

Catawbas.
Cherokees.
Chickaſaws.
} Suppoſed in the Engliſh Intereſt, but much debauched by the French.

WEST.

French.

Sioux.
Nadoneſſeries.
Illinois.
Tawigtwaes.
Miamis.
Piankeſhanaes.
Wawyactaes.
Picques.
Kaſkuſkies.
Cawetas.
Abekas.
Talaponches.
Alibamôus.
} The four Nations of the Creeks, as above.

NORTH.

Wholly French.

Aſſinipoeles.
Adirondacks.
Algonkins.
Outawawaes.
Chononderdes or Hurons.
} Skaniadereroenues.
Meſſiſagues.
Outagamies.
Miſcontiris.
Sakis.
Chriſtanaux.
Almipogins.
Nipiſenes.

SOUTH.

Oſagaes.
Akanſaes.
Chactaws.
Panimaes.
Adages.
} Wholly French.

The Engliſh American provinces are as fine *ſettlements* as any in the world; but can ſcarce be called *poſſeſſions*, becauſe they are ſo ſettled, as to have no poſſeſſion of the country: They are ſettled as farmers, millers, fiſhermen, upon bays and rivers, that have no communication or connection of intereſt, conſequently, the ſettlers belonging to theſe rivers, bays, &c. have no natural connection.

But

But further, the ſettlers upon any one river or ſet of waters, which waters having a connection, might become the natural ſeat of a one intereſt, are yet ſo ſettled, that they have no connection nor union amongſt each other, ſcarce of communion, much leſs of defence.

Their ſettlements are vague without deſign, ſcattered, independent; they are ſo ſettled, that from their ſituation, 'tis not eaſy for them to unite in a ſyſtem of mutual defence, nor does their intereſt lead them to ſuch ſyſtem, and even if both did, yet through the want of a *police* to form them into a community of alliance, unity, and activity amongſt themſelves, they are helpleſs and defenceleſs; and thus may the Engliſh be conſidered as having, for many hundred miles, a long *indefenſible line of frontiers*, prior to the conſideration of the nature of the enemy they may be engaged with.

3*dly*, The ſtate of the ſervice as ariſing from the above facts.

It appears from the firſt caſt of the eye, that the Engliſh, without ſome *preparative meaſures*, will not be able to carry into execution any military expeditions againſt the French in the upper part of America; becauſe from any poſt where they can form an army, and lay in all its ſtores, ammunition and proviſion, they muſt undertake for many hundred miles, a long, dangerous, and tireſome march, by roads the moſt haraſſing, and of almoſt inſuperable difficulty, through a wilderneſs of woods and mountains, without magazines

zines of forage, &c. or any other aſſiſtance; through a country liable to ambuſcades, and all the ſtrokes of war; through a country whereof the French are poſſeſſed of the command, or if through any part where their perſonal command does not actually exiſt, yet where Indians, (the moſt dangerous enemies in ſuch a wilderneſs) where the Indians, I ſay, are maſters, and poſſeſſed of every hold and paſs.

To put this matter in a ſtill ſtronger light, let any one conſider, whence ariſes the danger of marching through a fortified country; whence the danger of a general's leaving behind him any enemies fort or garriſon, not taken.—It is that the enemy, who has poſſeſſion of theſe, has the command of the whole country, except the ſole confined ſpot where the ſtronger army is preſent, can forbid and reſtrain the inhabitants from furniſhing you with ſuch aſſiſtance as the country is otherwiſe capable of affording; can, by ſallies from theſe poſts, cut off and intercept all your parties and convoys, all your intelligence; can cut off all communication with your magazines, and your own poſts; can perpetually haraſs and obſtruct your march, and return within cover, before any ſuperior party, ſent out from the main body, can reach them; you are alſo always liable to ſurprize, even within your camp.

A march from any poſt where the Engliſh can *at preſent* form any army, and collect its ſtores, ammunition, proviſions, carriages, &c. through the country, as at this day above circumſtanced, is,

is, literally and preciſely in its effect, the ſame thing as the march here deſcribed.

While the Indians, whoſe chief art of war is that of forming ambuſcades, who have acquired from practice and art, a peculiar method of ſecretly traverſing the woods and lying concealed in them;—while the Indians, whoſe military ſkill of fighting either ſingle or in parties amidſt theſe woods, renders the ſituation to them equivalent to fighting under cover;—while the Indians thus trained, and incredibly expert in the art, can at any time ſally out from the holds, faſtneſſes, lurking places, and ambuſhes, in which the country abounds, (and all which they know) nay, even from the cover of the woods, and drive in all your ſmall out parties, prevent ſuch foraging as the country will afford, intercept and obſtruct your convoys, cut off your communication of intelligence, proviſions and ſuccours, and retire again within cover, out of danger of any purſuit, and continue thus conſtantly to harraſs and, perhaps, ſurprize your army: while they can do this, and (believe it) all this they can do and will do, your army is to all intents and purpoſes, as to the war with the Indians, marching through a country of forts and fortreſſes. Let any one here, compare this ſtate of the caſe with the cauſe and reaſons of the failure of the ſeveral military expeditions on this continent, and its truth will be ſtill more evinced.

As then no general would think of making a campaign in any country, to reach which, he muſt march through an enemy's fortified country, without

without ſome *previous meaſures* to maintain his march and ſecure his retreat through ſuch; ſo here (I repeat it) there are ſome *previous meaſures neceſſary*.

The *firſt* of theſe meaſures is, the ſettling the police of our alliance with the [Kenunctioni] or Five-nation confederacy, upon a permanent, ſolid, and effectual baſis, ſo as to reſtore and re-eſtabliſh our intereſt with them.

The *ſecond* is, taking poſſeſſion of, and fortifying a ſyſtem of advanced poſts, entrepôts, *viz.* magazines whereat to collect ſtores and proviſions, camps from whence (within a reaſonable diſtance and by a practicable way) to make our ſortis.

Thirdly, The ſecuring the dominion of lake Ontario for the preſent, and laying a foundation for the like dominion on lakes Erie, Huron, and Michigan.

Let now any one conſider the above ſtating of the form of the country that the Engliſh inhabit, and in which the operations of our arms muſt lie: Let him raiſe in his mind ſeriouſly, the preciſe idea of the native inhabitants who poſſeſs this country, and of the kind of operations by which we are, and ſhall be attacked, and by which we may be able to defend ourſelves: Let any one, I ſay, by a ſerious attention to the above facts, form to himſelf that idea, which an actual and practical knowledge of the country would give him: Let him then be told a me-

'lancholy truth, that almoſt all thoſe Indians, whoſe friendſhip and alliance were once our beſt and ſecureſt barrier, are now by the French debauched and alienated from us, nay even turned againſt us, and become the ſervile inſtruments of the French robberies, maſſacres, and treacherous incroachments: Let then his eye be turned upon the ſtate of our back inhabitants, ſettled in a vague, unconnected, defenceleſs manner, up to the mountains, to the very mouth of the dens of theſe ſavages.——Any one attentively conſidering the above facts, will ſee the Engliſh colonies in not only a weak defenceleſs ſtate, but expoſed to, and almoſt at the mercy of a very powerful enemy: Conſidering this, and the above facts, he would ſee how ſuperficial, wild, and falſe an idea of the ſervice that is, which would create a barrier by a line of forts; a barrier that might as well pretend to cut off the bears, wolves, and foxes from coming within it, as the Indians; a barrier that would have no more effect than ſo many ſcarecrows, unleſs you could actually build another Chineſe wall, and ſo another, ſtill advancing your wall-fence, as you advanced your ſettlements; a barrier that would take more troops to man it, than the country incloſed within it would take people to cultivate it; a line of 13 or 14 hundred miles, that is at laſt no line at all; he would, I ſay, ſee this meaſure not only impracticable, but ineffectual: Nay, were it practicable, and could it take effect, yet the inſupportable expence of it, would render it impoſſible to be engaged in. Any one reaſoning on the ideas as above ſtated, and knowing them to be what they really are, *facts*, would turn his thoughts

thoughts on thoſe objects which experience, fact, and reaſon point out to be one part of our barrier: Namely, a real and ſtable alliance with the Indians, formed on ſuch articles as ſhould give us the ſame kind of poſſeſſion and command in the Indian country, the ſame influence in Indian affairs, as the French have. And,

Firſt, As to that part of our barrier, and the ſervice which is connected with, and depends on our alliance and intereſt with the Kenunctioni, the confederacy of the Five nations, I can only repeat what I have ſaid formerly on this ſubject.

" The original natural form under which the Indian country lay being that of a foreſt, ſtocked not with ſheep, or oxen, or horſes, not with beaſts of labour and domeſtic animals, but only with wild beaſts and game, all that the country afforded for food or raiment muſt be hunted for: The Indians, therefore, would conſtantly be, as they were in fact, not land-workers, but hunters, not ſettlers, but wanderers; they would therefore, conſequently never have, as in fact they never had, any idea of property in land; they would conſequently never have, as in fact they never had, any one common fixed intereſt, any one communion of rights and actions, one civil union, and conſequently not any government; they know no ſuch thing as an adminiſtrative or executive power, properly ſo called. They allow the authority of advice, a kind of legiſlative authority, but there is no civil coercion; they never had any one collective, actuating power of

whole, nor any magiſtrate or magiſtrates to execute ſuch power.

But the country now appearing under a very different form, and they, the Indians, being under very different circumſtances, ariſing from trade, treaties and war, begin to feel rather than ſee, to find by experience rather than reaſon, the neceſſity of a civil union of power and action; and that theſe circumſtances have in fact, for many years been formed, and have at length formed to them ſuch a collective power: Theſe people are preciſely in that point of circumſtances, where a community, that was before only a community of ſociety, is becoming that of government.

In all their actions, therefore, of late years, whether of treaty or war, they have recurred to *ſome agent* to actuate this power: They are not only become capable of ſuch a general leading, but their circumſtances require it. The circumſtances with which they are connected, had formed them into a ſtate, but from the circumſtances of the ſociety under which they live, they can never have amongſt themſelves a *ſtateholder*; their circumſtances require and look out for ſome ſuch; ſome ſuch they muſt have, and if we do not find ſuch for them, the French will, and are, actually attempting it. Further, as they know not, nor acknowledge any leading power, but that of authority, there can be no nominal, viſible appointment of ſuch leader; they will never appoint ſuch within themſelves, nor will they ever ſubmit to any one appointed from without. This was the miſtake of the governor of Canada, which

which had like to have loſt him all the Cachnuagas two years ago.

Therefore ſuch perſon or perſons only, as can acquire, or actually are, in poſſeſſion of this leading power, this authority with them, can be *this agent*, *this leader*, *this* STATEHOLDER.

For this manager, this ſtateholder, the government hath appointed Sir William Johnſon; a perſon not only the proper one, but preciſely the very and only perſon that the above circumſtances and nature of things pointed out; the perſon whoſe knowledge of Indians, whoſe influence, by the opinion the Indians have of him, whoſe very uncommon zeal for the intereſt of his country, whoſe integrity and bravery, will, by ſuch meaſures as the Indians can really and indeed truſt in, if properly ſupported, reſtore this branch of our affairs to its ſalutary effect.

He has, in his papers communicated by me, mentioned every thing neceſſary, as to the management of this Indian adminiſtration: I cannot but add, as a collateral meaſure, that would ſtrengthen and finally confirm ſuch our intereſt amongſt the Indians, the making little ſettlements at Oſwego, Niarondaquat, and Niagara, and at our other forts, by leave of the Indians.

Secondly, We ſhould then, according to good faith and truth, leave the Indians in full and free poſſeſſion of their dwelling country and hunting grounds, which the Engliſh have, in the moſt ſolemn manner, confirmed to them by treaty, and

of which, by the ſame treaty, we have undertaken the protection: We ſhould guaranty and protect ſuch to them, to their uſe, and alſo all their hunting-grounds.—This part of the general ſcheme alſo, is in ſome degree carried into execution, by the inſtructions given by general Braddock to general Johnſon, for his direction in his late treaty with the Indians; which inſtructions were, at the deſire of general Braddock and governor Shirley, drawn up by your memorialiſt, having been firſt propoſed by him. This meaſure will be abſolutely neceſſary to preſerve theſe Indians to our alliance, as may be ſeen in almoſt every treaty held with them ſince the firſt ſurrender of thoſe lands; it is alſo neceſſary to ſupport ourſelves againſt the weſtern French Indians: This propoſed meaſure will be ſo far from being an impediment or hurt to our intereſt, that the greateſt advantages may be made of it, both in the means towards executing the general plan, and in the final execution of it. The uſes that may be made of this meaſure towards the executing of this plan, are, That while we are undertaking the protection of the Indian country and hunting grounds, we are actually becoming poſſeſſed of the command of the country. Of which, in the whole, when we are poſſeſſed of the command and protection (by means of a very few forts neceſſary to be erected, which I do not here mention) upon which, in part, according to the propoſed colonies and ſettlements, when we are ſettled, the Indians will be preſerved and protected to their ſatisfaction, and yet cannot move to war, nor even to hunt, nor ſubſiſt, but as they maintain their alliance with the Engliſh;

and

and yet in conjunction with us, their whole force by theſe means being become infinitely greater, may be directed at any time into the heart of the enemy's country.

Thirdly, As to the adminiſtration of * Indian affairs to the ſouthward, the firſt ſtep neceſſary to be taken is, that there be an abſolute ſtop put to all provincial adminiſtration; that there be no more agents, commiſſaries, or interpreters, appointed by, and acting under the private orders of a particular province or proprietories, from whence ariſes interferings and confuſion, and oppoſition in our Indian affairs, always to the obſtructing, often to the utter ruin, of the Britiſh general intereſt.

Inſtead of theſe, there ſhould be one only principal commiſſary (who underſtands the language and intereſt, and is acquainted with the people of that nation) appointed ſeverally to each

* Theſe Indians are the Catawbaes, Cherokees, Chickaſaws, and Creeks. The Creeks are in part debauched and alienated from us by the French, and attend the French treaties conſtantly at the Mobile, eſpecially the Alibamôus, Cowëtaes, Talapôuches, and Abekaes, and are in great meaſure held under ſubjection by the French forts at Alibamôus, and Tombeckbá.

The Chickaſaws are greatly weakened, and almoſt ruined by the intrigues of the French within them, and by the wars with the Chactaws, and other French Indians, being unſupported by us.

The Cherokees and Catawbaes, but ill ſupported by us, are conſtantly harraſſed and warred upon by the Five Nations, at the inſtance of the French influence among that people.

nation: This perſon ſhould have under him ſeveral ſtore-keepers, and ſmiths.

All theſe principal commiſſaries ſhould be ſubordinate to a one general agent or ſuperintendent *, who ſhould be under the orders of the commander in chief only,—acting by his orders and inſtructions, form'd on a *one general idea* of the Engliſh and Indian intereſt, of our alliance, and of the meaſures to be conſtantly and uniformly purſued.

As the being ſupplied with European goods, is to the Indians the firſt eſſential intereſt of their politicks, is the ſole and actual object of their alliance with us, and the only real and permanent motive of their attachment to us; and as, according to the cuſtom of theſe people, all public tranſactions are executed by exchange of preſents, all public friendſhip preſerved and animated by public hoſpitality and liberality, the firſt and fundamental object of the Engliſh meaſures ſhould be to provide for theſe, in a regular and ſufficient manner. The being able to do this, is our peculiar advantage and ſuperiority over the French in theſe affairs; their meaſures are perpetually impeded and diſtreſſed, through their being unable to do this; it is the only difficulty that they have not ſurmounted, and cannot ſurmount; it is this that makes our alliance, if we did conduct it as we ought, the true and natural intereſt, the true and natural politicks of the Indians.

* *N. B.* There has been one ſince appointed, Mr. Stewart, a very active, intelligent, and able man.

There

There ought therefore to be concluded with theſe ſouthern nations, a general alliance of friendſhip and mutual defence and aſſiſtance, founded on the Britiſh general intereſt, not any provincial private one, upon a one general, uniform plan: The *1ſt* article of which ſhould be, To do juſtice to all their claims, to redreſs all their wrongs.

2*dly*, To maintain with them all public hoſpitality and friendſhip, by public, annual, and occaſional preſents, by entertaining them, and by all other uſual aſſiſtance, to eſtabliſh a fair and juſt trade with them, and ſettle ſtores within their countries, or wherever is moſt convenient for them, with a conſtant ſupply of goods at a ſettled and cheaper rate than the French do ſupply them.

3*dly*, Mutually to aſſiſt each other againſt all attempts of the French or their Indians, or any hoſtile attempt whatſoever upon either, conſtantly and faithfully to give all intelligence to each other, to mend their guns when they have occaſion to go to war, to ſupply them at ſuch times with ammunition, and always to ſend ſome of our people along with them if they require it, except againſt Indians in alliance with the Engliſh; and whenever the Engliſh call upon them, to go out with them to war, that the Engliſh ſupply ſuch as want them, with arms, and *all* with proviſions and ammunition, and defend and maintain their wives and children in the mean time.

This being done, a fund capable of anſwering the above engagements, and of conſtantly and faithfully executing them, and alſo capable of ſupporting an adminiſtration of Indian affairs, that may work effectually to the preſerving and maintaining the Britiſh intereſt in ſuch meaſures, ſhould be ſettled on a general and permanent foundation; which may be as follows:

That the ſeveral colonies who have hitherto conſtantly raiſed monies for Indian affairs, as a private provincial ſervice, ſhould for the future appropriate ſuch monies to this general fund.

That ſuch colonies as have never raiſed any monies for theſe ſervices, ſhould, for the future, raiſe and appropriate to this fund, ſuch ſums under a quota, in proportion to the benefit received, or the harm avoided, by the barrier ariſing from this general alliance and adminiſtration of Indian affairs; and it becomes worthy of conſideration, whether the iſlands in the Weſt Indies, their intereſt being inſeparably connected with that of the continent, ſhould not bear a certain proportion of taxes towards the charge of the war.

Matters within ourſelves being thus prepared and provided for:

The firſt ſtep of our meaſure in this branch ſhould be, eſtabliſhing, by the advice of people of the beſt authorities, and moſt knowledge of the affairs of each nation reſpectively, at proper places, general magazines for this ſervice, at the moſt convenient entrepôts between *marine and inland*

land navigation of carriage, whence leſſer ſtores, reſpectively ſubordinate to theſe, might be beſt ſupplied within the Indian countries, or where is moſt convenient for the Indians: As for inſtance, one at Schenectady, or rather at Mount Johnſon; —one either at William's ferry on the Potomac, or at Fort Cumberland on Will's creek;—one other ſomewhere on the Roanoak, or James river;—one other at fort Auguſta, on the Savanah.

From theſe general magazines, the ſeveral national or tribe-ſtores ſhould be conſtantly ſupplied: Theſe ſtores ſhould be alſo public truck-houſes, and the ſtore keeper be alſo a public truck maſter: Theſe to be fixed in each particular nation, in ſuch places, and in ſuch number as hath been uſual, or will be beſt for the good of the ſervice, at each of which there ſhould alſo be a ſmith. The commiſſary appointed to the affairs of each nation, to command and ſuperintend all the ſtore keepers, truck maſters, ſmiths, and all the ſtores, and to be conſtantly circuiting through theſe, living always at ſome one of them, and attending reſpectively at any of them, whereſoever he is commanded by the general agent, or the good of the ſervice requires: Alſo at all times (unleſs in matters of a more public general import, when the general agent is to attend) to negotiate and tranſact all matters of buſineſs which ſuch nation may have to do with any other, or with any colony, and to interpret between the Indians of the nation he is appointed commiſſary to; and in general, within the powers of his inſtructions, to do all thoſe matters and things as have

have uſually been done by provincial agents or interpreters; that the ſtore keepers and ſmiths do keep conſtant journals, and make report to the commiſſary; that the commiſſaries keep a regular journal of theſe reports, and of their own tranſactions, and report to the general agent, and he likewiſe to keep a journal and record, and report to the commander in chief.

The order then of the public preſents, the public hoſpitality and liberality being ſettled, according to the nature of thoſe Indians and our alliance with them:

The method and laws of the trade with them being alſo ſettled:

The next ſtep to be obſerved, I take entirely from the French; and it is a meaſure, according to my idea, abſolutely neceſſary. Obſerving the want of ſubordination among the Indians, the French make a number of ſachems, to whom they give medals, and appoint them to preſide as chiefs, leaders, counſellors, ſpeakers, &c. ſome over eight, ſome over ten villages, and ſo on as their influence extends; being eaſily, by preſents and money, poſſeſſed of theſe medal-chiefs, they thus eaſily acquire a more uniform and ſtable management of their Indians, than the Indians even know of amongſt themſelves.

Let it be a ſtanding inſtruction, faithfully in all and every matter, to execute and fulfil, according to the true ſpirit and intent, the above treaty and alliance, both as to the true intereſt of the

the Indians, and as to the forming their alliance into a firm barrier againſt the French, and enemy Indians.

The ſeveral people employed in Indian affairs to have conſtantly in view, the ſcheme *of uniting theſe ſeveral nations into a confederacy* like that of the Five Nations. In order to this, that there be found out and fixed upon ſome one place in the back country, whereat the general agent ſhould hold all his general treaties and parlies with theſe Indians, as the French do at the Mobile; which place, upon the ſucceſs of this ſcheme, to be the council place,—as Onondaga is to the Five Nations. Let any one conſider how a little republick, formed by the Welinis on the river Ouäbaſch, by ſome free and independent Indians, did greatly embaraſs, and had well nigh ruined the French affairs there.

This third branch (according to my idea of our barrier) being thus or in ſome ſuch way provided for and adminiſtred.

The fourth, is, that of *a ſyſtem of magazines and fortified camps* as entrepôts, whereat either to collect for defence, or from whence, within a reaſonable diſtance and by a practicable way, to make our ſortis. This branch is in part provided for; for by removing and advancing theſe ſtores, and at length, when a proper place is found to fix them on that would defend and command the country, getting leave to fortify them, and ſo erect them into forts, the Indians are defended, are at the ſame time held within

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proper terms, and we have within a friends country, advanced poſts or entrepôts,—that would anſwer all the purpoſes of defenſive or offenſive operations againſt the enemy; and all that could be in this place ſaid on that head, I have very minutely entered into in that part, where I explain the nature and ſtate of the ſervice, as ariſing from the nature and ſtate of the country and its inhabitants. I will only add their opinion of one poſt, which we once had, and of another that they feared we were about to make.

Mr. Vaudreuil, governor of Canada, in his letter to the court, May 10, 1744, mentioning the leave which the Engliſh had got to build a fortified trading houſe at Ockfuſques, amongſt the Creeks, ſays, "If the meaſure of which this might be a foundation, ſhould be properly carried into execution, it would oblige the French to retire from their fort of Alibamôus down to the Mobile."

And again in another letter, September 17, 1744, he mentions this ſtore-houſe having opened a traffick with the Chactaws,—yet this the Engliſh abandoned; and the French have now a fort on each main branch of the river Mobile; one at Tombechbé, and fort Toulouſe at Alibamôus.

In another letter of November, 1748, he ſays, it would be very eaſy for the Engliſh, by means of the river Ohio, to form an entrepôt at Prudehomme to ſerve them as a retreat, having the nations of the Shawoänaes, Cherokees, and Chickaſaws, on their back to ſupport them. From this

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entrepôt, it would not be difficult for them to penetrate to the Ackanſas, Panis, Oſâges, Padoucas, and Miſouris, and all the other nations of that country, if the poſts and ſettlements of the Illinois were broke up, as they would certainly be, did the Engliſh ſettle and fortify at Prudehomme; not only the inhabitants of the Illinois would be loſt to us, but alſo the inhabitants near New Orleans, would be ſo greatly diſtreſſed for the want of the ſuccours and proviſions of this country, the granary to it, by loſs of the benefit of the trade with that poſt, it would be difficult for them to ſubſiſt, it would be impoſſible to maintain the expence they muſt live at without it, and they muſt be obliged to abandon the colony: But ſhould not matters be ſo bad as this, yet, were the poſt of the Illinois taken away, the colony would not be able to extend itſelf at furtheſt, beyond the poſt of the Natches, without a very ſtrong garriſon at the poſt of the Ackanſas, and at beſt that poſt would be too low to cover the hunting country.

When ſuch forts are erected, the commanding officer at each fort ſhould be a kind of comptroller on the commiſſary or ſtore keepers for that diviſion, and ſhould be furniſhed with proviſions and neceſſary ſtores to make preſents to, and to entertain the Indians when they come to him, and to ſupply their neceſſities: He ſhould, for this reaſon, have a right to make an order on the magazine of his diviſion for this purpoſe.

Fifthly, In other parts of our frontier, that are not the immediate reſidence and country of Indians, ſome other ſpecies of barrier ſhould be thought

thought of, of which nothing can be more effectual than a barrier colony; but even this cannot be carried, as is hereafter explained, into execution and effect, without this previous measure of a syſtem of entrepôts in the country between us and the enemy. *The nature of this* syſtem, muſt depend on the nature of the ground, which can only be determined by a particular view, and will then immediately be beſt known to military men; but all mankind muſt know that no body of men, whether as an army, or as an emigration of coloniſts, can march from one country to another, through an inhoſpitable wilderneſs, without magazines, nor with any ſafety without poſts, communicating amongſt each other by practicable roads, to which to retire in caſe of accidents, repulſe, or delay.

It is a fact which experience evinces the truth of, that we have always been able to outſettle the French, and have drove the Indians out of the country more by ſettling than fighting; and that wherever our ſettlements have been wiſely and completely made, the French neither by themſelves, nor their dogs of war, the Indians, have been able to remove us. It is upon this fact that I found the propriety of the meaſure of ſettling a barrier colony in thoſe parts of our frontiers, *which are not the immediate reſidence or hunting grounds of our Indians.* This is a meaſure that will be effectual, and will not only in time pay its expence, but make as great returns as any of our preſent colonies do; will give a ſtrength and unity to our dominions in North America, and give us *poſſeſſion* of the country as

well as *ſettlements* in it. But above all this, the ſtate and circumſtances of our ſettlements renders ſuch a meaſure not only proper and eligible, but abſolutely neceſſary. The Engliſh ſettlements, as they are at preſent circumſtanced, are abſolutely at a ſtand; they are ſettled up to the mountains, and in the mountains there is no where together, land ſufficient for a ſettlement large enough to ſubſiſt by itſelf and to defend itſelf, and preſerve a communication with the preſent ſettlements.

If the Engliſh would advance one ſtep further, or cover themſelves where they are, it muſt be at once, by one large ſtep over the mountains, with a numerous and military colony. Where ſuch ſhould be ſettled, I do not now take upon me to ſay; at preſent I ſhall only point out the meaſure and the nature of it, by inſerting two ſchemes, one of Mr. Franklin's; the other of your memorialiſt; and if I might indulge myſelf with ſcheming, I ſhould imagine that two ſuch were ſufficient, and only requiſite and proper; one at the back of Virginia, filling up the vacant ſpace between the Five Nations and ſouthern confederacy, and connecting, into a one ſyſtem, our barrier: The other ſomewhere in the Cohaſs on Connecticut river, or wherever beſt adapted to cover the four New England colonies. Theſe, with the little ſettlements mentioned above, in the Indian countries, compleats my idea of this branch.

The dominion then of the lakes being maintained by a *Britiſh navy* of armed veſſels, ſuited to the nature of the ſervice, according to a plan propoſed

poſed by your memorialiſt, in June 1754, to the commiſſioners met at Albany; which part of the general frontier is, according to that propoſal, by order from England, and at the expence of the crown, now carried into execution, compleats the whole of my idea of this frontier.

Theſe matters being thus propoſed, I do not at all enter into that point of their execution which is the duty of the military, as it is a matter in which the judgment of a civil man may not have its weight, nor into the manner of removing the French from their encroachments; yet I cannot but in general obſerve, that as the preſent military object of his Majeſty's ſervice in this country, is either to erect forts, or to demoliſh thoſe erected by the French on his Majeſty's lands; and as the way to all ſuch lies through woods and wilderneſſes, there is a proper ſphere of action peculiar to each, both for his Majeſty's regular troops, and for the provincial troops of the country. The provincial forces of theſe countries, as irregulars or light troops, can, the beſt of any forces in the world, eſcort his Majeſty's troops through theſe woods, to where their proper ſcene of action lies; they can alſo in the ſame manner hand up all their convoys, and would, I am perſuaded, ſhould any occaſion call for their ſervice, act with bravery and ſpirit: They are alſo fit for what may be properly called an expedition, ſome excurſion a la bruſque of ten or twenty days continuance: They ſhould therefore be employed either as a covering army, or kept with the regular army, in companies of light infantry, for eſcorts, ſcouring and ſcouting parties;

ties; while the regular troops, as a main body, marching by theſe means without being harraſſed, ſuſtain them; while his Majeſty's troops alone are fit for the various duties and ſervices of a continued regular campaign, and for the fatigues and perſeverance, and ſkill, neceſſary in a ſiege.

I muſt alſo obſerve, ſecondly, that this is not propoſed as a ſcheme to be executed all at once; but, as a general plan of operations, to be preſerved and attended to in the whole; to which every part of our meaſures, as they ſhall ariſe into action and come upon the field, are to be referred; to which, in all ſeaſons and at all occaſions, as from time to time ſuch ſhall offer or ſerve, our meaſures muſt be directed; and to which every individual, and every part, muſt conſpire and co operate to form a whole.

SECTION II.

THE ideas of the ſervice contained in the paper above, lead by fair conſequence to the following propoſition, that after the Engliſh had been repeatedly diſappointed in their attempts to penetrate the country, by the way of Crown-point and lake Champlain, and had loſt Oſwego and the command of the lake Ontario, conſidering the reaſon there was alſo to expect the defection of the Indians in conſequence of it, there remained no other alternative, but either to make peace, *or to change the object of the war*, by making a direct attack, up the river St. Lawrence, upon Quebec itſelf, urged to a total reduction of Canada. The writer of theſe papers came over to England in the latter end of the year 1756, to propoſe and ſtate theſe meaſures, nearly in the ſame form as was afterwards repeated by the paper that follows, particularly marking the neceſſity of two fleets, and two armies: One army deſtined for the attack; the other under orders to inveſt Canada, by taking poſt ſomewhere between Albany and Montreal, ſo as to cover the Engliſh colonies: One fleet to eſcort and convoy the army up the river St. Lawrence; and the other to cover and protect the ſea-line of the colonies. The object was adopted. Why nothing was done in the year 1757, and why no more was done in the

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year 1758, than the taking of Louiſbourg, will be explained on a future occaſion; the ideas contained in the following paper lead to the reſt.——

IDEA of the SERVICE in AMERICA, for the Year 1759.

BOSTON, December 5th, 1758.

IF the point diſputed between us and the French, be determinately and preciſely underſtood, the manner of conducting it may be ſoon fixed: If we are ſtill, as we were at the firſt breaking out of the war, diſputing about a boundary line, and for the poſſeſſion of ſuch poſts, communications and paſſes, as may be *a foundation* to our poſſeſſions *of a future dominion* in America, we are ſtill engaged in a petty ſkirmiſhing war: from the ſtate of which it was always plain, and experience now proves it, that we ſhall ever be inferior, and beaten by the French; for the French have long ago, by a continued ſyſtem of meaſures, been taking poſſeſſion of ſuch poſts as hath given them that foundation: They have already eſtabliſhed that which we muſt fight to eſtabliſh, inch by inch.

If we have changed the point, and brought it to its true iſſue, its natural criſis, whether we, as provinces of Great Britain, or Canada as the province of France, ſhall be ſuperior in America; then the ſervice to be done, is *a general invaſion*

of Canada, in conjunction with the European troops and fleet; then is our natural ſtrength employed, and we muſt conſequently be as naturally ſuperior.

This being fixed, the next point is, where the real attack muſt be made: the ſame reaſons that ſhow the neceſſity of ſuch a general attack, ſhow that it will *never effectually be carried on over land*; for, if it could, Canada might as effectually be deſtroyed, by the petty ſkirmiſhing war, for poſts, paſſes, &c. as by a general invaſion. But experience has now ſhown, what reaſon might have ſeen ſome time ago, that as the ſtate of the ſervice is circumſtanced between us and the French, that cannot be; the poſſeſſion which the enemy has of the poſts of ſtrength, the carrying places, paſſes, water communications, and roads, by forts, redoubts, and their Indians, would render the paſſage to Canada by land, the work of a campaign, even with ſucceſs; but finally alſo, the ſucceſs doubtful. The road to Quebec, up St. Lawrence river, we poſſeſs by *the ſuperiority of our marine navigation.* There is neither danger nor difficulty, nor do I ſee how there can be any oppoſition, to hinder the fleet getting up to the Iſle of Orleans; and a ſuperior army in poſſeſſion of that, may, by proper meaſures, command the reſt of the way to Quebec. If our army can once ſet down before Quebec, it muſt take it: If Quebec be taken, the capitulation may at leaſt ſtrip Canada of all the regulars, after which the inhabitants might poſſibly be induced to ſurrender.

If this attack be determined, the fleet of tranſports will be eſcorted up the river by the frigates, bombs, and other ſmall veſſels of war: *But while our forces are all up the river, a very ſtrong ſquadron ſeems neceſſary to cover the maritime parts of our own colonies.*

I am told, that many French veſſels proceed early in Spring, to the bay of Gaſpee, before the river St. Lawrence is navigable, and lie there till the river breaks up, then ſlip up without danger, when for ſome time it would be almoſt impoſſible to croſs the gulf; for as ſoon as the ice breaks up in the river, it is preſently clear; but the ice embayed in the gulf, ſwims about for a long time, and renders the navigation of that gulf extreamly dangerous, long after the river may be navigated with ſafety. If this fact be true, it ſeems neceſſary, that two or three of the ſhips of war ſhould proceed to Gaſpee, before the river St. Lawrence breaks up, in order to prevent any ſuccours being ſent up the river in Spring.

But although this attempt on Quebec, by way of St. Lawrence river, may be the only real, and will be the only effectual attack on Canada; yet one other, if not two falſe attacks will be neceſſary, one by way of lake Champlain; the other by way of lake Ontario. That by way of lake Champlain may, as far as Crown-point, be offenſive, and ſhould then change into a defenſive meaſure, by taking ſtrong poſt there, with a garriſon which will effectually check the enemy at that gate of the country, and from whence

continual ſcouting parties, to harraſs the ſettlements, and beat up the quarters of the enemy, ſhould be ſent down the lake. As there are now ſo many regiments at Albany, Sckenectady, fort Edward, and the poſts on the river, the taking fort Carillon, at Tieonderôga, and of conſequence fort St. Frederick, at Crown-point, might be effected with theſe, together with ſuch provincials as ſhall be thought neceſſary, (if not in winter) yet, before the time for embarking for St. Lawrence river approaches: and this time appears the more proper, as it may poſſibly be before the French can ſufficiently relieve it. The reaſon that makes me think that this ſhould be attempted is, that the poſſeſſion of this poſt is an effectual inveſting of Canada in that quarter: The reaſon why I think no more ſhould be attempted is, that it would prove unſucceſsful, and that all the labour and expence that is employed in the attempt, is loſt as ſoon as it is given over.

As we have now ſo good an entrepôt towards lake Ontario, as the fort at the Oneida carrying place, it is now in our power to attempt acting on that lake; the want of this rendered all attempts there before, abortive and unſupportable. An appearance of an attack on Canada by that way, muſt greatly alarm the enemy at Montreal; and, though I do verily believe we ſhall never ſucceed to make an effectual irruption that way, until Quebec be taken, yet as whatever ſhall be done on that lake towards ſuch an attempt, viz taking poſt at ſome part on the lake, and building veſſels, will have a collateral effect; even ſuppoſing the firſt to prove abortive, that will prove a

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moſt eſſential point of ſervice, namely, the gaining dominion of the navigation of the lake. So that ſhould nothing elſe be done, yet what is done, and what is ſpent, will not be thrown away; but remain a chief corner-ſtone in the foundation of the Britiſh dominion in America:—Beſides, if we remain, during the campaign, ſuperior in the lake, the enemies communication with their ſouthern poſts is cut off, their connection with the Indians of the Five Nations interrupted; and we may, in the courſe of chances, poſſibly take Niagara. This amphibious kind of ſervice ſeems adapted to the provincials, eſpecially thoſe of New York and Rhode Iſland, accuſtomed to privateering and batteauing: but theſe ſhould be ſupported by good garriſons of regulars, in ſuch poſts as may be found neceſſary to be taken at the entrepôt on the Oneida carrying place, and at the port it ſhall be found neceſſary to poſſeſs on the lake.

As to the number of regular troops neceſſary for the attack on Quebec, I have not preſumed to ſpeak, for I am no judge; but a number of provincials will certainly be neceſſary, and theſe ſuch as are uſed to the water, and marine navigation, for ſuch will be of the moſt eſſential ſervice in the paſſage of the army from the lower end of the Iſle of Orleans to Quebec, where moſt of the difficulty and danger will lie. Now for this ſervice, none can be ſo well adapted as the people of the province of Maſſachuſetts Bay, as they are all, in the ſouthern parts, whalers and fiſhermen. After the troops are landed near Quebec, numbers will be wanted, ſuch as are uſed to carrying heavy lumber and timber, &c. through the woods. Now for this

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ſervice, none can be ſo well adapted as the inhabitants of New Hampſhire, and the county of York, in the province of Maſſachuſetts Bay, who are ſo perfectly accuſtomed to the maſting ſervice, that is, fetching the great maſts down from the woods; beſides, the people of Maſſachuſetts in the counties of Hampſhire, Worceſter and York, are the beſt wood hunters in America; and would therefore, diſpoſed in proper outpoſts, be the beſt adapted to the keeping the camp before Quebec quiet from the enemies partizans and Indians, or perhaps in breaking up the enemies ſettlements in the country, while the regulars were taking their towns. For this purpoſe alſo, I ſhould think, if about a hundred thorough wood hunters, properly officered, could be obtained in the county of York, a ſcout of ſuch might make an attempt upon the ſettlements by way of Chaudier river. Such a ſcout, to the purpoſes of alarming and keeping the enemy in abeyance there, or perhaps breaking up the ſettlements, is practicable; and, I think, with early notice, ſuch a ſcout may be obtained.

Theſe are the ſervices our people are fitted for; and therefore, as far as relate to the people of the province his Majeſty has committed to my care, I can be poſitive, that if his Majeſty's General would have a real and effectual ſervice from them, they muſt be employed in ſuch. Take thoſe who live inland and carry them to ſea, or thoſe who have lived by the ſea, and march them through the woods, they will be uſeleſs and ſickly. Employ each in their proper element; let thoſe who are naturally connected with Hudſon's river,

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and acquainted with inland navigation, be employed up in the back country, and lakes to the weſtward; and thoſe who border on the ſea, and are uſed to marine navigation, be employed in the ſervice that goes by ſea to the eaſtward; and then for every ten men on paper, there will be ten men's real ſervice.

I have in this paper confined my idea to the invaſion of Canada, and the attacks on that country, and ſo have ſaid nothing of that very neceſſary ſervice, the erecting a fort at Penobſcot river, which on different occaſions I have before repeatedly expreſſed.

I have confined my idea to Canada, and have therefore ſaid nothing of fort Du Queſne; but if I had extended my idea to that part, I ſhould have endeavoured to conſider how far, or not, it might be practicable to break up the enemies ſettlements on the Ohio, and the Illinois country, founded on this opinion of Mr. Vaudreuil himſelf, in his letter to his court, when governor of Louiſiana, November 1748.——"It would be very eaſy for "the Engliſh, by means of the river Ohio, to "form an entrepôt at Prudehomme, to ſerve "them as a retreat, having the nations of the "Shawöaneſe, Cherokees and Chickaſaws on their "back and to ſupport them. From this entre-"pôt it would not be difficult to penetrate to the "Akanſaes, Panis, Oſagaes, Padouces, and "Miſſouris, and all the Ohio nations of that "country, if the poſts and ſettlements of the "Illinois were broken up, as they would cer-"tainly be, did the Engliſh ſettle and fortify

"at

" at Prudehomme; not only the inhabitants of " the Illinois would be loſt to us, but alſo the " inhabitants near New Orleans would be ſo " greatly diſtreſſed for want of the ſuccours and " proviſions of this country, *the granary to it*, " by the loſs of the trade with that poſt, that it " would be difficult for them to ſubſiſt, it would " be impoſſible to maintain the expence they " muſt live at without it, and they muſt be " obliged to abandon the colony: But ſhould " not matters be ſo bad as this, yet, were the " poſts of the Illinois taken away, the colony " would not be able to extend itſelf at furtheſt " beyond the poſt of the Natches, without a " very ſtrong garriſon at the poſt of Akanſaes, " and at beſt that poſt would be too low to *cover* " *the hunting ground.*"

I ſhould have extended my idea to an attempt by a Weſt India ſquadron, with troops raiſed in the iſlands on Mobile, for nothing would more embarraſs the enemy's Indian affairs in Louiſiana, than the taking this place, the grand rendezvous at all their treaties. For they ſupport a garriſon here; amongſt other reaſons, for this alſo, (as Mr. Vaudreuil, in one of his letters to the court, ſays) " to influence the Indians, as there are at our " meetings and treaties, held here annually with " the Indians, ſometimes 2, ſometimes 3,000 " Indians preſent."

I ſhould alſo have recommended the taking poſt at Ockfuſqué amongſt the Creeks, becauſe, ſays Mr. Vaudreuil, " If the meaſures of which " this might be a foundation, ſhould be properly

" carried into execution by the Engliſh, it would " oblige the French to retire from their fort at " Alibamôus down to the Mobile."

To the Right Honourable
Mr. Secretary Pitt.

The reader is here deſired to refer to the events of the year 1759 in America.

Quebec was taken by general Townſhend, the moment that the army was enabled to ſet down before it, by the greatly hazarded, and glorioufly ſucceſsful ſtroke of general Wolf.

The operations of the army under general Amherſt, could not, by all the ſkill and determined perſeverance of that excellent officer, be puſhed further than Crown-point, and there became defenſive by fortifying that point.

The operations up the Mohawks river, and on lake Ontario, were carried juſt to that effect which opened the way for the next campaign, 1760, when general Amherſt went that way to take poſſeſſion of Canada.

Amidſt theſe objects, I mention the taking poſſeſſion of the Penobſcot country, and the building a fort there by the governor of the Maſſachuſetts province, merely as it was propoſed in the paper above, and as the propoſal and execution of it was approved by the King and his miniſters at that time.

The

The whole fleet was taken up the river St. Lawrence, where, as general Wolf expreſly declares, it was a part of the force leaſt adapted to the object: The ſea-line of the colonies was left uncovered and open. If the French had had ſenſe enough to have ſent two ſhips of the line, with a frigate or two, and one or two bomb-ketches, they might have burnt Halifax, Boſton, New York, or Philadelphia, without interruption; or even if ſuch meaſure had not been carried to that degree of ſucceſs, they might have raiſed ſuch an alarm as ſhould have broken up ſome of our active, offenſive operations, in order to come to the defence of this ſea-line; and, perhaps, thus the whole of the operations of 1759, have been diſconcerted and defeated. To enquire why this was done, would at this time become a mere criticiſm, for as, by good luck, no ſuch accident happened, it is right that ſucceſs ſhould juſtify every meaſure.

To give reaſons why nothing was attempted towards the quarters of Louiſiana at that time, will be the ſolution of ſome future diſcuſſion.

FINIS
MVSEVM
BRITAN
NICVM